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The first two chapters are on the funding challenges and the value of infrastructure to
households and firms. Chapter 1 is titled “Do State Governments Defer Highway Main-
tenance Expenditures?”. Deferring maintenance expenditures in fiscal downturns can be
more costly than accumulating debt or cutting pension contributions. I take advantage of
the formulary distribution of Federal highway grants to examine the extent and context
of highway maintenance deferral. Since the formula factors used in the apportionment of
Federal highway grants are always three years old, I can measure exogenous grant shocks
as the difference between this year’s and previous year’s forecast of each state’s future
grants. I show that state governments respond to a negative grant shock by cutting highway
maintenance expenditures more rapidly than other expenditures. The Impulse Response
Functions (IRFs) of maintenance expenditures as a share of total expenditures show that
states only partially compensate for the initial cuts in the subsequent periods – deferring
maintenance expenditures and accumulating maintenance needs. Furthermore, I find that
deferral of maintenance expenditures is more pronounced in election years, which suggests
that this inefficient behavior is subject to agency problems.
In Chapter 2, titled “Valuing Public Goods More Generally: The Case of Infrastructure”,
David Albouy and I examine the relationship between local public goods, prices, wages,
and population in an equilibrium inter-city model. Non-traded production, federal taxes,
and imperfect mobility all affect how public goods (or “amenities” more broadly) should
be valued from data. Reinterpreting the estimated effects of public infrastructure on prices
and wages in Haughwout (2002), we find infrastructure over twice as valuable with our
more general model. New estimates based on more years, cities, and data-sets indicate
stronger wage and positive population effects of infrastructure. These imply higher values
of infrastructure to firms, and also to households if moving costs are substantial.
Finally, chapter 3, titled “Imputing Missing Tax Variables for TAXSIM: Nonlinear-
ity Matters”, is a technical paper on improving income tax rate estimates using NBER
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TAXSIM. Many researchers estimate household income taxes for using the limited house-
hold characteristics of survey participants. I show that as a result of missing tax form fields,
which are typically entered as zeros, the estimated income taxes are biased. This bias is
not only in the form of shifting the distribution of taxes, but also changes the shape of
the distribution depending on which tax field is missing. Experimenting with a naively
specified linear regression model, the zero-imputed marginal tax estimates are actually
performing almost always better than regression-imputed tax outcomes. However, when
four TAXSIM variables are simultaneously missing, regression-imputation is outperform-
ing zero-imputation for total taxes. Finally, imputing multiple TAXSIM variables in a
replication example shows that the final empirical findings change dramatically.
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To my dear wife and my mother.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my committee chair Professor David Al-
bouy. Without his guidance, this dissertation would not have been possible. His unyielding
excitement about research in the fields of urban and public economics continues to inspire
me. I learned some of the most valuable lessons meeting every week and fixating on every
little detail of our joint project.
I would like to also thank my committee members, Professor Jeffrey Brown and Profes-
sor Daniel McMillen whose exemplary work I strive to follow throughout my career. Their
insightful comments and feedback were invaluable in redefining my own work.
Professor Tatyana Deryugina was my not only one of my committee members, but I
also worked with her as research and teaching assistant during my studies at University of
Illinois. Working with her has been an invaluable part of my PhD education. Also, getting
to know her has been an absolute delight. I would like give her my special thanks for her
generous mentorship and encouragement throughout my research.
Professor Firouz Gahvari is responsible for so much of my knowledge and interest in
public economics. I would like to thank him for his engaging lectures and always following
up on my progress. I’d like to also thank Professor Dan Bernhardt for providing me with
his frank and timely advice on research and more.
In addition, a thank you to Sylvain Leduc, Daniel Wilson, Alexander M. Gelber, and
Joshua Mitchell is in order for so generously sharing their data and programs which were
used in this dissertation. I also thank the University of Illinois, Professor Roger Koenker,
and the NBER for sharing their computational facilities to conduct my doctorate research. I
also thank the participants in the annual meetings of National Tax Association also provided
invaluable feedback on my work.
I would like to also thank my friends. Among others, my friends Sepideh Rezvani,
Joseph Grohens, Chantelle Hougland, and John Schneider made Champaign-Urbana a
sweet place to live. I am thankful to my classmates for making the economics department
v
feel like home. I shared many laughs and engaging discussions with Luiz Felipe Amaral,
Bing Zuo, Cong Zhang, Atul Nepal, and Joao Bernardo Duarte and others who were much
more than classmates. Without the support and understanding of Professor George Deltas,
I could not have continued my PhD journey. I’d like to sincerely thank him for being a
friend.
Last, but not least, my most sincere thanks go to my spouse, Maryam Ghaseri, and my
mother, Maryam Sharifi who are my symbols of strength. They sacrificed so much to give
me their relentless support and encouragement.
Any mistakes are my own.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER 1 DO STATE GOVERNMENTS DEFER HIGHWAY MAINTE-
NANCE EXPENDITURES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Institutional Design of Highway Infrastructure Spending . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Empirical Model & Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Deferring Maintenance Expenditures and Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
CHAPTER 2 VALUING PUBLIC GOODS MORE GENERALLY: THE CASE
OF INFRASTRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Previous Literature and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 Prices and Amenities in Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Price Effects of Amenities with Home Goods and Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5 Population and Price Changes with Imperfect Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.6 Simulated Impact of Public Goods on Prices and Populations . . . . . . . . 52
2.7 Inferring Values with Limited Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.8 The Value of Urban Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
CHAPTER 3 IMPUTING MISSING TAX VARIABLES FOR TAXSIM: NON-
LINEARITY MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Evaluation Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4 Evaluation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5 Empirical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
vii
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
APPENDIX A APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.1 Replicating Leduc and Wilson (2013) and FHWA(2005) . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.2 Balanced Budget Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3 Robustness Checks for within-fiscal-year effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.4 Magnitude of Deferral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.5 Anticipated Changes versus Unanticipated Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.6 Impulse Response Functions for Levels and Per Capita Outcomes . . . . . 106
A.7 Study of Heterogeneity in IRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.8 First Order Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
APPENDIX B APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B.1 Additional Proofs and Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B.2 Theoretical Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
B.3 Parameterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.4 Data and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B.5 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
B.6 Supplementary Results and Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
APPENDIX C APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
C.1 Supplemental Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
C.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
viii
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Summary Statistics on Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Within-Fiscal-Year Response of different state and local outcomes to grant shocks . . . . 18
2.1 Model Parameters and Possible Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2 Simulated Effect of Attributes on Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Inferred Amenity Values from Prices and Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4 The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on the Original Haughwout Estimates . . . . . 62
2.5 The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on New Price Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6 The Value of Public Infrastructure with Price and Population Estimates . . . . . . . . . 65
3.1 Summary Statistics for Tax Variables in SOI and CPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2 Predictability of Income Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.3 Zero-valued percentage of SOI variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4 Original versus Missing Variable R-Squareds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Regression- vs. Zero-Imputed TAXSIM inputs: Federal Tax Outputs . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6 Regression- vs. Zero-Imputed TAXSIM inputs: State Tax Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7 Performance of CPS Imputation in SOI Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.8 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.9 Summary statistics on Gelber and Mitchell (2012) tax estimates before and after im-
puting TAXSIM variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.1 Budget Rules and Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.2 Budget Stabilization Funds from Wagner and Elder (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.3 Robustness Check I: Response of different outcomes to concurrent grant shocks with
state specific trends and lags of GDP and total expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.4 Response of different outcomes to shock in the current period . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.5 Cumulative Response of Per Capita Maintenance to Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.1 List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
B.2 Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.3 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B.4 Component shares of investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
ix
B.5 The relationship between Infrastructure Stocks and Commuting time . . . . . . . . . . 141
B.6 Central City and Suburban Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.7 City Exclusion Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
x
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Impulse Response Functions for different outcomes relative to total expenditure. . . . . . 20
1.2 IRF of Maintenance with Capital and General Budget Borrowing Restrictions . . . . . . 23
1.3 IRF of Capital Outlays with Capital and General Budget Borrowing Restrictions . . . . . 24
1.4 IRF of Maintenance with Political Indicator Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5 IRF of Capital Outlays with Political Indicator Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Nonlinear relationship between federal tax estimates for zero-imputed and regression-
imputed tax variables in CPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 Scatter plot of average net-of-tax rate estimates of Gelber and Mitchell (2012) before
and after imputing TAXSIM variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3 Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients versus TAXSIM Imputed
Coefficients by color-coded by dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients versus TAXSIM Imputed
Coefficients by color-coded by empirical specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.1 Federal Highway Administration versus my 2009 Grants Forecasts to States as of 2005 . . 93
A.2 Unanticipated changes in expected present value of highway grants in selected states . . . 95
A.3 IRF of GDP per Capita with my vs. LW shock estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.4 LW vs. my Highway Grant Shocks (1993-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.5 LW vs. my Highway Grant Shocks over time (1993-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.6 Per Capita Maintenance IRFs in response to Anticipated Changes and Unanticipated Shocks105
A.7 Impulse Response Functions for different outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.8 Impulse Response Functions for different outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.9 Impulse Response Functions with May Not Carry Over Debt to Next Fiscal Year Requirement108
A.10 IRFs of outcomes (expenditure share) with Budget Stabilization Fund Size . . . . . . . 109
A.11 Impulse Response Functions with Referendum Debt Approval Requirement . . . . . . . 110
A.12 Impulse Response Functions with Governors’ Election Year interactions (when gov-
ernor is not a lame duck) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.13 Impulse Response Functions with Government Partisanship Indicators . . . . . . . . . 112
A.14 Level and Interaction Effect of House Election Years (not controlling for year fixed effects) 113
B.1 Price, Wage, Population and Infrastructure Values for the Four Largest Central Cities . . . 143
xi
C.1 Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients with 95% confidence bands
versus TAXSIM Imputed Coefficients by color-coded by dependent variable . . . . . . . 145
xii
CHAPTER 1
DO STATE GOVERNMENTS DEFER HIGHWAY
MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES?
1.1 Introduction
When governments receive a negative revenue shock, it is in the public interest that they
use borrowing to smooth taxes and expenditures1. However, because voters are concerned
that politicians accumulate too much debt, various balanced budget requirements limit the
ability of governments to borrow. It is a legitimate concern that the same politicians may
accumulate maintenance needs in fiscal downturns. This behavior may be enhanced by the
same forces that prevent accumulation of debt, yet accumulating maintenance needs may
be even more costly than accumulating debt. For example, Hicks et al. (1999) find that in
some cases delaying pavement maintenance for four years could cost up to five times more
than performing the proper maintenance.
Do we need to regulate governments expenditures on infrastructure2? As critical as the
deferral of maintenance expenditures might be, there are very few papers that have studied
governments’ maintenance expenditure. This is largely due to lack of data3. However,
such regulation may receive popular support. For example, in 2016 elections, 79% of
Illinois voters supported the Transportation Lockbox ballot, which blocks lawmakers from
spending transportation funds on anything other than transportation.
This paper provides evidence on the dynamic response of state highway expenditures and
1See Barro (1979); Aiyagari et al. (2002); Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994); Buttner and Wildasin (2010) are a
few papers among many that have established this result.
2Governments can also cut pension fund contributions (Chaney et al., 2002; Giertz and Papke, 2007)
or sell public assets and engage in accounting gimmicks like inter-temporal shifting of expenses to meet
balanced budget requirements (Costello et al., 2012). Enforcement of annual required contributions (ARC)
is an example of such regulation in the case of pensions.
3For example, in the US, maintenance expenditure is aggregated into total current expenditures Survey
of Government Finances, and Survey of School District Finances only includes “Operation and Mainte-
nance”. Recently available aggregate maintenance data for Canada has been used in Kalaitzidakis and Ka-
lyvitis (2004) and Albonico et al. (2011) which study the macroeconomics of maintenance expenditure.
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borrowing to unanticipated revenue shocks in different political and institutional environ-
ments. I first provide an empirical analysis using a rich and novel dataset on state highway
finances including maintenance, capital outlays, other expenditures, and borrowing. I fo-
cus on highways because Federal Highway Administration uniquely provides consistent
data on maintenance expenditures and because the institutional design of federal grants en-
ables me to identify shocks to state highway revenue. Particularly, I rely on formula based
distribution of grants to construct unanticipated shocks. The state-specific factors used in
these formulas are often unrelated to other economic conditions and are also lagged several
years. Therefore, formula grants provide states with an exogenous source of revenue which
is not related to current economic conditions or highway needs4.
I am able to construct grant shocks because these grants are partially forecastable. State
governments know national levels of grants and apportionment formulas in a typical year,
but they update their information about expected formula factors every year. I use the
same forecast methodology that Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) used in 2005
for the 2005-2009 highway act (Young, 2005), and extend it for years beyond current high-
way bill by assuming that level of national grants grow at expected inflation rate5. Using
these forecasts, I construct the unanticipated highway grant shocks as the difference in the
expected present value of federal grants. Federal grants compose a quarter of state high-
way revenues, they can flexibility be used for different purposes and over time. Therefore,
studying governments’ response to these exogenous grant shocks is highly relevant.
I compile state and local government highway finance data for 50 state governments
from the annual reports of 1992-2013. FHWA reporting guidelines assure the consistency
and accuracy of these data that are reported by the state governments (FHWA, 2016). Ac-
cording to these guidelines, capital outlay includes additions, alterations, and replacements
to the existing roads and structures, but does not include repair expenditures. On the other
hand, general maintenance does not include improvements, additions and betterments, or
resurfacing, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction expenditures (3R/4R). However,
in this dataset, preventative maintenance is not differentiated from critical maintenance.
Using the panel dataset of state governments, I am able to study both within-fiscal-
year and dynamic response of state highway administrations to unanticipated federal grant
shocks. I use the methodology of Jordà (2005) to study impulse response functions of
4Leduc and Wilson (2013) use this strategy to study the dynamic macroeconomic effect of infrastructure
investment. Kraay (2012) uses the fact that spending on World Bank-financed projects is determined by
project approval decisions made in previous years to study the multiplier effect in developing countries.
5I follow the methodology of Leduc and Wilson (2013) to create grant shocks.
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different variables with respect to shocks. Furthermore, I control for state and year fixed
effects. Therefore, my results are not an artifact of factors that affect all states at the na-
tional level, or the fixed underlying characteristics of the state governments or economies.
In addition to studying the real and per capita expenditures, I investigate the effect of grant
shocks on ratios of these expenditures to total expenditure. Therefore, I can study which
expenditures win the budget battle.
I find that maintenance expenditure is the most responsive category of highway expen-
ditures. Furthermore, the U-shaped Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for maintenance
show that state governments increase maintenance expenditures in the period that they re-
ceive a negative shock, and subsequently increase maintenance in later periods. This find-
ing confirms that state governments defer maintenance expenditures in response to bud-
getary shocks, and is robustly found for maintenance share of total expenditure and per
capita maintenance expenditure. I calculate that this behavior is inefficient because later
increases in maintenance expenditure do not make up for the initial response to the negative
shock even if I assume a small annual 5% additional cost of deferring maintenance.
I use the interaction of grant shocks with balanced budget requirement and budget stabi-
lization fund indicators to study whether governments’ responses are heterogeneous with
respect to borrowing constraints. I find that the deferral of maintenance expenditures is
slightly more pronounced for states that may not carry over a deficit to next fiscal year or
require referendum debt approval for capital projects. The former is the most stringent one
on state general budget. Using the ACIR stringency index (ACIR, 1987), which is an index
of all the balanced budget requirements, I find the same result.
Furthermore, I find that the response of maintenance to unanticipated shocks is subject
to the political power. If government receives a negative shock and next year is house
elections, the within-fiscal-year maintenance effects are even more pronounced. In addi-
tion, the U-shaped response of maintenance expenditure is clearly less pronounced when
political power is divided between the legislature and governorship. Both of these findings
suggest that the deferral and accumulation of maintenance needs are not simply explained
by voters choices.
Borrowing increases when states receive a positive shock. Therefore, states are using
highway borrowing to fund their projects rather than using it to smooth their expenditures.
Consistent with my findings about deferral of maintenance expenditures, this suggests that
they do not have access to borrowing as an instrument to smooth other expenditures.
My empirical analysis of maintenance expenditures is most closely related to three pa-
3
pers that study the correlation between fiscal and political variables and governments’
maintenance expenditure. Borge and Hopland (2015) use the post-2008 Norwegian local
government expenditure data to study the correlation between fiscal and political indica-
tors and maintenance expenditure. They show that low levels of maintenance and poor
building conditions are associated with low fiscal capacity, and fiscal stress; and a high
degree of party fragmentation is associated with low levels of maintenance and poor build-
ing conditions6. Bumgarner et al. (1991) find that municipal governments cut maintenance
expenditures in fiscal distress to fund other expenditures in a cross-section of 47 cities. Fi-
nally, a very recent paper by Can Chen (2016) uses the model of Bumgarner et al. (1991)
to study how highway expenditures respond to state governments’ general budget deficit
and economic variables. The most pronounced finding of the paper is that capital outlays
go down in fiscal and economic downturns. However, maintenance expenditures respond
to fiscal stress with lags7.
I do not find that unanticipated highway grant shocks drive up the total per capita expen-
diture significantly. Therefore, these shocks mostly affect the composition of expenditures.
It must be that the shocks are crowding out states’ contributions to highway revenues from
other sources. However, in response to shocks, states reallocate their resources from one
task to another8. These observations, alongside smaller and delayed effects on capital out-
lays, sheds light on how we should interpret the results of Leduc and Wilson (2013). While
in Leduc and Wilsons framework capital outlays are responsible for the response of GDP,
maintenance expenditures seem to be the main player here. The qualitative response of
GDP to shocks is similar to maintenance expenditures. The response is positive, then neg-
ative, and finally positive again. Capital outlays do not follow the same pattern. Therefore,
the government expenditure multipliers estimated by LW do not solely capture the response
to capital expenditures.
This paper also contributes to the literature on capital expenditures’ response to the fis-
cal crisis (Poterba, 1995, 1994). Although capital outlays respond to unanticipated shocks
after two periods, I find that unexpected grant shocks are not spent on capital outlays more
than any other highway expenditures. Surprisingly, I also find that states with the stringent
requirements on general budget respond to shocks by reducing capital outlays in favor of
6Also, Gyourko and Tracy (2006) study whether consumers defer maintenance expenditures when they
receive revenue shocks. They use American Housing Survey and find small effects.
7All three papers address the endogeneity of fiscal stress variable is by controlling for different variables,
while this paper identifies the effects using exogenous and unanticipated shocks.
8One other possible reason for this finding may be that states may not easily adjust their labor force.
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other current expenditures. This may be the result of states with general budget constraints
constantly underfunding current expenditures. Therefore, they prefer to spend unantici-
pated shocks on these projects. The fact that we see the same effect in per capita figures is
consistent with the finding that total expenditures do not increase and states just reallocated
their resources to different uses. On the other hand, the referendum debt approval results go
in the expected direction. Governments with referendum debt approval requirements rely
more heavily on grant shocks to fund their capital expenditures. I find that they respond
more strongly to unanticipated grant shocks.
Theoretically, it would be optimal for governments to absorb the transitory shocks using
borrowing whether the source of revenue uncertainty is volatile tax bases, economic uncer-
tainty, or federal grant shocks. The optimal borrowing literature (Barro (1979), Aiyagari
et al. (2002), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994)) suggests that through borrowing, tax and expen-
diture smoothing achieves the maximum social welfare. This may not necessarily be the
behavior of the short-sighted politicians. Therefore, a lot of governments have established
institutions to that hinder free borrowing. While these measures achieve balanced budgets
(Bohn and Inman, 1996; Poterba, 1996), under borrowing constraints, governments should
optimally form rainy day funds, and still they should forgo tax and expenditure smoothing
(Buttner and Wildasin, 2010).
Finally, I discuss that the deferral of maintenance expenditure is not necessarily an in-
efficient borrowing tool. I employ a dynamic model of a government that chooses critical
maintenance, preventative maintenance, and investment to maximize social welfare. Ab-
stracting from the choice of optimal long term infrastructure levels, I impose that govern-
ments may have preferences for smoothing the services provided by public infrastructure. I
allow for heterogeneous preferences for smoothing through model parameters. These fea-
tures of the model, are similar to but a more general form of the existing models of optimal
borrowing9, but my model includes government expenditure (similar to Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1994); Buttner and Wildasin (2010)). Since my model is to describe the behavior of high-
way administrations in response to shocks, governments revenues include such shocks in
my model. Furthermore, governments may face borrowing constraints.
I show that if the ratio of depreciation return to preventative relative and critical main-
tenance is small enough (compared to consumers discount rate), a government should opt
to use maintenance deferral as a borrowing tool. Anecdotally, this condition is not often
9This theoretical literature originates in Barro (1979). The empirical papers after Sahasakul (1986) include
Bohn (1998), and Bohn (2007).
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met. I discuss that this may be true for a subset of highway projects, but further research is
required to create these measures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background
information about the Federal-Aid Highway Program and describes how federal highway
grants are distributed among states. Furthermore, this section discusses the institutional
design and data, and the methodology used to construct the exogenous shocks. In this
section, I describe how I construct the highway grant shocks and flexibility of states for
using the funds across programs and over time. My empirical methodology and data are
described in 1.3. In section 1.3.3, I discuss the main empirical findings, including the role
of political and institutional environment. I present my theoretical model in section 1.4,
and the last section concludes.
1.2 Institutional Design of Highway Infrastructure Spending
The institutional design of Federal-Aid Highway Program allows me to identify expen-
diture and borrowing patterns using exogenous shocks. Because the distribution of such
grants follows strict formulary rules based on three-year-old data on various factors, there
is little concern about the endogeneity of these shocks with respect to current economics or
budgetary conditions of the states. Highway bills are designed to facilitate long term plan-
ning which provides the perfect context to study how states maintain steady expenditures.
Furthermore, states can quite easily reallocate the grant funds from one grant category to
another which makes it relevant to study their choices. Finally, Federal Highway Statistics
cover standardized and detailed information on state highway finances which allows me to
study the composition of expenditures over time. In this section, I provide more details on
these features after providing the necessary background information.
The Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP) is a collection of grant programs that pro-
vide funding to the states. The national level for each program and the distribution for-
mulas are periodically authorized by the Congress through multiyear legislation. The four
acts since 1990 are the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) in 1991,
covering Fiscal years 1992-97, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21) in 1998, covering Fiscal years 1998-2003; the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) in 2005, covering Fiscal
years 2005-09, and Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) in 2012,
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covering fiscal years 2013-14. The years in between those covered by the acts above were
covered using the so-called stop-gap funding bills which typically extend the funding for
existing programs. Fiscal years 2004, and 2010-12 are such examples.
The FAHP programs cover well beyond interstate highways and help construction, main-
tenance, and other functions. For example, MAP21 included 19 different federal aid pro-
grams totaling $40.6 trillion in 2014. Furthermore, under all acts, local roads are often
considered federal-aid highways, their construction and maintenance would be eligible for
such grants. However, the federal government will not cover the full cost of projects. Under
FAHP, states get reimbursed for 80 to 90 percent of the cost of eligible projects depending
on the program. Therefore, all FAHP grants are categorized as matching grants.
1.2.1 Different Mechanisms for Distribution of Grants
The institutional structure of the distribution of highway grants allows the states to form
forecasts about future grants for long term planning and enables me to construct shocks to
explore exogenous variation in state highway revenue. Each highway bill authorizes total
available funds at the national level for each program and each year and sets the apportion-
ment formulas that regulate the distribution of each program between states. For example,
for 2009, SAFETEA-LU authorizes $1.29 billion for Highway Safety Improvement Pro-
gram (HSIP). Furthermore, the same authorization act specifies that HSIP funds are to be
distributed according to total lane miles of Federal-aid highways, total vehicle miles trav-
eled on Federal-aid highways and the number of fatalities on the National Highway system
with equal weights. At the same time, each state should receive at least 1/2% of total HSIP
funds.
A key feature of the highway bills for our analysis is that the mix of the main programs
and the apportionment formulas have remained mostly unchanged over consecutive autho-
rization acts. This enables the states to forecast future apportionments that even beyond
the current highway bill for long term planning. I explain how these forecasts are built and
how I used them in section 1.2.3 below.
In addition to formulary apportionments described above, Highway bills include two
other noteworthy features: minimum guarantee and earmarked funds. However, these fea-
tures do not undermine my identification strategy. According to the legislation since 1982,
states receive a guaranteed minimum return on their fuel, tire, and truck-related tax contri-
bution to the Highway Trust Fund. During 1992-2014, the minimum guarantee has ranged
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from 90 to 92 percent of states’ contributions to the HTF. This provision becomes effec-
tive if the formulary apportionments are less than the minimum guarantee amount for a
state. In that case, the difference between the minimum guarantee and state’s total grants
is distributed to the state programs according to their shares of total grants. However, since
minimum guarantees are separately authorized in the bill, the distribution of funds to other
states remains unaffected and follows the formulary apportionments. So, this feature does
not undermine forecasting highway apportionments.
Funds that are earmarked for certain projects are also contained in highway bills. The
share of such funds in the highway bills has changed from one act to another, but these
allocations essentially work parallel to the formulary apportionments. Although these ear-
marked allocations are clearly influenced by political factors, formulas and authorization
mix have experienced little change over time. Hence, earmarked funds are to a large extent
orthogonal to formulary apportionments, and do not introduce additional difficulties for my
forecasts.
1.2.2 Planning Process and Reallocation of Grants
States have ample time to plan how they spend grant funds. In particular, they have four
years to obligate the funds from a given year of grants, and the funds are released to the
states during the course of or the completion of the projects. The process underlying these
lags is well detailed in FHWA (2007) and the timing of obligations is studied in Leduc
and Wilson (2013). After apportionment of grants, states write contracts with vendors,
obligating funds from current and past grants. During the course of or after completion of
projects, the contractors’ bills are submitted to the FHWA by the state. FHWA instructs
the US treasury to transfer funds to the states using which they pay the contractors. This is
only when the funds show up in highway statistics as expenditures.
Accordingly, grants may not necessarily have an immediate impact on expenditures.
That said, Leduc and Wilson (2013) show that about 75% of grants show up as outlays
within the first three years, 65% of which happens during the first two years. However,
it is noteworthy that the whole process from grants to outlays can take up to seven years.
Therefore, I study of longer term implications of grant shocks as well.
The funds from each program can flexibly be used for a variety of projects. For ex-
ample, Interstate Maintenance funds are not intended for only maintenance. According
to FHWA guidelines, these funds can be used for resurfacing, restoration, rehabilitation,
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and reconstruction; the reconstruction or new construction of bridges, interchanges, and
over crossings along existing Interstate routes; capital costs for operational, safety, traf-
fic management, or intelligent transportation systems (ITS) improvements; and preventive
maintenance. Most of these categories are in fact categorized as capital outlays.
Furthermore, grants do not only affect the expenditure of their specific program. In fact,
all expenditure categories of state governments are affected in two ways by FHWA funds
apportioned to specific programs. The indirect channel works through freeing up the other
state funds for all expenditures when, for example, grants for constructing new projects are
apportioned to the state. This is the spillover effect which works by substituting of own
funds with grant funds.
Furthermore, states can explicitly transfer funds across Federal-Aid Highway programs.
States have the flexibility to reallocate grants from one program to another. A state may
transfer up to 50 percent of the states’ apportionment in any fiscal year to its apportionment
of National Highway System or Surface Transportation Program. The same transfer can
be done from any program to another, but for up to 40 percent of funds. Furthermore, if a
transfer is requested by the State transportation department and is approved by the Secretary
as being in the public interest, the Secretary may approve the transfer of 100 percent of the
apportionment under one such program to the apportionment under any other one. (23
U.S.C. 104 - Apportionments, 2006)
1.2.3 Constructing Grant Shocks
In this section, I measure highway grant shocks using the data on authorizations and actual
apportionments. At the beginning of each period, governments know the national autho-
rization and apportionment formulas for the current and future periods that are on the same
highway bill. Furthermore, they know the values of the formula factors for the current
period. However, they do not know the values of formula factors in future periods. As
a result, highway grants are partially forecastable. I build the measures of unanticipated
shock using the forecast errors in a very similar fashion to Leduc and Wilson (2013) that in
turn extend the forecast methodology of FHWA office Young (2005).
The forecasts are made by assuming that for each of the grant programs states’ formula
factors, relative to national levels, remain the same as current period levels over the forecast
period. This effectively implies that the grant share of state will remain the same as the
current share for the future periods. As a result, forecasts of future apportionments for
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each program are given by the current share of each state for that program funds multiplied
by the national level of authorizations in the future, which is known for the future periods
in the current highway bill. This methodology is used by FHWA(2005), and Leduc and
Wilson (2013) extend it by assuming that authorizations for the periods beyond the current
highway bill grow at the expected inflation rate and the formulas remain the same10. For
each state, I use the same method to form the forecasts for each program, and sum up the
future forecast of all highway programs to calculate total grant forecast.
Using future forecasts, I measure shocks to grant expectations as the difference between
current forecast and last year’s forecast of future highway grants. First, I write the expected












where Et[Gj,t+s] is the time t forecast of the total grants for year t + s in state j, and
βt = (1 + π
e
t )/(1 + rt). The second term on the right hand side reflects that beyond
five years, grants are assumed to grow at the expected inflation rate. I use the ten-year
trailing average of the ten-year Treasury bond rate as of the beginning of the fiscal year t
as the discount rate rt. The expected inflation rate, πet is measured using the median five or
ten year ahead inflation forecast for the first quarter of the fiscal year from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters (SPF)11.
Finally, I construct the measure of unanticipated grant shocks as the difference between
this year’s expected grants and that of the previous year. To be comparable across states, I
turn these dollar values to percentage terms using the symmetric percentage formula:
shockt =
Et[PVj,t]− Et−1[PVj,t]
0.5× (Et[PVj,t] + Et−1[PVj,t])
(1.2)
When the unanticipated shocks deal with forecasts within the same highway bill, they
are the result of changes in the formula factors. These changes are amplified by the weights
of different highway programs in the later years because I am calculating the present value
of future grants. For example, an update from last year that vehicle miles traveled on the
10I am able to closely replicate the highway grant forecasts of both and shock measures of the former (See
Appendix A.1)
11These measures are chosen to reflect the long term trends in inflation and interest rates. To facilitate
replicating Leduc and Wilson (2013), I use exactly their measures.
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Interstate System is larger than last year will have a larger impact if future highway autho-
rizations for the Interstate Maintenance program are to be larger than this year. Further-
more, compared to the shock measures calculated using one-period-ahead forecasts, these
measures are more successful at reflecting forecast of the longer horizons. This feature is
critical for highway expenditures that may require longer term planning.
When the shocks are built for years that cover two different highway bills, they also
reflect the changes in expectations of national authorizations. However large these changes
may be, they affect all state governments. Because I control for year fixed effects in my
regressions, my main results are not identified by such changes.
It is also critical for my identification strategy that the formula factors are lagged three
years, since real time information is not readily available to the FHWA. Although some
formula factors are exogenous to economic activity and other revenue generating process
of the highway administration, others, such as payments into the HTF, are not. Using three
year old data by the highway administration mitigates concerns about contemporaneous
movements of formula factors and other revenue generating processes.
1.3 Empirical Model & Data
In this section, I present an empirical model to evaluate how the levels and composition
of different expenditures, revenue, and borrowing respond to unanticipated grant shocks.
Then, I discuss the different data sources that I use to conduct this study.
1.3.1 Empirical Framework
I use the constructed measure of highway grant shocks to study how governments real-
locate their expenditure in response to unanticipated fluctuations in revenues. My basic
specification is:
yj,t = βshockjt +X ′jtζ + γj + δt + εjt (1.3)
As I discuss below, yj,t is a measure of state taxes, borrowing, or expenditure for year t, and
shockjt is the grant shock defined before. Xjt represents other control variables which are
included for robustness checks. In different specifications, Xjt includes factors that may
affect maintenance needs or factors that may offer any additional forecastablity of grant
shocks. Finally, γj and δt are the state and year fixed effects, and εjt is the error term.
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To focus on the expenditure composition effect of the grant shocks I can measure bor-
rowing, maintenance expenditure, and capital outlay as shares of total highway expenditure.
Using this strategy, I am measuring which payments lose the budgetary battle between dif-
ferent expenditures. In other words, I can measure which expenditures are the easy targets.
We already expect that higher grants lead to higher expenditure. Therefore, I use this model
to measure which payments respond to a higher extent. However, I measure state gasoline
taxes as dollars per gallon.
As mentioned earlier, the response of governments to shocks may not be limited to the
current period. To assess the dynamics of such response, I can simply run the model in
equation 1.3 for different horizons. Effectively, by separately estimating the equations
below, I can estimate impulse response functions (IRFs) in a panel data setting (Jordà,
2005). Formally, I estimate
yj,t+h = β
hshockjt +X ′jtζ
h + γhj + δ
h
t + εj,t+h (1.4)
where I am repeatedly estimating the same equation in (1.3) for different horizons, h. Re-
cently Leduc and Wilson (2013), and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) used this direct
projection estimator to estimate the dynamic effect of government spending in panel data
settings. According to Jordà (2005), direct projections are more robust to misspecification,
such as too few lags in the model or omitted endogenous variables, than vector autoregres-
sion (VAR). More importantly, this method easily accommodates IRF confidence intervals
that are robust to clustering and heteroscedasticity whereas VAR based IRFs must be com-
puted using delta method or bootstrapping. Finally, it is easy to extend direct projection
method to study asymmetric effects such as different responses to positive and negative
shocks.
As state governments operate in different economic, political, and institutional environ-
ments, we expect heterogeneous effects with respect to these factors. For example, credit
constrained governments may use the deferral of maintenance expenditures to respond to
unanticipated shocks, or spend their unanticipated revenue on the underfunded capital out-
lays. To assess this, I estimate the differential effect of highway shocks on states with


















j × shockjtX ′jtζh + γhj + δht + εj,t+h (1.6)
where VIkj,t+h and FI
k
j are time varying and fixed political and institutional indicators such
as Balanced Budget Stringency measures and state partisanship indicators. These indicators
are discussed in more details in the data section.
1.3.2 Data
My primary response variables are maintenance expenditures, capital outlays, taxes, and
borrowing for state and local highways from 1993 to 201312. These data are drawn from
the annual tables of Highway Statistics, published by FHWA. These measures and total
expenditures are separately reported for state and local governments. I use these measures
in real dollars at levels, per capita, and as shares of total expenditure.
The collection process of Federal highway statistics guarantees consistency and detailed
level data over time. Federal legislation and policy require highway data from the states for
FHWA for Congress and other interested entities. Therefore, each year, FHWA receives
detailed data on fuel, vehicle, road conditions, and highway finances directly from the
states. FHWA, in turn, audits the data for reasonableness, completeness, consistency, and
compliance with data reporting guidelines and publishes the data in different tables which
are also available online.
FHWA reporting guidelines carefully differentiate between maintenance and capital out-
lays. Capital outlay includes additions, alterations, and replacements to the existing roads
and structures, but does not include repair expenditures. The term maintenance is defined
as the function of preserving and keeping the entire highway, including surface, shoulders,
roadsides, structures, and traffic control devices, as close as possible to the original condi-
tion as designed and constructed. Maintenance also includes preventive maintenance activ-
ities. These activities extend pavement and bridge service life to at least achieve the design
12Although state governments are the ones that receive the federal grants, the expenditures by state and
local governments may be substitutes or complements to each other. Furthermore, states may have differ-
ent jurisdictional divisions for state and local roads responsibilities. Therefore, I use total expenditure and
borrowing by state and local governments as my main measures.
13
life of the facility. Preventive maintenance involves programs that delay or eliminate the
necessity for future resurfacing, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of the roads
or structures. On the other hand, general maintenance does not include improvements,
additions and betterments, or resurfacing, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction
expenditures (3R/4R) which should be recorded as capital outlays13.
Therefore, FHWA statistics provide high quality data on three pieces of information: 1)
Grant authorization and apportionment formulas; 2) Final Grant Apportionments; and 3)
Composition of expenditures. The first item is in the text of highway bills, while highway
statistics provide details information on the next two.
The descriptive statistics dependent variables are reported in Table 1.3.2. We can see
that on average states spend $175 on maintenance and $355 on capital outlays per person.
The bottom three rows show that these expenditures compose 75% of highway expendi-
ture. The other highway expenditures, which comprise 25% of total expenditure, include
administration, highway police and safety, and interest payments.
Average gasoline tax rate is measured by dividing fuel tax revenue by total volume taxed.
On average, states receive 26 cents per gallon of fuel taxed. While most of the capital out-
lays are done by state governments (79.6%), the burden of maintenance is almost equally
divided between state and local governments. Also, note that the average borrowing is
positive in this period, but it is only $24 per person.
The balanced budget rules and stabilization fund indices are from Bohn and Inman
(1996) and Wagner and Elder (2005), respectively. These measures are summarized in
Tables A.1 and A.2 in appendix A.2. The balanced budget rules were directly approved by
the state’s citizens (constitutional constraints) or by the state’s legislature (statutory con-
straints) prior to 197014, and have not changed over time. On the other hand, some of the
budget stabilization funds we established as recently as 2000. Therefore, the balanced bud-
get rules do not reflect the preferences of the current residents of the states today, but the
stabilization fund indices do. Therefore, the stabilization fund result should be interpreted
with care. As Poterba (1996) notes, one possible strategy that researchers have used to
13“Roadway maintenance includes all expenditures for routine roadway surface, shoulder, roadside and
drainage operations. Structure maintenance includes expenditures for repair and maintenance of bridges,
tunnels, subways, overhead grade separations, and other structures, including substructure, superstructure,
stream bed operations, and bridge painting. Highway and structure maintenance also includes: spot patch-
ing and crack sealing of roadways and bridge decks, the maintenance and repair of highway utilities and
safety devices, including repair and painting of route markers, signs, guard rails, fences, signals and highway
lighting.” (FHWA, 2016)
14In most cases the law came into effect at the date of the state’s admission to the union.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Disb. (state and local) (Per Cap.) 7.05 2.51 1.83 24.74
Total Disb. (local) (Per Cap.) 2.44 1.32 0.45 12.36
Total Disb. (state) (Per Cap.) 5.32 2 2.60 16.17
Gas Tax (real $) 0.26 0.07 0 0.56
Maintenance (Per Cap.) 1.75 0.81 0.06 5.85
(state) % 47.25 18.33 10.74 100
(local) % 52.75 18.33 0 89.26
Capital Outlays (Per Cap.) 3.55 1.56 0.47 15.32
(state) % 79.63 29.31 0 900.76
(local) % 21.85 15.84 0 99.56
Other Highway Expenditures (Per Cap.) 1.77 0.90 0.48 9.56
(state) % 99.98 44.43 17.23 311.91
(local) % 43.20 21.85 0.09 225.15
Highway Borrowing (Per Cap.) 0.24 0.76 -6.13 4.62
(state) % 89 1,896 -12,367 55,875
(local) % 10.84 1,896.14 -55,775 12,467.57
Maintenance (Expenditure Share) 0.25 0.08 0.03 0.52
Capital Outlays (Expenditure Share) 0.50 0.09 0.16 0.79
Other Highway Expenditures (Expenditure Share) 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.71
Highway Borrowing (Expenditure Share) 0.04 0.09 -0.44 0.65
Source: Difference sources, 1993-2013. Per capita and adjusted for inflation. The per capita measures are in hundreds of 2014 dollars.
mitigate this endogeneity issue is controlling for political indicators.
The political environment of the states may also affect their behavior. To capture this,
I use political party indicators of the states’ governor, the house of representative, and the
Senate; an indicator for the split legislature; an indicator for the divided government; and
an indicator for whether the governor is up for reelection when it is not the governor’s last
term. I use the Klarner (2013b) and Klarner (2013a) data which I have updated for years
2011-13 from NCSL (2016).
Furthermore, I check the robustness of the main results to controlling for lags of state
Gross Domestic Product and state highway expenditure, climate indicators, and storm
events. I explain the outcomes in the results section. State GDPs are taken from Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). After 1997 the estimation methodology of BEA changes as the
industry classification transitions from SIC to NAICS. Furthermore, pre-1997 estimates are
more consistent with Gross domestic income (GDI) than GDP. However, the differences are
small and controlling for year fixed effects captures a lot of the accounting differences.
Table (1.3.2) present summary statistics on independent variables. Both shocks, which
are based on the present value of forecast errors, and forecast errors are constructed as
ratios. Notice that the constructed shocks, which present value of forecast errors, have a
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics on Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Shock 0.08 0.12 -0.65 0.83
Forecast Error 0.05 0.17 -0.61 1.15
State General Budget Deficit (% of Revenue) 0.72 5.40 -55.68 31.31
ACIR Stringency Index 8.08 2.60 0 10
May Carry Over A Deficit 0.80 0.40 0 1
Gov. Submits Balanced Budget 0.24 0.42 0 1
Leg. Passes Balanced Budget 0.18 0.38 0 1
May Not Carry Over Into Next Biennium 0.22 0.41 0 1
May Not Carry Over Into Next Fiscal Year 0.59 0.49 0 1
Elected State Supreme Court 0.47 0.50 0 1
Referendum Debt Approval 0.37 0.48 0 1
Governor Has Line Item Veto 0.84 0.36 0 1
Indep Governor 0.02 0.13 0 1
Dem Governor 0.45 0.50 0 1
House Split 0.02 0.14 0 1
House Controlled by Democrats 0.53 0.50 0 1
Senate Split 0.03 0.16 0 1
Senate Controlled by Democrats 0.50 0.50 0 1
Split Legislature 0.23 0.42 0 1
Divided Government 0.53 0.50 0 1
Gov. Elec. Year, not Lame 0.21 0.41 0 1
Senate Election Next Year 0.45 0.50 0 1
House Election Next Year 0.48 0.50 0 1
Senate Close Election 0.10 0.30 0 1
House Close Election 0.12 0.32 0 1
Min Temp Jan. 20.81 11.60 -20.20 54.50
Max Temp Jan. 40.05 12.90 -5.40 74.70
Heating Degree Days 438.57 173.82 44.75 900.83
Max Temp Avg. 63.14 8.94 31.80 82.80
Min Temp Avg. 40.86 8.19 16.32 62.21
Storm Property Damage 11.52 121.23 0 3,464.18
Number of Storms 2,811.93 2,467.55 3 16,737
Source: Difference sources, 1993-2013. Per capita and adjusted for inflation.
smaller standard deviation. The rest of the table lists and presents the average ratios of
balanced budget rules and political indicators, and averages of climate measures that I use.
The temperatures are in Fahrenheit.
1.3.3 Estimation Results
I present the within-fiscal-year and dynamic response of outcome variables to unantici-
pated highway grant shocks. Then, I investigate which political and institutional factors
are related to this response. Most of the response is compositional. My most robust finding
is that in the short run, maintenance expenditures positively respond to the shocks and in
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later periods they go down. However, the responses of capital outlays and other highway
expenditures are typically observed in later periods and are more heterogeneous than that
of maintenance expenditure.
1.3.3.1 Within-Fiscal-Year Effects
Table (1.3) presents the results of estimating equation (1.3) for different outcomes aggre-
gated for state and local governments. All outcomes are in logs except for borrowing, which
is in linear15. The three panels of this table present the within-fiscal-year effects of grant
shocks on real outcomes, per capita outcomes, and outcomes as shares of total expenditure.
The results in Table 1.3 suggest that except for maintenance expenditures, state and local
highway expenditure do not respond to grant shocks. Furthermore, column (5) of panels
I and II shows that in the short run, total expenditure does not consistently increase with
positive grant shocks.
As panel III of Table 1.3 presents, states reallocate some of their resources to do main-
tenance expenditure when they receive a positive shock. That is, while total expenditure
does not go up by much, the share of maintenance expenditure goes up while the shares of
capital outlays and other expenditures go down. However, these effects are not precisely
estimated. One likely reason for larger standard deviations for total expenditure shares of
capital outlay and other highway expenditures is that different states reallocate different
resources to maintenance expenditures. However, small responses for capital expenditure
are not surprising since investments typically require more planning time.
Columns (1) and (6) show the response of borrowing and gasoline tax respectively. States
immediately borrow when they receive grant shocks. This complementarity between bor-
rowing and grants is interesting. It shows that borrowing is not used as a tool for smoothing
over shocks, but rather when states have a guaranteed source of future income, they are
more likely to commit to borrowing. Finally, I find no short run effect for gasoline tax in
column (6).
Tables (A.3) and (A.4) in the Appendix A.3 show that the maintenance results are very
robust to controlling for state-specific time trends and three lags of GDP and total expen-
diture. Lags of output and highway spending are included to control for any additional
forecastability or anticipation of highway apportionment changes missed by our forecast-
ing approach that generates shocks. Similar to LW, I use log of state federal-aid highway
15Borrowing takes negative values. Therefore, I cannot specify it in logs.
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Table 1.3: Within-Fiscal-Year Response of different state and local outcomes to grant shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borro. (Linear) Cap. Out Maint. Other Total Disb. Gas Tax $
Normalization Level Level Level Level Level
Shock 1065.386 0.041 0.207*** -0.046 0.052
(1047.054) (0.064) (0.074) (0.068) (0.043)
Normalization Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap.
Shock 0.268* 0.035 0.201*** -0.053 0.045
(0.154) (0.064) (0.072) (0.062) (0.039)
Normalization Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Level
Shock 0.041* -0.016 0.146*** -0.098 -0.007
(0.024) (0.038) (0.046) (0.064) (0.033)
Fixed Effects State,Year State,Year State,Year State,Year State,Year
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered over state. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
obligations to measure government anticipation (though using other measures of state high-
way spending yield similar results). The results are robust to controlling three lags of GDP
and obligations. Furthermore, the same results are found when excluding local government
expenditures. The negative effects for other expenditure effects are more pronounced after
these controls, and borrowing effects are less pronounced when excluding local govern-
ments. In addition, the maintenance results are robust to controlling for climate indexes,
using forecast error as the shock indicator, or excluding years beyond 2005 (not presented
in the paper). Since the 2005 highway bill included more ear-marked grants, and those
years coincided with the financial crisis. Therefore, these results are driven by neither the
financial crises nor the earmarked grants.
1.3.3.2 Dynamic Effects
The short term maintenance results can be interpreted as states putting off accumulated
maintenance needs until they receive grant shocks, or maintenance expenditures being eas-
ier to adjust in the short run. Therefore, I further look at the effect of shocks in later periods.
As Figure 1.1 presents the IRF of the share of maintenance expenditure is U-shaped:
in response to a shock, governments substitute maintenance expenditures of future periods
with current period expenditure16. Therefore, states systematically use maintenance expen-
16As mentioned before, the impulse response functions are simply the effect of current period shock on the
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diture to respond to negative and positive shocks like they would use borrowing to absorb
the shocks. This substitution effect is even present in levels and per capita. Figures A.7 and
A.8 in Appendix A.6 show these U-shaped IRFs for maintenance expenditure.
As deferring maintenance expenditures is costly, we need to consider if it might be jus-
tified. Let’s suppose that maintaining the same road to a given quality next year costs 5%
more than doing it this year. By calculating the present value of the effect of a one per-
cent grant shock on maintenance expenditure at this depreciation rate, we can evaluate the
magnitude of deferral of maintenance. This can only be done by taking the point estimates
at their face value, because the confidence intervals of later horizon estimates are wide17.
Overall elasticity of per capita maintenance expenditure with respect to grant shocks over
the 10 years from the original shock is 0.0818 This means that, overall, later increases in
maintenance expenditure do not make up for the initial decrease in response to a negative
shock. However, noting that elasticity of current period per capita maintenance is 0.20,
later periods increases make up 60% of the initial decrease.
Figure 1.1 also shows that capital outlays respond to grant shocks after two periods.
However, the average response of all states is not differentially much higher than all other
expenditures. In other words, unexpected grant shocks are not spent on capital outlays
more than they are spent on anything else. Figures A.7 and A.8 in appendix A.6 show that
both capital outlays and total expenditures go up after two years. Both of these estimates
are statistically significant at 10% level.
Finally, we can see that borrowing goes up in the fifth year. This period is of significance
because states have four years to obligate funds from a given year of grants. The increased
borrowing may be needed to finish the work on the projects that were started in previous
periods. The same effect is observed in per capita borrowing and in levels.
level of outcome in current and future horizons which are the result of estimating equation (1.5).
17Alternatively, we can only use the statistically significant estimates. The results will be the same as
presented here.
18Appendix A.4 presents the cumulative effects at all horizons. At 5% discount rate, if we only consider
the first 5 to 7 horizon estimates, the overall effect is actually negative. Considering that confidence bands
on the periods 5 to 7 are as wide and those in periods 8 to 10, there is no good reason to exclude the later
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Response Functions for different outcomes relative to total expenditure.
1.3.3.3 Heterogeneity of the Main Effects
I have established how states government finances respond to unanticipated grant shock,
on average. However, states operate in different political and institutional environments
that may affect their behavior. In this section, I present the role of balanced budget rules,
budget stabilization rules, and states’ political environment. Since it is advantageous to
control for state and year fixed effects, I include the interaction of these variables with the
grant shocks. However, because of the large number of political and institutional indicators
relative to the number of states, I include these interactions one at a time19.
I discuss the important highlights of this analysis below20 My most robust finding is
that the U-shaped IRFs for maintenance share of total expenditure in the first six years
are found almost across all of the specifications. Robustness of the shape of maintenance
IRF implies that deferring maintenance expenditures is a result of technical characteristics
of maintenance being an easy target, and states’ lack of alternative tools for smoothing
19For example, if I include the interactions of all balanced budget indicators with the grant shocks, some
of the coefficients are still precisely estimated. However, interpreting these coefficients would be equivalent
to comparing the response of two or three states compared to others.
20The full set of IRFs after controlling for all different shock interactions is available upon request.
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expenditures.
I find that the deferral of maintenance expenditures is slightly more pronounced for states
that may not carry over a deficit to next fiscal year or require referendum debt approval for
capital projects. The deferral of maintenance expenditure is slightly less pronounced when
state government and legislature are of different parties. Other balanced budget rules are
less stringent, and they do not differentially affect the dynamic response of maintenance
expenditures. Both in governors’ election year, house election years, and with political
power divided within government, the U-shaped maintenance IRF is less pronounced.
The differential response of capital outlays to balanced budget rules and political envi-
ronment interactions is more pronounced. In states with more stringent balanced budget
rules, capital outlays have a negative response to unanticipated shocks while other expen-
ditures absorb the positive shock. This is particularly true for states with higher ACIR
balanced budget stringency index, and that may not carry over a deficit to next fiscal year.
In states that require referendum debt approval for capital projects or have a larger budget
stabilization fund, we observe the opposite effect. Similar to what I found with average
effects in section 1.3.3.2, unanticipated shocks only result in substitution between different
expenditures rather than an increase in total expenditure.
As I discuss, the capital outlay result with referendum debt approval requirement is ex-
pected. However, the fact that some states are reducing capital outlays in response to shocks
is surprising. This may be due to differential trends in state funding for capital outlay and
other highway expenditures in states with stringent balanced budget requirements for the
general budget.
Balanced Budget Rules and Enforcement
Figures (1.2) and (1.3) show the relationship between balanced budget requirements and
the dynamic response of maintenance expenditures and capital outlays to shocks, respec-
tively. In these figures, the left graph is the differential response of states with balanced
budget requirements while the right graph is the average response after controlling for the
shock interaction term. Because 25% of state highways are funded by the contribution
from the general budget, these balanced general budget requirements are relevant to state
highway finances. Not being able to carry over deficit to the next fiscal year is the tightest
of the constraints that govern general budget. On the other hand, referendum debt approval
requirements directly regulate states borrowing for capital projects. These requirements are
then expected to directly affect highway expenditures.
The left hand side graphs in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b shows the differential response of
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maintenance expenditure in states with the general and capital budget restrictions men-
tioned above, respectively. The average maintenance response found earlier is robust and
slightly more pronounced with this requirement. Although the confidence intervals of the
interaction terms are wide, within-fiscal-year effects are larger for states with these require-
ments. Furthermore, both graphs suggest that states with these requirements compensate
less for the initial responses. This effect is most pronounced for the fifth period after the
shock in Figure 1.2b.
Figure 1.3a shows that states that may not carry over debt reduce capital outlays relative
to highway expenditures when they receive a positive shock. Reducing capital expenditure
to increase other highway expenditures in response to a positive shock is surprising. How-
ever, this may be the case that states with general budget constraints can more easily fund
capital expenditures while they may rely on federal grants to fund current expenditures.
Note that this would not be captured by state fixed effects because it only becomes active
when states receive a grant shock. Another possible explanation is that states with credit
constraints on the general budget may be less flexible to commit to longer term investments
required for capital projects. Spending the unanticipated funds on other expenditures solves
this problem. Figure A.9b in appendix A.7 shows that in these states even per capita capital
outlay go down with positive grant shocks while the per capita other highway expenditures
go up. Again, this fact plus insignificant response of total expenditure highlights the pos-
sibility that states respond to unanticipated shocks by mostly reallocating their resources
across different departments. In Figure A.10 in the appendix, we see the mirror images of
the capital outlay and other expenditure IRFs of Figures A.9a and A.9b with respect to the
size of the budget stabilization fund. This is expected because both larger budget stabiliza-
tion fund and less stringent balanced budget requirements help a government to absorb the
shock more easily. Therefore, these results are consistent with each other.
However, Figure 1.3b shows that with referendum debt approval requirements, capital
outlays go up more rapidly than other highway expenditures. States that cannot fund capital
projects through borrowing rely more heavily on highway grants to fund these projects.
Therefore, when these states receive an unanticipated positive grant shock, they spend it
on capital outlays. I observe opposite effects for per capita and expenditure shares of other
highway expenditures in figures A.11a and A.11b in appendix A.7. Again, this finding is
consistent with lack of strong response in total highway expenditures.
Political Indicators










0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)










0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Maint.
IRF of Maintenance if Government May Not Carry Debt to Next Fiscal Year
90% confidence interval








0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)







0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Maint.
IRF of Maintenance if Government Needs Referendum Debt Approval
90% confidence interval
(b) IRF of Maintenance Expenditure with Referendum Debt Approval Requirement








0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)










0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Cap. Out
IRF of Capital Outlays if Government May Not Carry Debt to Next Fiscal Year
90% confidence interval









0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)








0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Cap. Out
IRF of Capital Outlays if Government Needs Referendum Debt Approval
90% confidence interval
(b) IRF of Capital Outlays with Referendum Debt Approval Requirement
Figure 1.3: IRF of Capital Outlays with Capital and General Budget Borrowing Restrictions
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that the observed behavior is inefficient. For example, reducing maintenance expenditures
in fiscal downturns may mean that quality of roads has a higher income elasticity21 than new
roads and policing. If this behavior is more pronounced in election years, we can conclude
that income elasticity is not the only driver of government behavior because voters are
highly unlikely to have different income elasticities in election years. In this section, I
study if the dynamic effects are different in election years, when political power is split
between legislature and governorship. Figures (1.4) and (1.5) show that in contrast to
balanced budget requirements, the correlation of these political indicators are more strongly
correlated with maintenance expenditures than they are with capital outlays.
Figure 1.4a and 1.5a show the differential effects when a government receives a grant
shock and house election is next year for maintenance and capital outlays, respectively.
For example, in Figure 1.4a, a differential positive effect in year four means that if the
government received a positive shock four years ago and next year is house election year,
the effect is differentially stronger. Also, the within-fiscal-year effects in this graph show
that deferral of maintenance expenditures is driven by house elections. The graphs in Figure
1.5a do not present any capital outlay effects until five years after the shock. These zig-
zag shape of these IRF in later years leads us to conclude the same no-effects for capital
outlays.
Figure (A.12) in appendix A.7 shows that incumbent governors use their political power
in election years. After controlling for election years when the state governor is not a lame
duck22, the shape of the maintenance IRF persist. However, in election years compensating
for deferred maintenance expenditures is slightly less pronounced. Furthermore, the inter-
action of grant shocks with election years shows that if highway administration received a
positive shock in period zero and horizons one to three are election years, borrowing in-
creases more rapidly. Furthermore, we can see that states tend to increase capital outlays
and decrease other expenditures. This feature is observable in the main effects in the earlier
horizons and interaction effects in horizons two through eight. Therefore, the incumbent
governors seem to find capital outlays more appealing to voters.
When state legislature and governorship are controlled by different political parties, us-
ing political power tends be more difficult. Figures (1.4b) and (1.5b) show the IRFs of
maintenance and capital outlays as shares of total expenditure when the government is di-
21I am using the term income elasticity as if governments’ revenues were an individual’s income. Clearly,
the voters have different preferences for quality of roads relative to other highway services.
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vided, respectively. We can observe the tendency to spend more of unanticipated grants
on capital outlays rather than other highway expenditures. Furthermore, the U-shaped
response of maintenance expenditure is clearly less pronounced when political power is
divided within state government. However, we can see through the main effects of di-
vided government that maintenance expenditures is smaller when government is divided
(figure A.13b). Therefore, both the share of total expenditure and the dynamic response of
highway outcomes are subject to political environment.
1.4 Deferring Maintenance Expenditures and Optimality
I show that governments use the deferral of maintenance expenditures in response to rev-
enue shocks. In this section I investigate whether this behavior may be optimal by solving a
simple economic model of government behavior. Defining preventative maintenance as the
expenditure that only affects the depreciation rates in the future periods, deferring preven-
tative maintenance can be regarded as purely financial transaction, similar to borrowing.
For example, crack sealing the asphalt or painting the bridge foundations only affect the
quality of the infrastructure in the future periods. This is because it is possible to do “crit-
ical” maintenance to make up for the deferred preventative maintenance. Efficacy of such
deferral depends on how costly this transaction might be when compared to states’ interest
rates and consumers discount factor.
1.4.1 Basic Model
In my model, the benevolent government is maximizing a social welfare function. The
objective function of this social welfare function could be viewed as that of a representative





βs−t{xs + U(Ks) + V (Gs)}] (1.7)
where government is optimizing at time t for the periods s = 0, 1, 2, ... . β is the discount
factor for consumers who consume private goods, xs, services from public capital, Ks, and
23This model extends the dynamic general equilibrium models of Barro (1979), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994),
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other public goods, Gs.
I focus on the intertemporal nature of the government side of the problem. Consumption
smoothing and government expenditure have both been studied extensively in the literature,
therefore inclusion of these details makes my model overly complicated without yielding
any new results. To abstract from private consumption smoothing, I assume that instanta-
neous utility is quasilinear in xs. Similarly, I assume that other government expenditures,
Gs, are exogenously fixed for clearer equations. The latter assumption can be easily relaxed
without loss of generality within the framework of this model.
The resource constraint of the government restricts its revenues plus debt to be less than





s +Gs + rBs = τs + zs +Bs+1 −Bs (1.8)
The government revenue, in each period, is τs + zs. The government sets taxes and fees to
receive the revenue, τs. However, the tax base is uncertain and the government may also
receive grants. zs, which represents this stochastic component of government revenue. The
government can borrow, Bs, at the fixed interest rate r. However, its borrowing may be
constrained by institutional and financial restrictions. On the expenditure side, the govern-
ment can invest its resources to build new infrastructure, Is, provide consumable goods,
Gs, pay off debt, or maintain the existing infrastructure through critical or preventative
maintenance expenditures, M cs and M
p
s .
The stock of infrastructure evolves according to the following equation.
Ks+1 = Is + (1− δ(M cs ,M
p
s−1, Ks))Ks (1.9)
In this formulation, the rate of depreciation, δ(M cs ,M
p
s−1, Ks), is a function of the critical
maintenance and last period preventative maintenance expenditures in relationship to the
stock of infrastructure.
The preventative maintenance is modeled to only affect the depreciation rate one period
forward. While this simplification keeps the model tractable, the model still captures the
substitutability of preventative and critical maintenance. Therefore, I can still capture the
mechanism through which maintenance deferral savings work.
When modeling maintenance, we need the following conditions for the δ(M cs ,M
p
s−1, Ks)
function to be technically feasible.
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1. Ms ≥ 0,∀s
2. δ(0, 0, .) = δ0
3. ∂δ()
∂Mps−1












δ(Mps−1) = 0 and lim
Mcs→∞
δ(Mps ) = 0
Conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that maintenance expenditure is non-negative, and with-
out any maintenance condition existing infrastructure depreciates at the rate δ0. Condition
(3) means that more maintenance will result in lower depreciation rate. Condition (4) is
twofold and captures the technological structure of maintenance and the optimizing behav-
ior of the government. On the technological side, the government does not have access
to infinite maintenance opportunities with high yields. On the behavioral side, it is as-
sumed that the government will spend the first dollar of maintenance expenditure on the
most productive maintenance project, which is the project that will reduce the depreciation
rate the most. Therefore, the next project always has a lower yield. Condition (5) ensures
that the maintenance expenditure is not capital improving, which is true by definition of
maintenance.
It is widely known that government taxation is associated with deadweight loss. As τs
denotes taxation, let h(τs) be the function that denotes the dead-weight loss of taxation. In
this setting, if taxes on consumer income are τs, their after-tax income is Y τs = Ys − τs −
h(τs).
1.4.2 Solution to the Model
To clarify the role of maintenance deferral in the government’s optimization problem, I de-
rive the first order conditions of the government’s problem and discuss the Euler equations.
The conditions can be compared with those of Barro (1979) (no borrowing constraints),
and Buttner and Wildasin (2010) (constrained borrowing with endogenous capital). I show
that the deferral of maintenance expenditures may play the same role as borrowing.





βs−t{Ys − τs − h(τs) + U(Ks) + V (Gs)}
+ βs−t+1λs+1{Bs+1 − (1 + r)Bs + (1− δ(M cs ,M
p
s−1, Ks))Ks −Ks+1
− (Gs +Mps +M cs − τs − zs)}] (1.10)
Using the first order conditions in appendix A.8, it is straightforward to derive the fol-































































where δ(., ., Ks+1) is δ(M cs+1,M
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The familiar equation (1.13) shows that in the equilibrium the relative shadow value of
funds equals β(1 + r) which is typically assumed to equal one. When we consider a main-
tenance technology through which the government can transfer funds over time, equation
(1.16) represents a different relationship between shadow price of funds in two periods.
Specifically, preventative and critical maintenance expenditures are done in such a way
that the relative value funds equal the relative responsiveness of depreciation to the two
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types of maintenance.
With no borrowing constraints, optimal taxes are constant over time. Furthermore, when
δ() = δ̄ is constant, optimal infrastructure will also be constant over time24.
1.4.3 Log Linearization
To derive more specific equations, let me use the following quadratic approximations.








Furthermore, let us assume that the depreciation function has the following functional form:
δ(M cs ,M
p









This functional form satisfies the feasibility conditions described earlier. Using this specific







Suppose that the governments’ borrowing is constrained. That is Bs+1 ≤ B̄. If βγpγc = 1,
it is optimal for the government to be on the same taxation and investment paths that it
would have been in the non-constrained borrowing case with β(1+ r) = 1. This is the case
where the present value of returns to preventative maintenance equals the return to critical
maintenance.
On the other hand, if βγp
γc
> 1, the present value of returns to preventative maintenance
is larger than critical maintenance. So, saving through the deferral of maintenance expen-
ditures is more costly than is suggested by the consumers’ discount factor. Therefore, in
the optimum, it is always better to do preventative maintenance. Consequently, in the op-
timum, the shadow value of funds in the earlier periods is larger than those in the later
periods. This case is the counterpart of the situation where the government is facing very
high interest rates or when borrowing is capped.
24See Buttner and Wildasin (2010) for a detailed explanation.
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The solution to the constrained borrowing problem is provided by Buttner and Wildasin
(2010), and it applies here. They solve the optimal taxation and capital outlays with credit
constraints where shadow value of funds is larger in earlier periods. They first show that
taxes are going to be decreasing over time. That is, the government optimally saves money
in earlier periods and spend them later. Next, they show that for any initial conditions,
taxes are going to be higher and investments lower than the case with no credit constraints.
And finally, they show that in the presence of borrowing restrictions, current investment
expenditures move together with income shocks. The resulting movements in the capital
stock adjustments are expected to be partially reversed in the following period.
1.4.4 Theory in Application
As discussed in section 1.3.3.2, even when year to year cost of deferring maintenance ex-
penditure is only 5% on average, the current behavior of the state government is costly.
Maintaining the ad hoc 5% assumption, the model suggests that if all of the maintenance
expenditures deferred are preventative expenditures, and state governments are facing in-
terest rates that are higher than 5%, this behavior is optimal. However, the government
should compensate for the deferred maintenance expenditure in later periods.
One limitation of state highway maintenance data is that it does not differentiate between
preventative and critical maintenance. Furthermore, there are no reliable estimates of cost
of deferring maintenance25. The latter plays a more important role in assessing the efficacy
of government behavior, while it is possible to calibrate the former at different values. One
possibility for estimating the cost of deferring maintenance is to use road level data on state
highway administration expenditures26. This is an avenue that I will pursue in later editions
of this project.
However, note that constant returns to maintenance is not a realistic assumption. That
is, γp and γc are more likely to be functions of available maintenance projects. In practice,
governments are dealing with individual units of infrastructure with varying βγp
γc
ratios. It





this sense, deferring maintenance expenditures presents the government with a secondary
source of borrowing which is itself constrained. Ideally, we would use the distribution
25Civil engineering reports suggest very large costs of deferral. However, these reports only refer to specific
cases. To make an assessment of the behavior of state governments we need some figures that describe the
whole distribution of the deferral costs.






to determine to what extent the deferral of maintenance expenditures will still be
efficient.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper studies the dynamic response of different highway expenditures and borrowing
to unanticipated federal grant shocks. Because the distribution of federal grants follows
formulary apportionments that use three years old formula factors, I am able to construct
grant shocks that are unrelated to current economic conditions and highway needs. I use
these shocks to study the within-fiscal-year and dynamic response of maintenance, capital
outlay, borrowing, and other highway expenditures.
Within-fiscal-year effects show that maintenance expenditures go down with a negative
grant shock. Furthermore, the U-shaped impulse response functions for maintenance ex-
penditure show that governments defer these expenditures when they receive unanticipated
revenue shocks. This behavior does not seem to be mainly driven by balanced budget
rules. However, in states with Referendum Debt Approval requirements maintenance ex-
penditures respond more strongly to the grant shocks. Given that the U-shaped IRFs for
maintenance are robust in different specifications, the deferral of maintenance expendi-
tures is likely to be the result of maintenance expenditures being easy to adjust. However,
maintenance expenditure is less responsive to unanticipated shocks in governors’ election
year and when governorship and legislature are from different political parties. The within-
fiscal-year part of this result is comparable to the findings of Borge and Hopland (2015)
on the effect on political fragmentation. However, I find the opposite of their finding.
Even considering that in later periods governments compensate for the within-fiscal-year
response to a lesser extent in divided governments, this is a good outcome because the
deferral of expenditures is less severe. Furthermore, house election years drive state gov-
ernments to respond more strongly to the shocks. These findings indicate that accumulation
of maintenance needs cannot solely be explained by preferences of the voters.
On average, state capital outlays only respond positively to the shocks in later years.
However, I find that some states respond to grant shocks by decreasing capital outlays and
increasing other current highway expenditures. Since these are the states that face stricter
restrictions to balance general budgets, one possible explanation is that current expenditures
may tend to be underfunded in these states. Therefore, when they receive an unanticipated
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shock, they spend it on current expenditures. I also find that capital outlays are more
appealing than current expenditures in incumbent governors’ election year, and in divided
governments.
Based on my findings, there are two areas of future research. First, I find that the unan-
ticipated shocks mostly affect the composition of expenditures rather than increasing total
expenditures. This effect may be due to limited flexibility of state highway administrations
to adjust their workforce or other resources. On the other hand, it is possible that state
government expenditures crowd out local expenditures. This is one area of potential future
research.
Second, I identify the important parameters that are necessary to determine the efficacy
of maintenance deferral in my theoretical model. We would need to know whether it is
preventative or critical maintenance that is getting postponed. Also, we would need the cost
distribution of deferring maintenance preventative maintenance. Both of these questions
can be answered using road level data that include both maintenance expenditures and road
conditions. Such a dataset is potentially accessible to highway administrations, so future
research can shed light on the efficacy of governments’ behavior.
Finally, the main policy suggestion of this paper is to regulate highway expenditures.
This is especially true if state governments are deferring preventative maintenance. The
deferral of maintenance expenditure is likely to be more costly than the accumulation of
debt, or cutting pension contributions. Therefore, there need to be institutions that regulate
the expenditure of maintenance expenditures alongside those that regulate accumulation
of debt. Voters are indeed concerned about this. For example, in a very recent ballot in
the state of Illinois, the proposed amendment blocks lawmakers from using transportation
funds for anything other than their stated purpose. Therefore, another possibility is more
transparent data practices that enable both media and the researchers to properly inform the
public, making the preventative maintenance expenditures more salient.
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CHAPTER 2
VALUING PUBLIC GOODS MORE
GENERALLY: THE CASE OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
2.1 Introduction
Determining the benefits of public goods is a challenging task. Benefits that accrue to
private producers should generate observable income (Eberts and McMillen 1999). Ben-
efits that accrue directly to households through “quality-of-life” improvements are harder
to value as their economic impacts are not directly observed. Luckily, the value of such
quality-of-life benefits may be inferred through higher housing values when households
are mobile (Rudd 2000). However, as we1 show in this paper, there are several shortcom-
ings with the basic theory that directly maps improvements in public goods to the value
of housing.2 First, public goods may ease housing production or lower local input costs,
so that valuable public investments actually lower housing values. Second, federal subsi-
dies to housing consumption, as well as taxes on income, will distort price responses to
public goods (Albouy 2009). Third, imperfect household mobility may mitigate or even
mute price responses altogether. In this case, housing tenants, rather than housing owners,
receive some or all of the benefits of a public improvement.
Below, we analyze how public goods (or amenities more broadly) in an urban system
impact local wages, land values, the prices of housing (or other nontraded goods), and
population. Our model is more general than the standard Roback (1982) model as it ac-
counts for nontraded production, like housing; federal taxes, including housing subsidies;
and most remarkably, population movements with limited mobility.3 The role of these three
1This chapter is coauthored with David Albouy
2The term capitalization is often used in this context to refer to changes to land and housing prices,
not rents. In practice, these prices are given by the present discounted value of rents. Since discounting is
unaltered, rents, values, and prices are used almost interchangeably here.
3nontraded production is discussed in Roback, but is not developed theoretically or used empirically.
Taxes are contained in Albouy (2009, 2016), although the analysis and simulations presented here are largely
new. The major modeling innovation is that of the third item, imperfect mobility, which builds on how Albouy
and Stuart (2015) translate structural population relationships using reduced-form elasticities.
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generalizations is demonstrated analytically and in a numerical simulation below. We dis-
tinguish improvements according to how much they affect household quality of life versus
firm productivity, where, following up on Albouy (2016), we distinguish between trade
productivity for firms producing traded output, and home productivity, for nontraded out-
put. Using this more nuanced framework, we reinterpret the estimated effects of public
infrastructure on prices and wages by Haughwout (2002), finding infrastructure to be much
more valuable. This conclusion is reinforced by new estimates of wage, price, and also
population effects, based on more data.
Our theoretical analysis and numerical simulations provide insights about how public
goods may impact competitive local labor and housing markets. The simulations predict
that housing prices capitalize the benefits of public goods quite differently than land val-
ues, making them poor substitutes but useful complements in disentangling the channels
through which public goods affect welfare. Also, increases in local wages are likely to
overstate increases in trade productivity due to important wage and tax “multiplier” effects,
discussed below. Local wages are predicted to fall with quality-of-life or home-productive
improvements, but not by much, especially if mobility is imperfect. Tax distortions cause
land values to rise with a quality-of-life improvement much more than a trade-productive
one of similar value; yet, housing prices will reflect these in similar proportions, absent
immobility. On the other hand, housing prices indeed fall with home productivity — while
land values rise — although the magnitude depends critically on household mobility. Price
decreases are greatest when mobility is modest.4
Our re-evaluation of infrastructure values calls into question Haughwout’s conclusion
that infrastructure investments are unlikely to pass a cost-benefit test. While his original
model implies that a typical investment returns between 30 and 60 percent of its cost (de-
pending on the estimates), the general model finds that range to be 70-135 percent. Most
of these benefits are in quality of life. New estimates, based on more years, cities, and
data sets, find more modest (albeit more robust) positive housing price effects, and larger
wage effects. Furthermore, infrastructure appears to increase population levels. Together,
the estimates imply positive net returns, with large benefits to firms, and some direct ben-
efits to households, particularly if they are imperfectly mobile. The new estimates also
4Rappaport (2008a, b) considers the price effects of changes in various amenities in a quantitative model
with nontraded production, but without federal taxes, or immobility, and restricting home productivity and
trade productivity to be equal, precluding some important issues raised here. Rappaport’s simulations are
especially useful for considering non-linearities for large changes, although they do not provide the same
insights provided by the analytical solutions given here.
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indicate that infrastructure has positive fiscal externalities and likely increases nontraded
productivity.
2.2 Previous Literature and Motivation
Our valuation model generalizes the Roback model as it considers labor and technology
in nontraded production, accounts for federal fiscal externalities, and demonstrates how
to use population changes to better measure quality-of-life improvements and compensate
for missing land data. This last innovation is helpful as land values are rare and hard to
measure, making it nearly impossible to estimate how public goods raise land values (see
Mills 1998; Case 2007).
The idea that land rents capitalize differences in the value of local amenities when all
other factors are mobile, has a long history (see, e.g., Ricardo 1817; George 1879; Tiebout
1956; Arnott and Stiglitz 1979; Brueckner 1983). This idea forms the basis of valuation
methods using cross-sectional hedonic techniques (e.g., Oates 1969; Rosen 1974), as well
as those using more focused identification strategies (e.g., Black 1999, Kline and Moretti
2014a). Since most valuations are conducted with home values, many previous studies may
need to be re-examined to consider the generalities raised here. This is particularly true for
public goods provided across areas as large as a metropolitan area.5
Nontraded production has long been known to affect income comparisons. Balassa
(1964) and Samuelson (1964) first demonstrated how nontraded production complicates
incomes and productivity comparisons across countries. Moving from countries to cities,
our work bridges the standard Roback model with Tolley’s (1974) theory of “wage multipli-
ers,” which amplify how amenity values are capitalized into housing costs and wages. We
also consider how public goods can improve nontraded production. Indeed, when consider-
ing the role public infrastructure, Gruen (2010, p. 2) writes “federal and state expenditures
for roads, utilities, drainage, and other improvements” are needed to make vacant land ac-
cessible to home builders. Thus, high housing prices may be a misleading marker of public
good values when we consider housing production.
Outside of Albouy (2009, 2016), the impact of federal taxes on local prices has largely
been ignored. Moreover, those two articles do not consider how federal tax policy may
5Inside a metro area, effects on wages should largely dissipate, eliminating their impact on housing costs
and federal tax payments.
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magnify or contract the effect of public goods on housing and land prices. We model
and quantify these effects below, and explain a feedback effect through what we name a
“tax multiplier.” One takeaway is that federal fiscal externalities should be counted when
valuing a public good. Furthermore, federal taxes distort local incentives to invest in public
goods toward quality-of-life improvements and against productive ones.
While perfect mobility is a powerful assumption, imperfect mobility has received grow-
ing attention in estimates of the fiscal impact of local policies, e.g., Busso, Gregory, and
Kline (2013) and Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016). Our framework is the first to incorporate
imperfect mobility with either nontraded production or federal taxes. It provides tractable
analytical expressions that cover full to zero mobility. It also interestingly divides benefits
between local residents, landowners, and the federation as a whole.6
2.3 Prices and Amenities in Equilibrium
2.3.1 Model Set-up and Notation
Consider a system of cities, indexed by j, that share a homogeneous population of house-
holds, N . Households are identical and consume a numeraire traded good, x, and a non-
traded home good, y, with local price, pj . We discuss multiple household and home-good
types in Appendices B.2.1 and B.2.2. 7 Firms produce traded and home goods out of land,
capital, and labor. Within a city, factors command the same price in either sector.8 Land, L,
is homogeneous and immobile, and is paid a city-specific price rj . Capital, K, is supplied
elastically at the price ı̄. Households each supply a single unit of labor, earning wage wj .
Revenues from land and capital are collected nationally and rebated as non-labor income,
I + R; total income, mj ≡ I + R + wj , varies only with wages. Federal tax payments of
6Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2016) estimate a framework with imperfect firm mobility that subdivides gains
from local corporate income tax cuts to local residents, land values, and local firms. Their analysis based on
establishment counts impose certain restrictions on firm production, such as Cobb-Douglas production.
7In practice, pj is the measured cost of housing services. In an urban system, housing costs may proxy
for cost-differences in all locally-provided goods. Non-housing goods, such as haircuts and restaurant meals,
are considered to be a composite commodity of traded goods and non-housing home goods, with price pj .
Appendix B.2.2 shows that if housing is more land-intensive than non-housing home goods, then housing
will more strongly reflect amenity values.
8Unlike in Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), where the supply of land in each sector is fixed, and cities ex-
hibit diminishing returns as the supply of residential land expands. The authors also impose Cobb-Douglas
production technology and do not account for taxes or non-labor income. See Appendix B.3.3 for more
explanation
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τ j(y) = τ (mj − δpjy) are net of transfers, and include a deduction at rate δ for nontraded
purchases, such as housing. For simplicity, assume net tax payments average to zero; some
payments are negative, while all marginal tax rates are positive.
Cities differ in three general “urban attributes”: (i) quality of life, Qj; (ii) trade pro-
ductivity, AjX ; and (iii) home productivity, A
j
Y . These attributes depend on a vector of
individual amenities, Zj = (Zj1 , ..., Z
j
K), which may include public goods.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions
We begin with the case where households are fully mobile, so that they receive the same
utility, ū, in all (inhabited) cities. This equilibrium maps the three prices (rj, wj, pj) one-
to-one with the three attributes (Qj, AjX , A
j
Y ), by assuming workers are mobile and firms in
both sectors make zero profit. Households preferences are represented by the expenditure
function, e(pj, u;Qj), which increases in utility, u, and pj , and decreases inQj . Thus, local
incomes mj = wj + I +R must provide utility ū after taxes: e(pj, ū;Qj) = mj − τ j(y).
Operating in perfectly competitive markets, firms produce under constant returns to
scale; city returns to scale are embedded within the factor-neutral productivities, AjX and
AjY . The unit cost of producing a traded good is cX(r
j, wj, ı̄;AjX) = cX(r
j, wj, ı̄)/AjX
where c(r, w, i) ≡ c(r, w, i; 1). A symmetric definition holds for home-good unit costs, cY 9
Firms make zero profits in equilibrium: cX(rj, wj, ı̄)/A
j
X = 1, and cY (r
j, wj, ı̄)/AjY = p
j .
2.3.3 Log-Linearization, Expenditure and Cost-Share Parameters
For analytical purposes, log-linearize the equilibrium equations around the national aver-
age, so that for any z, ẑj = d ln zj = dzj/z̄ approximates the percent difference in city j
of z, relative to the national geometric average z̄. Table 1 summarizes the key parameters,
which without superscripts, refer to national averages: “s” is for expenditure shares, “θ′′,




≥ u}. The single indexQj assumes that ameni-
ties are weakly separable from consumption. The model generalizes to one with heterogeneous workers that
supply different fixed amounts of labor if these workers are perfect substitutes in production, have identical
homothetic preferences, and earn equal shares of income from labor. Additionally, the mobility condition
need not apply to all households, but only a sufficiently large subset of mobile households (Gyourko and
Tracy 1989). Appendix B.2.1 discusses the case with multiple household types with varying preferences and
skills. Unit cost is cX(rj , wj , ı̄;A
j
X) ≡ minL,N,K{rjL + wjN + ı̄K : A
j
XF (L,N,K) = 1}. Appendix
B.2.1 demonstrates that non-neutral productivity differences have similar impacts on relative prices across
cities.
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for cost shares in traded production, and “φ′′ for cost shares in home production, each with
appropriate subscripts. The implied shares of land and labor used for the traded good —
given by the parameters λL and λN — and the tax and deduction rates, τ ′ and δ, prove to
be key. The “chosen” parameterized values shown come from Albouy (2009), reviewed
in Appendix B.3.1.10 The other columns present values implied by Haughwout (2002);
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), adjusted for absentee land and capital owners; and Rappaport
(2008a,b). The table highlights the simplifications other models often make in regard to
home production, federal taxation, and mobility, which we relax in section 2.5.11
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions describe how prices co-vary with city attributes
in a spatial equilibrium.12
(1− δτ ′) syp̂j − sw(1− τ ′)ŵj = Q̂j (2.1a)
θLr̂
j + θN ŵ
j = ÂjX (2.1b)
φLr̂
j + φN ŵ
j − p̂j = ÂjY (2.1c)
Each equilibrium condition states that the relative value of a city’s amenities is measured
implicitly by how much households or firms will pay for them. Equation (2.1a) measures
10The one exception to this notation is Q̂j ≡ − (∂e/∂Q) (1/m̄)dQj , which is the dollar value of a change
in Qj divided by income. The shares of (gross) expenditures spent on traded goods and home goods are
sjx ≡ xj/mj and sjy ≡ pjyj/mj ; the shares of income received from land, labor, and capital income are
sjR ≡ R/mj , sjw ≡ wj/mj , and s
j
I ≡ I/mj . For firms, denote the cost-shares of land, labor, and capital
in the traded-good sector as θjL ≡ rjL
j
X/X
j , θjN ≡ wjN
j
X/X
j and θjK ≡ ı̄K
j
X/X
j ; denote equivalent
cost-shares in the home-good sector as φjL, φ
j
N , and φ
j
K . Finally, denote the shares of land, labor and, capital
used to produce traded goods as λjL ≡ L
j
X/L
j , λjN ≡ N
j
X/N
j , and λjK ≡ K
j
X/K
j . Assume home













N . Nationally, the parameters obey the following identities:
(i) sw + sI + sR = 1; (ii) θL + θK + θN = 1; (iii) φL + φK + φN = 1; (iv) sw = sxθN + syφN ; (v) sI =
sxθK + syφK ; (vi)sR = sxθL + syφL. (vii) λL = sxθL/sR, (viii) λN = sxθN/sw.
11Other applications with φL = 1, λN = φN = 0 include Shapiro (2006), who proposes θL = 0.1, θN =
0.75, and sy/sw = 0.32, implying λL = 0.20 and λN = 1;Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004) use values implying
λL = 0.5 and λN = 1. Kline and Moretti (2014b) take θN = 0.47 and θL = 0.23. Roback (1982, p.1273)
assumes sy/sw = 0.035, but does not provide other values.
12When simply linearized with Shephard’s Lemma, the equations are
−(∂e/∂Q)dQj = ȳ · dpj − (1− τ ′) · dwj
dAjX = (LX/X) · dr
j + (NX/X) · dwj
p̄ · dAjY = (LY /Y ) · dr
j + (NY /Y ) · dwj − dpj
The first equation is log-linearized by dividing through by m̄, and the third, by dividing by p̄. As shown by
Hochman and Pines (1993), it is the marginal tax rate on wage income that matters.
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Table 2.1: Model Parameters and Possible Values
Nota- Chosen Haugh- Glaeser- Rappa-
Parameter tion values wout* Gottlieb* port
Non-labor income rebate rebate absent rebate
Panel A: Values parameterized directly
Home-goods share sy 0.360 0.124 0.200 0.180
Traded-good cost-share of land θL 0.025 0.055 0.100 0.018
Traded-good cost-share of labor θN 0.825 0.856 0.733 0.655
Home-good cost-share of land φL 0.233 1.0 0.300 0.350
Home-good cost-share of labor φN 0.617 0.0 0.400 0.455
Marginal tax rate on labor τ ′ 0.361 0.0 0.0 0.0
Deduction rate for home-goods δ 0.291 0.0 0.0 0.0
Immobility (see section 2.5) ψ 0.0/0.05/∞ 0.0 0.0 0.0
Panel B: Parameters derived from theory (see below)
Income share to labor sw 0.750 0.750* 0.667* 0.615
Share of land in traded good λL 0.17 0.28 0.57 0.19
Share of labor in traded good λN 0.70 1.0 0.88 0.87
Wage multiplier µw 1.42 1.0 1.14 1.15
Tax multiplier µτ 1.20 1.0 1.0 1.0
NOTE: Haughwout: sI is set to get sw = 0.750; Glaeser-Gottlieb: θN is set to get sw = 0.667.
local quality of life from how high the discounted cost-of-living, (1− δτ ′) syp̂j , is relative
to after-tax nominal income, sw(1 − τ ′)ŵj . Equation (2.1b) measures local trade produc-
tivity, ÂjX , from how high the labor costs, θN ŵ
j , and land costs, θLr̂j , are in traded-good
production. Equation (2.1c) measures local home productivity, ÂjY , from how high the
labor costs, φN ŵj , and land costs, φLr̂j , are in production relative to the home-good price,
p̂j .
The equilibrium conditions hold even when the attributes are endogenous, e.g., if they
change with population N j . Due to feedback effects, it can be difficult to isolate the effect
of a single public good without a full accounting of amenities. To appreciate the potential
complexity of comparative statics, say that Qj = Qj0(N






X0 are exogenous, and γ ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0 are congestion and agglomeration
parameters. If a city’s transportation network improves, then both Qj0 and A
j
X0 rise. These
benefits attract new workers, raising N j . This population increase then reduces Q̂j =





j . While we cannot observe these effects
separately, we may infer them if we estimate N̂ j , and have prior information on γ and α.
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2.4 Price Effects of Amenities with Home Goods and Taxes
2.4.1 Mathematical Inversion of Equilibrium Conditions
To describe how prices are affected by small changes in local attributes, the system in
Equations (2.2a), (2.2b), and (2.2c), below invert the system of Equations in (2.1a), (2.1b),
and (2.1c). For comparison, each price differential is multiplied by its income share, so
that each equation expresses the change in total land, labor, and home-good values relative
to local income. Thus, a 1 percent increase in sRr̂j represents an increase in land values of
one percent of income. Each attribute is similarly weighted. With these normalizations, we



















−λLQ̂j + (1− τ ′δ)
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(λN − λL)Q̂j + (1− τ ′)
[





lj ≡ Lj/N j is the land-to-labor ratio. These expressions depend only on the fractions of
land and labor in traded-good λL and λN , and the tax and discount rates τ ′ and δ. To build
understanding, we collect some parameter into two multipliers: a wage multiplier, µw, and








δ + (1− δ) λL
λN
] (2.3)
Both multipliers are weakly greater than one with normal parameterizations, λN ≥ 0, τ ′ ≥
0. When home-goods have no labor component (λN = 1), then µw = 1; when federal
taxes are absent (τ ′ = 0), then µτ = 1. Both multipliers decrease in λN ; the tax multiplier
increases in τ ′, δ, and λL and equals (1− τ ′)−1 if δ = 1. Subsection 2.4.3 explains more.
2.4.2 Basic Capitalization Effects
Land values are closely related to the total value of amenities, denoted Ω(Q,AX , AY ).







∗, where the subscript “∗” denotes differentials with τ ′ = 0, taken
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from the solution for land rents (2.2a). Thus, the last equality expresses the classical result
that land values fully capitalize amenity values.13 With federal taxes, this capitalization
result breaks down, since local land values also capitalize federal-tax payments, captured
in the “tax differential” dτ j/m ≡ τ ′swŵj − δτ ′syp̂j .14 The land-rent differential then
capitalizes this equilibrium tax differential, i.e., it follows from sRr̂j = sRr̂j∗ + dτ
j/m.


























This expression neatly summarizes the results of Albouy (2009): federal taxes increase in
trade productivity, and fall in home productivity and quality of life; deductions mitigate tax
differences from both kinds of productivity, but magnify for them for quality-of-life.
Abstracting away from taxes, higher land values pass through to lower wages by an
amount −λLsRr̂j , seen inside the brackets of (2.2b) for Q̂j and ÂjX . With trade productiv-
ity, this negative effect through land is outweighed by positive productivity effects, propor-
tional to sxÂ
j
X , modifying the coefficient to 1 − λL. A similar pass-through effect applies
to home-good prices: lower-paid workers do not accept a lower real wage, unless it is due
to a higher quality of life — e.g., syp̂j∗ = swŵ
j
∗ + Q̂
j . This modifies the coefficient on
Q̂j from −λL to (λN − λL). To better understand this modification, we explain the wage
multiplier.
2.4.3 Wage and Tax Multipliers
The wage multiplier, µw = 1/λN , outside the brackets in Equations (2.2b) and (2.2c), is
related to one proposed by Tolley (1974). It results from local workers purchasing home
goods from other local workers. To derive the multiplier, ignore taxes, and let equilibrium
wages without home-good price responses equal ŵ0. Since home producers make zero
profits and must offer the same wages as traded producers, they must raise prices by φN
13Wihout taxes, the linearized version of (2.2a) is (L/N)drj = −(∂e/∂Q)dQj + (X/N)dAjX +
(pY/N)dAjY = dΩ
j . Per capita, (L/N)drj is the change in land value, −(∂e/∂Q)dQj is the improve-
ment in quality-of-life per resident, (X/N)dAjX and and (pY/N)dA
j
Y are the per-capita decrease in tradable
and non-tradable costs. The solutions in (2.2) are derivable from Albouy’s (2009) model. The expressions
here are more interpretable, relative to income, use factor (not cost) shares, λ, and incorporate δ.
14Like the other terms, this differential is normalized to express how much relative to the national average
households in a city pay in taxes as a fraction of their income.
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times ŵ0, meaning p̂0 = φN ŵ0. Yet, since workers are mobile, firms need to compensate
them for the increase in cost-of-living of syφN ŵ0 by 1/sw that amount in wages, lead-
ing to a further wage increase of ŵ1 − ŵ0 = φN (sy/sw) ŵ0 = (1− λN) ŵ0. This leads
to further increases in costs-of-living and feedback effects on wages, given by the sum
ŵ∞ =
∑∞
k=0(ŵk+1 − ŵk) + ŵ0 =
∑∞
k=0 (1− λN)
k ŵ0 = (1/λN)ŵ0 = µwŵ. This infinite
sum provides a fixed point, ŵ∞ = ŵ∗, in equilibrium. The more labor is in nontraded
production, i.e., the smaller λN , the larger the wage multiplier. Operating in symmetry,
home-good prices are subject to the same effect. Land prices remain unaffected.
The tax multiplier, µw, which multiplies all of the expressions in (2.2), follows a similar
logic. For ease, let δ = 0, and consider µτ = 1/(1− τ ′λL/λN) ≥ 1. A wage dif-
ferential of ŵ∗ leads to an additional tax payment of τ ′swŵ∗. This payment lowers land
prices for firms. They pass on these savings to workers by the amount λLτ ′swŵ∗/sw =
λLτ
′ŵ∗. This premium is subject to the wage multiplier, causing wages to rise further
to ∆ŵ = (τ ′λL/λN)ŵ∗. This full wage increase is then taxed, completing the tax feed-





[1/(1− τ ′λL/λN)]ŵ∗ = µτ ŵ∗. Thus the tax multiplier magnifies any equilibrium wage
differences. Furthermore, it impacts land values in addition to home-good prices.
With a deduction, the tax multiplier also integrates how taxes lower home-good prices,
which in turn implies a lower deduction amount. Following the previous logic, wages
rise by an amount satisfying sw∆ŵj = (λL/λN)τ ′ (swŵ − δsyp̂j). At the same time,
prices fall to offset the tax, save the portion that is compensated for via higher wages,
meaning sy∆p̂ = − (1− λL/λN) τ ′ (swŵ∗ − δsyp̂j∗). This results in a net tax increase of
τ ′ (sw∆ŵ − δsy∆p̂) = τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)λL/λN ]. Compounding these tax effects in an infi-
nite sum produces the full tax multiplier. The tax multiplier causes both wage and price
differential to expand. Higher taxes beget higher wages, which beget higher taxes. Mean-
while, higher prices beget lower taxes, which beget higher prices. Therefore, the two effects
work in tandem.
There are also three direct effects of taxes, seen inside the curly brackets. First, both
productivity terms in the price Equation (2.2c) are reduced immediately by τ ′. This occurs
since any initial pass-through effects of productivity on wages are immediately subject to
taxes, lowering the initial willingness-to-pay for local goods. Second, both productivity
effects in the wage equation are reduced by δτ ′. This accounts for how firms can incorpo-
rate the deduction immediately when offering compensation for local cost-of-living. Third,
there is a more complex effect on land rents. τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)µw] sxÂjX +τ ′δsyÂ
j
Y . The term
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on home productivity reflects how price decreases lower tax deductions. The more com-
plex term on trade productivity is due to the initial impact of trade productivity on wages,
which is multiplied by µw, with ensuing effects on deductions given by δ (µw − 1).15
2.5 Population and Price Changes with Imperfect Mobility
The model above is predicated on perfect mobility across cities, which are deemed “open.”
While the case of perfect mobility is a useful benchmark for long-run adjustments, in the
short to medium run, mobility is likely to be imperfect. Economists also often work with the
other extreme of “closed” cities, with no mobility. In a monocentric city model, Wheaton
(1974) and Brueckner (1987) demonstrate that an improvement in transportation infras-
tructure raises central land and housing values in open cities. Meanwhile, in closed cities,
central land values are depressed relative to peripheral values, and infrastructure benefits
are shared by workers and landowners. While our analysis ignores the inner structure of
cities, below we provide a formulation that captures some of these features and allows for
any degree of mobility across cities.16
An accepted way to handle imperfect mobility is to assume preferences for location are
heterogeneous along an unobserved dimension (e.g., Aura and Davidoff 2008; Kline and
Moretti 2014b). Suppose that quality of life for household i in metro j equals the product
of a common term and a household-specific term, Qji = Q
jζji . In addition, assume that
ζji comes from a Pareto distribution with parameter 1/ψ > 0, common across metros, and
distribution function F (ζji ) = 1 − (ζ/ζ
j
i )
1/ψ, ζji ≥ ζ . A larger value of ψ corresponds to
greater preference heterogeneity; ψ = 0 is the baseline value for an open city with perfect
household mobility, and as ψ →∞ the city becomes closed, with perfect immobility. ψ is
therefore naturally called the immobility parameter.
For each populated metro, there exists a marginal household, denoted by k, such that
e(pj, ū;Qjζjk) = m
j − τ(mj). Log-linearizing this condition replaces Q̂j in Equation
(2.1a) with Q̂j − ψN̂ j , where N̂ j is the population change. In other words, where Q̂j0
15Roback (1982, p. 1265) reports a linear analogue to Equation (2.2c) without taxes in her Equation (9)
expressed in derivatives of cost and indirect utility functions. Roback states that the effect of improvements
in quality-of-life on home-good prices is ambiguous. It is unambiguous if home goods are relatively land
intensive, meaning λN > λL. This condition underpins Roback’s assumption that the determinant in her
Equation 9 (∆∗) is greater than zero.
16Both open and closed monocentric cities have perfect mobility within the city
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is the quality of life inferred with perfect mobility, Q̂j = Q̂j0 + ψN̂
j .17 The population
change depends on a complex structural relationship depending on substitution responses
in production and consumption, income effects, and output effects in housing. We take the
approach of Albouy and Stuart (2015), of modeling this structural relationship as a reduced-
form relationship between population and attribute changes. To do this, first consider the
perfectly mobile case of ψ = 0. The log-linearized population change is described as
N̂ j0 = ε
N,Q
0 Q̂







where εN,Q0 is the elasticity of population with respect to quality of life under full mobility;
εN,AX0 and ε
N,AY
0 are defined similarly. These elasticities are functions of elasticities of
substitution, as well as expenditure and cost shares and tax rates. 18
For a general level of immobility ψ, we substitute for Q̂j − ψN j and solve for N j . This





























— since firms need to pay incoming migrants an increasing schedule of after-tax real wages
to have them overcome their increasing distaste to live in city j.19




0 all of the predictions can be reformulated. Fur-
thermore, the equations in (2.2) can then be rewritten with the substitution Q̂j − ψN̂ j for










1/ψ . This provides the same basic structure as a discrete choice formulation,
e.g. McFadden (1978), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), although it is not as conducive to estimation.
18L̂j brings up the possibility of any changes in land. Therefore, think of N̂ j − L̂j as describing a change
in density, and for now set L̂j = 0.The assumptions of an internally homogeneous open city, exogenous and
neutral amenities, and constant returns in the cost and expenditure functions imply that all of the production
quantities increase linearly with the quantity of land. If land in a city doubles, labor and capital will enter and
also double, so that all prices and per-capita quantities do not change.
19The comparative statics with imperfect mobility are indistinguishable from congestion effects: ψ and
γ are interchangeable. The welfare implications are different as infra-marginal residents share the value of
local amenities with land-owners. The increase in real income is given by sw(1− τ)dŵj − sydp̂j = ψN̂ j =
−sRdr̂j , where “d” denotes price changes between actual and full mobility. As with most closed-city models,
the main challenge in putting into operation the assumption of imperfect mobility is specifying the baseline
level of population that deviations N̂ j are taken from, as a baseline of equal density may not be appropriate.
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The first expression amends the tax differential from Equation (2.4). It adds the term
(µτ − 1)ψN̂ j to account for the tax on the real-wage premium offered to income workers.
The second expression (2.8) states that benefits from amenities in sRr̂j∗ net of tax effects
in dτ jψ/m, on the right, are shared between capitalization effects in sRr̂
j and benefits to
inframarginal households in ψN̂ j . This latter amount also depends on ψ and the actual
population change we observe.20 Overall, imperfect mobility reduces the capitalization
responses in wages and prices needed to equilibrate cities in proportion to the population
change observed.
The previous capitalization formulae in (2.2) are modified by the following subtractions

















j − ψµτµw (λN − λL)
1 + ψεN,Q0
N̂ j0 (2.9c)
With immobility, wages are reduced less by quality of life, are increased more by trade
productivity, and are also boosted by home productivity. Home-good values capitalize
quality-of-life and home-productive amenities less, as locals benefit more from them. Most
importantly, home productivity has a greater effect in reducing local home-good prices. No
matter what the value of ψ the inferred values of AX and AY are unaffected, conditional on
observing N̂ j .21
A useful feature of the model is the limiting case of complete immobility. This occurs
20Estimates of ÂjX and Â
j
Y from ŵ
j , p̂j , and N̂ j do not depend on ψ.
21The solutions for the case of imperfect mobility come from manipulating Equation (2.6a) to show
Q̂j − ψN̂ j = 1
1 + ψεN,Q0
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in the limit with ψ → ∞. At this extreme, quality-of-life benefits are not seen in prices
or population at all; benefits are internalized completely by existing residents. Productive
amenities still affect prices, but their benefits are in proportion to the structural elasticities
under perfect mobility according to the ratios, εN,AX0 /ε
N,Q





Curiously, the collection of parameters in these reduced-form elasticities describing fric-
tionless mobility are pertinent to understanding price responses with no mobility.
2.6 Simulated Impact of Public Goods on Prices and
Populations
Simulating the above capitalization results using hard numbers helps to build intuition and
understand the magnitudes of the predictions. Our simulation applies the values in table
2.1, meant to represent a typical city, to Equations (2.2) and (2.9). Table 2.2 reports how
a $1 dollar increase in the value of a local attribute is capitalized into local prices. To
highlight the importance of federal taxes and nontraded production, the coefficients in panel
A eliminate taxes and the wage multiplier by altering the parameterization so that τ ′ = 0
and λN = 1, while holding λL constant. Panel B re-introduces only the wage multiplier,









































































In the limit,as ψ → 0, the elasticity coefficients become
εN,Qψ
εN,Q0








with a value of µw = 1/λN = 1.42. Panel C then cumulatively adds federal taxes on wages
at a rate of τ ′ = 0.36, leading to a tax multiplier of 1.09; panel D adds refinements for
housing tax benefits and state taxes, which raises the tax multiplier to 1.17. While the first
four panels assume perfect mobility, ψ = 0, panels E and F consider the case of partial
mobility with ψ = 0.05, and perfect immobility, with ψ →∞.
The first rows of panel A and B demonstrate that, without taxes, land rents capitalize
the full value of amenities. In panel A, 83 percent of quality-of-life values are capitalized
into higher home-good prices, with the remaining 17 percent in lower wages. In panel B,
the effect on wages grows relative to prices. With trade productivity, the wage multiplier
effect plays an important role: home-good prices go from mirroring 83 percent of their
value in A, and to 119 percent in B. Naturally, these price changes are fully offset by
equally valued wage increases. Even with the wage-multiplier effect, home productivity
only modestly decreases home-good prices by 23 percent of their value; this too is offset
with lower wages.
Federal taxes change some of the capitalization effects substantially. While panel C cov-
ers the case of a simple wage tax, panel D offers a more realistic case to focus on. Here we
see land rents capitalize only 63 percent of the value of trade productivity, while the federal
government expropriates the remaining 37 percent. Meanwhile, the federal government
implicitly subsidizes quality-of-life amenities at a rate of 19 percent, and home-productive
amenities at a rate of 8 percent. A local government maximizing land rents has twice the
incentive to provide public goods to households than to traded-good producers.
Through the tax multiplier, wage differentials are amplified by 9 percent. In total, wages
then capitalize quality-of-life amenities by $0.27 on the dollar. This low figure undermines
studies (e.g., Moore 1998) that try to value quality-of-life amenities using nominal wages
alone. For trade productivity, wages reflect an even higher 128 percent, indicating that
wage-only measures of productivity — often seen in the agglomeration literature — can
overstate differences in total factor productivity. 22
For home-good prices, taxes increase the capitalization of quality-of-life to 90 percent
and decrease that of productivity to 92 percent. Home-good prices capitalize the value of
quality-of-life and trade productivity differences more accurately than land rents considered
in isolation. Home productivity remains hard to detect with any land data.
22Rappaport (2008b) finds a capitalization effect of quality of life on wages similar to the one here without
taxes, as his calibration implies similar values of λL. For other amenities his results differ as λN and τ ′ play
more of a role.
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Table 2.2: Simulated Effect of Attributes on Prices
Value increase from a one-
dollar attribute increase
Attribute/ Quality Trade Home
type of amenity: of life product. product.
Panel A: No Wage Multiplier; Federal Taxes Neutral
Land rents* sRr̂j 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wages swŵj -0.17 0.83 -0.17
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.83 0.83 -0.17
Population N̂ j 5.52 4.54 7.80
Panel B: Wage Multiplier; Federal Taxes Neutral
Land rents* sRr̂j 1.00 1.00 1.00
Wages swŵj -0.23 1.19 -0.23
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.77 1.19 -0.23
Population N̂ j 7.09 5.81 7.54
Panel C: parameterization with Wage Multiplier & Federal Taxes
Land rents* sRr̂j 1.09 0.53 1.09
Wages swŵj -0.25 1.30 -0.25
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.84 0.83 -0.16
Fed. Tax Payment* dτ j/m̄ -0.09 0.47 -0.09
Population N̂ j 8.28 3.15 8.06
Panel D: Wage Multiplier, Fed. Taxes with Housing Benefits
Land rents* sRr̂j 1.18 0.63 1.07
Wages swŵj -0.27 1.28 -0.24
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.92 0.91 -0.17
Fed. tax payment* dτ j/m̄ -0.18 0.37 -0.07
Population N̂ j 8.17 3.38 8.01
Panel E: Wage Mult., Taxes/Benefits, and Imperfect Mobility (ψ = 0.05)
Land rents* sRr̂j 0.84 0.48 0.73
Wages swŵj -0.19 1.31 -0.17
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.65 0.79 -0.43
Fed. tax payment* dτ j/m̄ -0.13 0.40 -0.02
Population N̂ j 5.80 2.40 5.69
Local resident gains* ψN̂ j 0.29 0.12 0.28
Panel F: Wage Mult., Fed. Taxes/Benefits, and No Mobility (ψ =∞)
Land rents* sRr̂j 0.00 0.13 -0.10
Wages swŵj 0.00 1.39 0.02
Home-good prices syp̂j 0.00 0.52 -1.08
Fed. tax Payment* dτ j/m̄ 0.00 0.45 0.12
Population N̂ j 0.00 0.00 0.00
Local resident gains* ψN̂ j 1.00 0.41 0.98
NOTE: Based on (2.2) with parameterization in table 1. Panel A sets λN = 1, but
keeps λL = 0.17. * indicates final incidence, with values summing to 1.00.
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The results for imperfect mobility are shown in panel E, with a value of ψ = 0.05,
reduce population responses by 30 percent. Benefits are now divided between land-owners,
federal revenues, and local residents. Land values capitalize local improvements by about
30 percent. Wages are less affected by attributes, except for trade productivity. Home-good
prices become less responsive to quality of life and trade productivity; instead, residents
gain directly more from these improvements, as their real wages rise. Home-good prices
drop by 43 percent by the value of home productivity: a much larger pass-through than
before.
With perfect immobility in panel E (ψ → ∞), the results are more stark. Quality-of-
life gains have no effect on anything. Trade productivity raises wages by more than 40
percent over their value, as mobile capital inflows boost labor productivity. These gains
are taken back partly in home-good prices from a standard “cost disease.” Nonetheless,
local residents receive two-fifths of the gains; land-owners receive less than a seventh, and
the federal government receives the most. Improvements in home productivity provide
benefits mainly in the form of lower home-good prices, reflecting them almost one-for
one. Interestingly, this does have tax consequences, as tax-benefits for housing are lower,
making land-owners slightly worse off. Still, existing residents come away with most of
the benefits.
An important take away from this analysis is that when households are immobile, high
housing prices reflect not so much quality-of-life and trade productivity (employment) ben-
efits, as much as low productivity in housing. This insight helps to reconcile seemingly op-
posing views that high housing prices reflect either desirable locations or limits in housing
supply.
2.7 Inferring Values with Limited Data
2.7.1 Using Housing Costs and Wages Alone
Most of the time, researchers estimating the value of public goods do not have access
to adequate and reliable land value data. With only data on wages and home-good (or




are not.23 The difficulty of distinguishing trade and home productivity can be seen by














The two productivity terms are collinear: each changes wages and housing-cost in the same
proportion in opposite directions. Two possible shortcuts come to mind: 1) simply ignore




X , as do a few. While convenient,
these assumptions may engender erroneous conclusions. Furthermore, they run contrary
to evidence in Albouy and Ehrlich (2016) using actual land values across U.S. cities, that
productivity in the housing sector is highly variable, i.e., not zero, and quite different from
trade productivity (and, in fact, negatively correlated with it). 24
Solving for differences in total amenity values in terms of wages and home-good prices









This measure is increasing in home expenditures, syp̂j , and accounts for land used in the
traded sector multiplying by 1/(1 − λL), discounting for the deduction. The bracketed
term associated with wages is of ambiguous sign: high wages signal high federal-tax
revenues, but also high labor costs in housing. The measure also misses differences in
home productivity by 1/(1 − λL) of their value. Even if we give up on measuring the
value of home productivity, the value of the remaining amenities is still biased by ÂjY :
Ω̂j − syÂjY = Q̂j + sxÂ
j
X − [λL/(1− λL)]syÂ
j
Y .
23Rearranging the zero-profit condition for home-good producers (2.1c) demonstrates how land rents may











This follows Muth (1969), except for the inclusion of unobserved home productivity.
24To aid intuition, consider two extreme cases. In the first case, traded goods are made without land, i.e.
θL = 0. Then, trade productivity is proportional the wage level, Â
j
X = θN ŵ
j . This may be a reasonable
approximation if θL is small, but not if the variation in r̂j is much larger than ŵj . In the second case, the cost





j as the input costs are
the same in each sector: home-good prices may be used to infer input costs in tradables only insofar as home
productivity remains constant.
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2.7.2 Incorporating Population Data
Without land-value data, researchers can look to other data sources to deal with nontraded
production. Fortunately, data on local population levels are as common as land values are
rare. The intuition behind using population data is that cities that are efficient in providing
nontraded goods should be able to support a larger population than cities that are not as
efficient, but otherwise equal.
Combining Equation (2.1a) and the analog of Equation (2.6b) for population yields the
following expression, which says that “excess population” (or density) not explained by
quality-of-life, on the left, must be explained by either trade or home productivity, on the
right:
N̂ j − εN,Qψ [syp̂
j − sw(1− τ)ŵj + ψN̂ j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q̂j







While immobility appears to complicate this equation, it actually simplifies to
N̂ j − εN,Q0 [syp̂j − sw(1− τ)ŵj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q̂j0







which is independent of ψ. Equations (2.12) and (2.15) are exactly identified, so that the
inferred amenities perfectly predict population. Inverting this system, as we show in Ap-
pendix B.1.3, allowsAjX andA
j
Y to be inferred separately from wage, price, and population







inferred from prices and wages, and the immobility term ψN̂ j
The difficulty of using this procedure is that it depends on population elasticities, which
are not known as well as the simple cost, expenditure, and tax parameters listed in Ta-
ble 1. These reduced-form elasticities depend on more “structural” parameters, including
these parameters, as well as those describing immobility and substitution elasticities of sub-
stitution and immobility. However, Albouy and Stuart (2015) do make a case for certain
numerical values of these parameters appear to explain local labor and housing supply elas-
ticities, and in particular, population density differences across metro area. We use these
values below.25
25Long-run densities do appear to be consistent with the assumption of perfect mobility, ψ = 0, which
appears sensible. Many researchers simply assume Cobb-Douglas production, which implies large reduced-
form elasticities. For comparison we take Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009). We note four differences with our
57
2.7.3 Inferring Benefits to Households and Firms by Different models.
We now summarize the general problem of inferring the benefits of public improvements
to households and firms using parameterized simulations in Table 2.3
Empty cells imply that the data presented in the column are not used or are unavailable
in the methodology, and therefore do not convey information about whether there was an
amenity improvement of that type. For instance, neither land rents nor population are
needed to estimate quality of life, assuming preferences are homogeneous, since urban
households are assumed to consume land only indirectly.
If land data are available, then inference works ideally. In panel A, trade and home
productivity are inferred from cost-share weighted input costs; with home goods, these
costs are considered relative to the output price. The total value of amenities involves
examining land values in proportion to its income share of 10 percent. Wages and home-
good prices serve only to measure the value of tax externalities from higher wages, minus
deductions for home goods.
Without land data, the numbers in panel B show how to infer amenity values, assuming
home productivity is the same everywhere, i.e., ÂjY = 0. Housing costs help to infer
trade productivity, although the measure relies mostly on wages, with a slightly smaller
coefficient than in A. The total value of amenities now depends strongly on housing values
and only weakly on wages: this occurs from competing tax and housing cost effects almost
canceling out.
Haughwout’s inference technique, shown in panel C, is similar to panel B in its limi-
tations, but more restrictive by equating housing with land. It is like the model of panel
A in Table 2.2, but using Haughwout’s values in Table 2.1. On quality of life, it shows a
much weaker effect of prices and stronger negative effect of wages. Trade productivity also
depends more on wages, mainly as the traded sector is a larger share of output. The total
value depends only on housing prices, and weakly, as they are being taken literally as land
values. Here wages serve only to identify benefits to households as opposed to firms.
The results in panel D present how to use population data to identify and refine estimates
of both trade productivity and home productivity, using the formula solved for in Appendix
model. First, while we assume income is rebated back to workers, they assume it accrues to absentee owners.
In a general equilibrium model, this creates some ambiguity around the share spent on nontraded goods the
value of amenities to households relative to firms. Second, they assume that traded and nontraded (housing)
sector each has an “immobile capital” input, similar to land, that cannot move between sectors within a city.
This creates diminishing returns in nominal wages when the supply of (residential) land grows. See Appendix
B.3.3 for detail on our re-parameterization of their model.
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Table 2.3: Inferred Amenity Values from Prices and Population
Attribute increase from a
one log point change in
Price or Land Housing Pop-
quantity: value cost Wage ulation
r̂ p̂ ŵ N̂
Panel A: Chosen Price Model: Ideal Data
Household QOL Q̂j 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxÂ
j
X 0.016 0.550
Firm: Home prod. syÂ
j
Y 0.083 -0.36 0.231
Total value Ω̂j 0.100 -0.035 0.280
Panel B: Chosen Price Model: Housing Costs and Wages Only (Aj constant)
Household QOL Q̂j 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxÂ
j
X 0.069 0.506
Firm: Home prod. syÂ
j
Y
Total value Ω̂j 0.394 0.007
Panel C: Haughwout (2002) Price Model: Housing Costs and Wages Only
Household QOL Q̂j 0.124 -0.75
Firm: Trad prod. sxÂ
j
X 0.048 0.750
Firm: Home prod. syÂ
j
Y
Total value Ω̂j 0.172 0.00
Panel D: Chosen Price and Population Model, Perfect Mobility (ψ = 0)
Household QOL Q̂j 0.325 -0.499
Firm: Trade prod. sxÂ
j
X 0.005 0.558 0.022
Firm: Home prod. syÂ
j
Y -0.333 0.274 0.115
Total value Ω̂j -0.003 0.333 0.138
Panel E: Chosen Price and Population Model, Imperfect Mobility (ψ = 0.05)
Household QOL Q̂j 0.325 -0.499 0.050
Firm: Trade prod. sxÂ
j
X 0.005 0.558 0.022
Firm: Home prod. syÂ
j
Y -0.333 0.274 0.115
Total value Ω̂j -0.003 0.333 0.188
NOTE: Panels A, B, D, and E use chosen values in Table 2.1. Panel C uses values from Haughwout column.
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B.1.3. Trade productivity uses almost no weight on housing costs, using population pri-
marily to identify land values. Home productivity estimates rely even more on population
numbers, and negatively on home values, much as in the ideal case. Total value figures
rely strongly on the wage and population, and essentially not at all on housing prices. The
shift from relying exclusively on housing prices to not at all, when population numbers are
available, represents a dramatic shift from the current literature. Conditioning on wages
and population, housing values serve almost exclusively to identify quality-of-life ameni-
ties from dis-amenities in home production.
Results in panel E present results from raising the immobility parameter ψ to 0.05.
Since the mobility parameters does not affect the productivity estimates, this just raises
the quality-of-life and total-value estimates by ψ times the population change, N̂ j .
2.8 The Value of Urban Infrastructure
Haughwout (2002) estimates the marginal benefit of public capital investments using housing-
cost and wage data from 1971 to 1992 for a sample of 36 large US cities. The public capital
stock for these cities includes roads, parks, sewer systems, and public buildings. When val-
ued by Haughwout and Inman’s (1996) perpetual inventory technique, this infrastructure
had a depreciated value of $428 billion in the year 2000. Financing is taken as external
(i.e., state and federal). However, if financing is internal, then the implied values would be
larger.
In the next subsection, we reconsider the value of infrastructure using Haughwout’s es-
timates of how this infrastructure changes wages and housing prices, based on our general
model. We then present estimates based on a similar panel covering more cities and years,
using similar pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates and those with city and year
indicators, or “fixed effects” (FE). 26
26While space precludes offering a full literature review, we noted that Gramlich (1994) provides. Aschauer
(1989) present income-based estimates of infrastructure which are disputed by Holtz-Eakin (1994). Fernald
(1999) and Duranton and Turner (2012) consider other methods to consider the growth impacts of highways
in particular. See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) fora larger discussion of the impact of local investments.
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2.8.1 Reinterpreting Haughwout’s Estimates
Haughwout follows the standard Roback model that equates housing values with land val-
ues. Thus, he uses a housing-value differential as a land-value differential, yet he multiplies
it by the average value of urban land to estimate the effect of public infrastructure on land
values. This reduction of the zero-profit condition (2.1c) to p̂j = r̂j assumes that home
goods are not produced — as in Haughwout and Inman (2001) — and leaves out wage
multiplier effects. It also does not account for federal tax effects.
The original Haughwout (2002) estimates of the effect of public infrastructure on hous-
ing costs and wages are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4. The regression estimates
in panel A are based on repeated cross-sections that control for natural amenities, including
climate, and local taxes and services; the less precise estimates in panel B control for state
and year effects. The inferred values of a dollar of public infrastructure are in column 5,
with columns 3 and 4 separating the values for households and firms. In panel A, public
infrastructure is valued at 60 cents per dollar of cost, with 39 cents going to households and
21 cents going to firms. The values in panel B is only 30 cents on the dollar, representing a
39-cent gain to households and a 9-cent loss to firms.27
The revised estimates of the value of public infrastructure shown in each panel, use the
same regression estimates, but recalculate the values using the coefficients in panel B of
Table 2.3, as opposed to panel C. The revised values are considerably larger: in panel A the
marginal value of a dollar of public infrastructure is $1.35, which may passes a cost-benefit
test provided the marginal cost of public funds is sufficiently low. In panel B, the estimate
is $0.70 — all to households — still falling short of even the $1.00 benchmark, albeit it
cannot be ruled out statistically. Endogeneity concerns aside, the “Iron Law of Economet-
rics” (Hausman 2001) implies that estimates are likely highly attenuated given the errors
in measuring infrastructure. Furthermore, they ignore spillover effects to suburban resi-
dents.28
27Our parameterization of the Haughwout (2002) model is explained in Appendix B.3.2.
28This effect is especially true locally, as local wages do not rise. Also note that because home productivity
effects are unobserved, it is hard to know how these bias the estimates. If public infrastructure improves home
productivity, which seems likely, then the revised estimates are too low.
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Table 2.4: The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on the Original Haughwout Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public infrastructure on log Household Firm Total Federal
Housing cost Wages Valuation QOL tr. prod. value revenue
(1) (2) procedure (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled Estimates with Controls
Haughwout 0.39 0.21 0.60
0.23 0.003 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
(0.02) (0.002)
Revised 1.09 0.26 1.35 -0.11
(0.18) (0.04) (0.18) (0.02)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Fixed Effects
Haughwout 0.39 -0.09 0.30
0.12 -0.016 (0.10) (0.10) (0.15)
(0.05) (0.009)
Revised 0.70 0.00 0.70 -0.13
(0.31) (0.21) (0.29) (0.06)
Source: Estimates taken from rows 2 and 4 of Table 4 in Haughwout (2002), covering 33 cities
from 1974 to 1992. Haughwout valuation based on Panel C of Table 2.3; Revised from panel B.
Per-dollar values obtained by multiplying values by 14.93, the ratio of the present value of
income flows to the valued infrastructure (with a std. dev of $ 4,640 million in 1997$).
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2.8.2 Estimates from a Longer, Wider, and Deeper Panel of Cities
In the pursuit of updating Haughwout’s estimates, we construct a longer panel of infras-
tructure stocks from 1974 to 2011, doubling the sample length. We increase the number
of central cities in the sample from 31 to 55, and include New York City. We also expand
the range of data sources used to estimate housing-cost and wage differences to include not
only the American Housing Survey (AHS), but also the Current Population Survey (CPS),
and the Census (Decennial in 1980, 1990, and 2000; American Community Survey in 2005
and 2011) from Ruggles et al. (2004). One manner in which we differ from Haughwout is
that we combine benefits to renting households to owner-occupied ones, merging the two
in a “housing cost” index, described in Appendix B.4.
We estimate the same specifications as Haughwout, focusing on his full elasticity (log-
log) model. This specification uses total infrastructure without normalizing for population
size.29 One challenge we face is that we are unable to replicate Haughwout’s findings
exactly. Furthermore, his standard errors do not adjust for clustering effects by city. Our
calculations — based on our own data — suggest they may have been too small.30
Our wage and housing-cost estimates presented in Table 2.5 are rather different from
those in 2.4, The wage estimates are considerably greater: 0.21 in the pooled OLS, as
opposed to 0.003; 0.77 with FE, as opposed to -0.16. This may have to do with the much
higher quality of wage data in the CPS, ACS and the Census, relative to the AHS. Our
housing-cost effects are slightly more modest: 0.12 vs 0.23 in the pooled OLS; 0.11 vs
0.12 with city and year effects.
Our estimates are less precise, although that appears to be due to the clustering of the
standard errors, which cluster not only by state, but also rather conservatively by year.
These standard errors are roughly double the size of un-clustered, albeit robust, ones. Still,
all of the wage and housing cost estimates are statistically different from zero at a size of 6
percent.
The value of public infrastructure to households and firms is again inferred from the
coefficients in Panel B of Table 2.3. In the pooled OLS, the implied benefits to households
29We consider alternative specifications using the transformation g = Gα, where α ∈ [0, 1] is a generalized
congestion parameter. We find, like Haughwout, that values of α > 0 lead to worse fits of the data most of
the time.
30We did consider several variables that might serve as instruments for infrastructure investments, primarily
political ones such as those from Atlas et al. (1995) and Albouy (2013) None of our candidate variables
proved to be sufficiently relevant when trying to accommodate for stocks of infrastructure. See Cellini,
Ferriera, and Rothstein (2010) for a more successful attempt for school infrastructure.
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Table 2.5: The Value of Public Infrastructure Based on New Price Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public infrastructure on log Household Firm Total Federal
Housing cost Wages Valuation QOL tr. prod. value revenue
(1) (2) procedure (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled OLS Estimates with Controls
0.12 0.021 Revised 0.44 0.28 0.73 0.02
(0.03) (0.007) (0.17) (0.06) (0.19) (0.03)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Fixed Effects
0.11 0.077 Revised -0.07 0.69 0.62 0.27
(0.06) (0.023) (0.32) (0.18) (0.33) (0.10)
Source: Housing-cost and wage estimates from years 1974 to 2011 for 55 cities combining AHS, CPS,
Census, and ACS data. Standard errors are clustered by city and year. See Appendix B.4 for more.
are a bit weaker; for firms they are modest, yet larger than before. With fixed effects, only
the benefits to firms are detected, but they are considerable. Furthermore, federal taxes now
recoup almost half of infrastructure’s total value. On the whole, the valuations in A and
B are more modest than the reinterpreted estimates in Table 2.4, yet they cannot rule out
the hypothesis that infrastructure investments generate a dollar of benefits for each dollar
of cost.
2.8.3 Incorporating Population Changes and Home-Good Production
As mentioned earlier, estimates based on prices alone ignore information from population
changes. These may be particularly informative about home productivity changes, and
if households have some immobility, quality-of-life changes. This valuation procedures
draws on panels 4 and 5 of Table 2.3 Recall, this method generally infers higher productiv-
ity and overall value from wage and population changes; conditional on population, high
housing costs no longer signal total value, just in what form it takes.31
The population numbers may be the most difficult to interpret as causal, since endogene-
ity concerns are that investments may be based on predicted population patterns. Neverthe-
less, they do appear to be positively related with infrastructure. The pooled OLS numbers
31When considering changes in population, it is important to note that in the early part of the sample,
most central cities saw a decline in population. In the latter part of the sample, a number of cities saw a
considerable resurgence in population, particularly cities in the “sun belt” as opposed to the “rust belt.”
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Table 2.6: The Value of Public Infrastructure with Price and Population Estimates
Effect of a 1 std. dev. increase Value per dollar of infrastructure
in public Infrastructure on log Mobility Household Firm Firm Total
Housing cost Wages Population assumption QOL tr. prod Home pr. value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Pooled OLS Estimates with Controls
Perfect 0.44 0.42 0.71 1.58
0.12 0.021 0.72 ψ = 0.00 (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08)
(0.03) (0.007) (0.04)
Imperfect 0.98 0.42 0.71 2.12
ψ = 0.05 (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) (0.09)
Panel B: Panel Estimates with City and Year Effects
Perfect -0.07 0.77 0.46 1.17
0.11 0.077 0.39 ψ = 0.00 (0.32) (0.19) (0.31) (0.15)
(0.06) (0.023) (0.04)
Imperfect 0.22 0.77 0.46 1.46
ψ = 0.05 (0.33) (0.19) (0.31) (0.15)
Population estimates for central cities. See 2.5 for details
imply a population elasticity of 0.72; the FE, just 0.39. Both are positive and statistically
and economically significant.
The results for welfare now are considerably more positive. Because of the large popula-
tion effect, the pooled OLS estimates suggest a large benefit for firm producing nontraded
goods. The net result is a $1.58 return per dollar spent, almost half through home produc-
tivity. This result underscores the need to account for nontraded goods, and how misleading
results may be if those factors are ignored. The FE results show a somewhat smaller valu-
ation tilted towards higher home productivity.
With moderate immobility, the case for quality-of-life benefits also rises. With a ψ > 0,
existing residents have not seen the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of infrastructure
completely offset by housing costs. The resulting valuation more comfortably passes the
cost-benefit test, even in cases where the the marginal cost of public funds is considerably
above one.
While our estimates are far from conclusive, at a minimum this illustration reveals how
important valuation methods are; moreover, that they are sensitive to modeling assump-
tions. Even the best estimates of the impact of public infrastructure on prices and popula-
tion, if not interpreted properly, could lead to misleading results. For a topic as important
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as public investment, this has important policy implications.32
2.9 Conclusion
This paper highlights how the standard urban model of wages and housing values may
be inadequate for valuing of public goods. Valuations can be made more accurate by ac-
counting for nontraded production and federal taxes. In practice, these additions more than
double our value of public infrastructure based on previous estimates. Valuations may be
improved further by accounting for population changes, particularly if mobility is imper-
fect. Our appraisal of infrastructure is much greater when population changes are accounted
for. Fortunately, data on wages, housing values, and population should be available in many
instances to evaluate local projects.
It is remarkable how wages, housing values, land values, and population numbers con-
vey different but complementary information. Moreover, the conventional wisdom that the
full value of public goods is captured in land values, e.g., Brueckner (1983) may be mis-
guided. Land values do not capture federal tax externalities, nor the net benefits received
by local residents when mobility is imperfect. Simulations suggest that these housing costs
may serve mainly to distinguish improvements in quality-of-life reductions in nontraded
productivity. Thus, if housing prices in a city rise while its population and incomes remain
constant, this indicates that improvements in quality of life are being negated by diminish-
ing productivity in the housing sector.
Finally, this paper sheds light on the actual value of infrastructure. The estimates here
find that housing costs, wages, and populations all increase with infrastructure investments.
While the estimates are not conclusive, the positive results for housing do reinforce Haugh-
wout’s original estimates. The stronger positive wage estimates based on CPS data, com-
bined with the novel population estimates, evoke the older literature that focused on the
contribution of infrastructure to output. The inferred values indicate that infrastructure in-
vestments may indeed be worthwhile for central cities, even without spillovers to the sub-
urbs. Some of these benefits may accrue directly by local residents because of imperfect
mobility. Furthermore, infrastructure investments seem to have substantial fiscal externali-
ties, which help to justify federal subsidies for infrastructure. Lastly, infrastructure services
32Appendix B.4 also considers results around commuting times, spillover effects to suburbs and other
metro areas, and the sensitivity of results to large cities
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may help to keep housing costs from rising, even as it engenders urban population growth.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPUTING MISSING TAX VARIABLES FOR
TAXSIM: NONLINEARITY MATTERS
3.1 Introduction
The NBER tax model was first created by Amy Taylor in 1976 to estimate the effects of tax
deductibility on charitable giving (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). The current internal NBER
program estimates income taxes using the 213 variables available for individual income tax
return (Form 1040) published by the IRS as SOI Tax Statistics. While that dataset includes
fine details about income, there are very demographic variables. The TAXSIM model,
which is available on the web and as Stata and SAS programs, uses 22 variables to estimate
household income tax for surveys. Therefore, researchers can combine tax estimates with
behavioral responses available in the US surveys to evaluate the effects of tax policy – such
studies are not possible using SOI data. At this point, there are user-written programs to
calculate relevant 22 variables using the survey responses,1 and about 2500 Google scholar
records for TAXSIM.
However, depending on the survey design, such estimates suffer from various biases
caused by missing or unavailable variables. In this paper, I evaluate the types and extent of
the missing variable bias and discuss the use of SOI dataset for imputing these variables. I
show that the zero-imputed marginal tax estimates are actually performing almost always
better than regression-imputed tax outcomes. The reason is that most of the values for the
imputed variables are actually zeros, and linear regression does not take that into account.
However, when four TAXSIM variables are simultaneously missing, regression-imputation
is outperforming zero-imputation for total taxes. The likely reason for this performance
is the cumulative effect of these variables against the standard deductions in income tax
formula.
After discussing the data, methodology, and the results of the evaluation study, I present
1For a list of publicly available programs, see http://users.nber.org/ taxsim/to-taxsim/
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an empirical example. To demonstrate how the tax measures perform differently after im-
puting tax inputs, I replicate the results of Gelber and Mitchell (2012)2 Imputing multiple
TAXSIM variables, this replication shows that the final empirical findings change dramati-
cally.
3.2 Evaluation Data
I use two main data sources in the evaluation study: (1) Statistics of Income(SOI) public use
files (PUF), 1960-2016, and (2) Current Population Survey, 1961-2012. I use the NBER’s
tax model version of SOI-PUF which includes 213 variables that are consistent over time3
For comparability, I translate these variables to the 22 TAXSIM variables.
The CPS dataset is among the richest surveys for estimating different categories of the
households’ characteristics. To that effect, it may be considered an external data source to
impute the missing variables for other surveys itself. I translate the IPUMS CPS variables
to tax inputs. For example, wages and salaries are estimated using the wages income,
business income, and farm income variables in CPS. There are three main concerns for
generating tax estimates. Firstly, we cannot estimate short term capital gains, property
taxes paid, mortgage payments paid, and childcare expenses for households. Secondly,
while we can estimate the other TAXSIM variables, those estimates themselves suffer from
missing variables.4 Finally, the income categories are top-coded.
While I only address the problem of missing variables, a side by side comparison of the
summary statistics for SOI and CPS tax variables shows the severity of these three issues.
2The authors were kind enough to provide me with their data and programs which reproduce the results
of their paper.
3This dataset is available on /home/data/soi/taxsim/ on NBER server. It is restricted to NBER members
who may gain access by contacting Dan Feenberg.
4For example, Other property income should include interest, unearned partnership and S-corp income,
rent, alimony, fellowships, non-qualified dividends, state income tax refunds (itemizers only), capital gains
distributions on form 1040, and other income or loss not otherwise enumerated here. We can only estimate
four of these items in CPS.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Tax Variables in SOI and CPS
SOI CPS
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Marital status 1.83 0.50 1.55 0.65
Number of dependents 1.05 1.46 0.57 1.06
The age indicator of primary taxpayer 0.15 0.46 0.21 0.51
Number of dependent children under 17 0.66 1.09 0.00 0.00
Wage income of primary taxpayer 194.4 1086.2 15.2 33.2
Wage income of secondary taxpayer 0.0 0.0 7.9 19.0
Dividend income 39.2 446.1 0.3 3.1
Interest and other property income 86.9 887.4 1.0 6.0
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 16.2 155.4 0.9 5.2
Gross social security benefits 1.9 6.7 1.6 4.6
Non-taxable transfer income 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.7
Rent paid 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Property tax paid 0.1 1.9 0.0 0.0
Taxes paid other than state income taxes 0.0 0.0 3.1 6.0
Child care expenses 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.1 1.3 0.1 1.1
Mortgage interest paid 10.9 160.9 0.0 0.0
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) -9.8 752.3 0.0 0.0
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 191.3 2235.0 0.4 4.9
3.3 Evaluation Methodology
3.3.1 The Econometric Issue
A typical linear regression model which includes an income tax measure such as federal or
state marginal tax rate, average tax rate, etc. may be formulated as follows:
yijt = α +X
′
ijtβ + τTijt + δt + γjεijt (3.1)
where y denotes the dependent variable,X is the vector of control variables, T is an income
tax measure, and ε is the residual term. Dependent on the survey design, the regression may
also include time and geography fixed effects denoted by δ and γ, respectively.
The tax measure itself, is a nonlinear function of income variables, I , and some house-
hold demographics, H . I can write:
T = f(I,H) (3.2)
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where I and H are both vectors, and I denote different income variables by Ik, k =
1, 2, ..., K.
Suppose that the tax measure T is a linear function of I , that is, T = I ′ϕm where ϕ is
the vector of coefficients. Therefore, we can write equation (3.1) as follows.




ijtϕ) + δt + γjεijt (3.3)
With vector ϕ known, one can run a restricted regression model, to estimate τ .5
Let’s assume that the household demographics are available, but one or a few of the
income variables are missing. In this context, the regression results suffer from omitted
variable bias. When the remedies for this problem6 are not available to researchers, one
might consider imputing these variables using an auxiliary dataset. However, keeping the
linear framework for the imputation, the new variables would be completely collinear with
the existing ones and will be dropped from the regression7.
However, we know that the federal individual income taxes follow a highly nonlinear
formula in the U.S. In that context, the imputed variables no longer suffer from collinearity
and can be included in the hypothetical regression of equation (3.3). As a made-up exam-
ple, suppose that dividends follow a deterministic one-to-one relationship with salaries in
our sample, and the tax rate is zero for dividend income below $1000, and 10% otherwise.
Further, suppose that dividends are omitted in our dataset, but we know the exact relation-
ship between dividends and salaries from an auxiliary dataset. In this hypothetical case,
imputing dividends clearly gives us the correct tax estimates, while dropping dividends
results in all taxes calculated as zero.
The example above demonstrates that when the tax formula is nonlinear imputing the
missing income variables can potentially reduce the omitted variable bias.
5The restriction being that all the Ikϕk variables have the same coefficient τ .
6There are three possible approaches to lessen the omitted variable bias: (1) using and instrumental vari-
able, (2) using individual fixed effects, (3) including proxy variables.
7Another issue might be measurement error in any of thee input variables. The similar bias that arises
in these cases can be addressed using the same methods discussed here. However, this paper focuses on the
cases where one of the variables is completely missing.
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3.3.2 Imputation Methodology
My objective is to impute the missing income variables of survey data using the auxiliary
dataset of Statistics of Income published by the IRS.8 While an arsenal of different methods
is available to accomplish this task, I use linear regression imputation.9 Given the number
of observations in the SOI data the number of features resulting from state and year fixed
effects, the linear regression approach is a natural choice.
I implement the imputation using the below algorithm:
1. Create similar samples: create the target sample strata weights and get a bootstrap
sample the auxiliary sample (SOI) according to those weights.
2. Run regression: Using the sample in (1) above, find the relationship between the
omitted variables and the existing ones using regression. Save the regression formula.
3. Predict the omitted variables: using the regression formulas in (2), impute the
omitted variables in the target sample.
4. Add random noise: sample from the normal distribution ∼ N (0, σ2) . where σ2 is
the variance of the regression residuals.
The goal of step (1) is to create a subsample of SOI dataset which is representative of the
target dataset. I use the demographic indicators, like the number of tax exemptions, state,
and year indicators. Additionally, I use quintile indicators for salaries and wages to create a
sample which is representative of the same income distribution. While the same procedure
can be used for other available income variables, as I discuss in section 3.2, a lot of those
variables are not correctly estimated in survey samples. Finally, I use bootstrap sampling
(sampling with replacement) to create a subsample that mimics the target dataset in terms
of strata counts.
In step (2), using the auxiliary data (SOI), I regress the variables that are not available
in the target dataset on those that are available in both datasets. Those variables include
state10 and year, using which I create state and year fixed effects. Once the regression is run,
results are saved and can be used to impute the relevant missing variables in any dataset.
8See section (3.2) for more details about the datasets.
9Nearest-neighbor imputation, mean imputation, ratio imputation, regression imputation, and quantile
regression imputation are some examples of determinist imputation methods used to compensate for non-
response in datasets. See ? for an elaborate discussion of these methods followed by quantile regression
imputation.
10In SOI, state is missing in most of the years before 1979, for 2009 and 2010.
77
In step (3), I predict the missing variables using the existing variables in the target dataset
in accordance with step (2) regressions.
Using the predicted values in step (3) leads to biased variance estimates for the measured
taxes. Little and Rubin (2002) suggest adding random draws from ∼ N (0, σ2) . where σ2
to account for the variance in imputed variables. Assuming that the step (2) residuals are
homoskedastic and normally distributed, step (4) adds the appropriate randomness to the
imputed results.11
Zero-imputing the missing variables can indeed reduce the variance of tax estimates.
For example, in SOI sample, the standard deviation of federal income taxes is 15% lower
than the original taxes when long term capital gains or other property income are zero-
imputed. However, the same standard deviations are 1% higher if we zero-impute the
mortgage interest payments. The latter highlights that step(4) above is a naive strategy that
ignores the correlation structure and heteroskedasticity.
I should highlight that in what follows, I stop imputing at step (3). This is largely because
my comparison sample is the tax estimates zero-imputed income variables, which by design
do not account for the variance of the original variable.
3.4 Evaluation Results
I implement the imputation methodology using the income and demographic variables in
SOI-PUF dataset. Since surveys are typically rich in demographics and poor in income
variables, I assume that the tax variables that are based on demographics are always avail-
able. I make the same assumption about salaries and wages since they are the basis for
estimating income taxes.
In this section, I focus on two experiments. First, I drop each of the variables in SOI,
run the regressions, and compare the zero-imputed, regression-imputed, and actual tax esti-
mates. In each case, I make the comparison through the lens of R-Squared of the regression
of real tax outcomes on those with one missing input. My rationale for this test is that if a
linear transformation of the tax outputs with missing inputs is very close to the actual tax
outputs, we can use the coefficients of such transformation to identify the true effect of tax
outputs on our outcome variable. For example, if I knew that a proxy variable is always
11Quantile imputation can be used to handle heteroskedasticity. However, it is hard to implement in Stata.
An R implementation of this method is in order after TAXSIM is further tested in R.
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twice as large as my target variable, then the coefficient of my target variable is exactly
identified. Table 3.4 shows that not having data on “interest and other property income”
and “long term capital gains” are very costly.
Next, I compare the zero-imputed tax outcomes with the regression-imputed ones. I first
impute each TAXSIM variable and then impute all the variables that are missing in CPS.
Comparing the regression-imputed and zero-imputed tax estimates, I show that the zero-
imputed marginal tax estimates are actually performing almost always better. The reason
is that most of the values for the imputed variables are actually zeros, and linear regression
does not take that into account. The only case where regression-imputation is outperform-
ing zero-imputation are the total taxes when four TAXSIM variables are simultaneously
missing.
Before presenting the results of those experiments, I assess how predictable each of the
income variables is when we have all the other ones.
3.4.1 Predictability of Income Variables
Successful imputation of missing variables partially depends on the quality of predictions.
Using SOI data, we can predict each of the tax variables using all the other ones. Table 3.2
reports the R-Squared for each of such regression. R-Squared exceeds 20% for six out of
our ten variables. It is particularly lower for the variables like unemployment benefits and
child care expenses that are reported more rarely. Tobit model may be a more appropriate
model for these variables. For example, R-Squared for unemployment benefits increases to
11% using the Tobit model.12
For the variables with low R-Squared, regression imputation is at the worst equivalent to
mean imputation. However, as far as these tax variables are to compete with the standard
deductions, the means of these variables are too small to have an impact on the calculated
taxes. In fact, as Table 3.3 demonstrates, absent prediction power, zero-imputation will
perform better that mean-imputation for some of these variables like child care expenses or
unemployment benefits.
12However, Tobit model is very slow in multi-processor Stata, even on NBER server and standard devia-
tions are not reported. Therefore, I keep the OLS results in this paper.
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Table 3.2: Predictability of Income Variables
Variable to Impute R-Squared
Interest and other property income 53%
Dividend income 46%
Gross social security benefits 35%
Mortgage interest paid 34%
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 24%
Property tax paid 21%
Child care expenses 8%
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 5%
Unemployment compensation benefits 4%
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 3%
Table 3.3: Zero-valued percentage of SOI variables
Variable to Impute % Zero
Interest and other property income 21%
Dividend income 48%
Mortgage interest paid 51%
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 55%
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 71%
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 81%
Gross social security benefits 87%
Property tax paid 93%
Child care expenses 95%
Unemployment compensation benefits 96%
3.4.2 Significant Tax Variables
I drop each of the variables in SOI, run the regressions, and compare the zero-imputed,
regression-imputed, and actual tax estimates. In each case, I make the comparison through
the lens of R-Squared of the regression of real tax outcomes on those with one missing
input.
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Table 3.4: Original versus Missing Variable R-Squareds
Fed. In-
come Tax
Fed. MTR State In-
come Tax
State MTR
Child care expenses 100% 100% 100% 100%
Dividend income 96% 90% 97% 97%
Gross social security benefits 100% 99% 100% 100%
Interest and other property income 81% 86% 87% 93%
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 97% 95% 98% 96%
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 81% 94% 66% 96%
Mortgage interest paid 100% 99% 100% 99%
Property tax paid 100% 100% 100% 100%
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 98% 99% 98% 99%
Unemployment compensation benefits 100% 100% 100% 100%
3.4.3 Imputation Simulations in SOI
For each TAXSIM variable, Tables (3.5) and (3.6) present the R-squared measures of zero-
imputed and regression-imputed tax outcomes on actual tax outcomes. For each of the out-
come variables, “Imp. R2” columns are the R-squared of the regression-imputed outcome
on actual outcomes– The larger the “Imp. R2” the better the regression-imputed outcomes
can be at reducing omitted variable bias. “∆R2” is the zero-imputed R2 subtracted from
the “Imp. R2” values. A large and positive “∆R2” signifies that regression-imputation of
that specific variable outperforms doing nothing – remember that TAXSIM zero-imputes
by default.
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Table 3.5: Regression- vs. Zero-Imputed TAXSIM inputs: Federal Tax Outputs
Fed. Tax Fed MTR
Imp. R2 ∆R2 Imp. R2 ∆R2
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 97% 0.00% 95% -0.01%
Interest and other property income 80% -0.45% 87% 0.82%
Dividend income 96% 0.02% 91% 0.34%
Gross social security benefits 100% 0.00% 99% 0.04%
Property tax paid 100% 0.00% 100% 0.00%
Child care expenses 100% 0.00% 100% -0.26%
Unemployment compensation benefits 100% 0.00% 100% -0.01%
Mortgage interest paid 100% 0.00% 99% 0.02%
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 98% -0.03% 83% -15.88%
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 81% 0.08% 71% -23.38%
Table 3.6: Regression- vs. Zero-Imputed TAXSIM inputs: State Tax Outputs
State Tax State MTR
Imp. R2 ∆R2 Imp. R2 ∆R2
IRA distributions and Taxable pensions 98% -0.02% 96% -0.08%
Interest and other property income 87% -0.24% 93% 0.24%
Dividend income 97% 0.00% 97% -0.39%
Gross social security benefits 100% 0.00% 98% -1.42%
Property tax paid 100% 0.00% 100% -0.07%
Child care expenses 100% 0.00% 100% -0.13%
Unemployment compensation benefits 100% 0.00% 100% 0.00%
Mortgage interest paid 100% -0.02% 99% -0.02%
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 98% 0.02% 87% -12.30%
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 68% 1.41% 82% -14.60%
The one takeaway from this experiment is that using linear regression predictions using
the SOI variables is almost always worse than doing nothing. This is demonstrated by the
negative values in “∆R2” columns.
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3.4.4 CPS Tax Estimates
Let’s see what happens if we impute four variables simultaneously. I impute four missing
tax variables in CPS: (1) short term capital gains/losses, (2) property Taxes, (3) mortgage
interest, and (4) childcare expenses, in addition to (5) long term capital gains. The CPS
estimate for long term capital gains is 9% of that of the SOI sample, and Table 3.4 shows
that its availability is particularly important for accurate tax estimates.
The simulation results in Table 3.7 show the performance of this method for different tax
measures. For each tax measure, the second column presents the R-Squared of the regres-
sion of actual SOI number on that of the SOI with the five variables above imputed. The
third column shows the difference of the R-squared in column (2) with the same measure
when those tax variables are zero-imputed. We can see that imputing these variables, as
prescribed here, slightly improves the total taxes estimates over zero-imputed variables.
However, the marginal tax rate estimates perform much better with zero-imputed variables.
As discussed earlier, this may be caused by the inability of linear regression to correctly
predict the majority of tax variables that are zero.
Table 3.7: Performance of CPS Imputation in SOI Sample
Tax Measure Imp. R2 ∆R2
Federal Taxes 61% 5.90%
Federal MTR 64% -30.06%
State Taxes 31% 1.67%
State MTR 81% -16.53%
Figure (3.1) shows the nonlinear relationship between federal tax estimates for zero-
imputed and regression-imputed tax variables in CPS after controlling for salaries and
wages. The non-parametric estimates are obtained from a kernel regression with the Gaus-
sian kernel where I linearly control for salaries and wages. This figure shows that imputing
the missing variables does not simply move the average of tax estimates, which is the case
where imputing does not matter for the final regression.
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Figure 3.1: Nonlinear relationship between federal tax estimates for zero-imputed and regression-imputed
tax variables in CPS.
3.5 Empirical Example
After briefly discussing the context and methodology of Gelber and Mitchell (2012) (GM),
this section shows how their estimates differ after imputing the inputs to TAXSIM tax
estimates. Their paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation during the entire
day and how these time allocation decisions interact with expenditure patterns. Using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1975 to 2004, they analyze the response of single
women’s housework, labor supply, and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules
across income levels, number of children, states, and time. Their findings suggest that when
the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases, market work increases and
housework decreases, with the decrease in house work accounting for approximately two-
thirds of the increase in market work. While they use three different datasets to compare
these findings for multiple cross-section set up, I only show the results for their PSID
(1975-2004) sample 13.
When estimating the tax burden in TAXSIM, they assume that all other TAXSIM vari-
ables are zero except marital status and number of dependent children. Here, I impute these
13Their methodology is very similar for other datasets. Working with PSID has the advantage of observ-
ing if going from pooled OLS to individual fixed effects estimates significantly changes the importance of
imputing TAXSIM variables.
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variables and trace how their results change.
In their basic empirical set up for PSID, they regress usual weekly hours of time spent
on an activity (market work, housework, or other time14) for individual i in year t on the
average net-of-tax share (1 − τ), a measure of unearned income Y , a set of demographic
control variables X , year fixed effects θ, individual fixed effects Γ , and an error term ε15 :
hit = β1(1− τit) + β2Yit +Xitβ + θt + Γi + εit (3.4)
The effective average net-of-tax share (ANTR) is defined as the fraction of an individual’s
earnings that she would keep, if she chose to work:
(1− τit) = [Eit − (Tw,it − Tnw,it)]/Eit (3.5)
where E is earnings if you work, Tw is net taxes paid if you work, and Tnw is net taxes paid
if you do not work. ANTR measures an individual’s incentive to participate in the labor
force and is relevant if an individual makes a choice between staying out of the labor force
and participating in the labor force and earning the pre-tax amount E.
They estimate Tw and Tnw as the sum of income tax burden using TAXSIM. When
working, since earnings are unobserved, total labor income is regression-imputed based on
demographics. When not working, total earnings are imputed zero. They assume all other
TAXSIM variables are zero in both cases except marital status and number of dependent
children.
Based on the methodology of section 3.3.2, I use the SOI data to impute their TAXSIM
variables based on state, year, marital status, number of dependent children, and the labor
income levels of a working person. I present summary statistics on the imputed variables
in Table 3.8. To only capture the tax effect of changing labor income as their paper intends
to, the imputed variables are fixed at these levels when estimating income taxes of non-
working persons16. We can see that the biggest movers are short term and long term capital
gains. However, as discussed before, the cumulative effect of small changes in TAXSIM
14In their Gelber and Mitchell (2009) NBER paper, they also present the results for a labor market partici-
pation indicator, which I present here. The standard errors presented here also follow the clustered standard
errors strategy of that paper. Their 2012 paper bootstraps the standard errors, which are computationally more
intensive to calculate and do not alter the findings of the current paper in any meaningful way.
15See equation (1) of Gelber and Mitchell (2012)
16I am not imputing unemployment earnings. They are sparse and hard to impute (as discussed earlier) and
they are likely to be considered for households work decisions. I abstract from such considerations to keep
this analysis consistent with Gelber and Mitchell (2012).
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input variables can cause major movements in estimated taxes.
Table 3.8: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Short term capital gain or loss (+/-) 7203.388 30837.96 -50298.383 221469.766
Long term capital gain or loss (+/-) 95015.376 192711.198 -330614.281 786870.438
Property tax paid 1.647 1.586 0.623 25.095
Mortgage interest paid 14.783 20.351 0.551 765.115
Child care expenses 1.601 0.744 0.707 4.09
Dividend income 32.964 114.343 0.104 2427.87
Gross social security benefits 1.545 0.881 0.138 7.686
N 9242
Table (3.9) compares the summary statistics before and after imputing TAXSIM vari-
ables for ANTR, (1− τit),net taxes paid if you work, Tw,it, and net taxes paid if you don’t
work, Tnw,it. On average, my estimated ANTRs are 16.7% lower than GM’s and have a
higher variance. We can see that the major mover of ANTR is my estimated net taxes
paid if you don’t work. This difference is because, when estimating income taxes, Gelber
and Mitchell (2012) assume that the household earns no other income if not working. On
the other hand, higher tax deductions are the stronger force for working households. On
average, The estimated net taxes paid if you work decrease from $3991 to $38370.
Figure (3.2) shows the scatter plot of my ANTR on GM’s estimates. Note that while for
many the estimated ANTRs are lower, there is significant bunching on the 45-degree line.
There are almost no observations for which my ANTRs are estimated higher than GMs.
Table 3.9: Summary statistics on Gelber and Mitchell (2012) tax estimates before and after imputing
TAXSIM variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
GM’s net taxes paid if you work 3991.854 3541.001 -4360.75 18885.721
My net taxes paid if you work 38370.647 45613.755 -2138.13 236731.719
GM’s net taxes paid if you don’t work -13.687 58.246 -530.45 0
My net taxes paid if you don’t work 31574.972 42321.002 -408 212194.328
GM’s average net-of-tax rate 0.799 0.128 0.606 1.357
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Figure 3.2: Scatter plot of average net-of-tax rate estimates of Gelber and Mitchell (2012) before and after
imputing TAXSIM variables.
Using the GM’s original and my new estimated ANTR’s, I replicate Table 2 of Gelber
and Mitchell (2009) and compare the main coefficients in Figure 3.3. For identical em-
pirical specifications, each point on this figure represents the coefficient of GM’s ANSR
versus that of my TAXSIM-imputed ANSR. The points in this figure are color-coded by
the dependent variable. The coefficients on my TAXSIM-imputed ANSR, represented on
the vertical axis, are consistently much smaller in magnitude. Furthermore, the 95% confi-
dence bands of these new estimates show that they are typically not statistically significant
at the 5% level17.
However, there is no relationship between the empirical specification used and the dif-
ference between the coefficients. This is highlighted in figure 3.4 where the coefficient
pairs are color codes by the column number of the specification used in Table 2 of Gelber
and Mitchell (2012). This means that the result of not imputing the TAXSIM variables
outweighs any changes that are due to empirical specification of the final regression.
This section shows how imputing TAXSIM variables can dramatically change the results
of the final empirical analysis. However, we saw in the previous sections that after imput-
ing, TAXSIM outputs are noisier than desirable. Therefore, the results of this section are
subject to the caveats in the performance of imputing methodology which were shown by
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GM’s Table 2 Coefficients vs. My Coeficients
Figure 3.3: Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients versus TAXSIM Imputed
Coefficients by color-coded by dependent variable
Notes: ANTR refers to the average net-of-tax rate, calculated using income imputed with demographics, as described in the text. The
average net-of-tax rate is the percentage of income that a woman would keep if she participated in the labor force. Vertical lines
represent 95% confidence bands. The results are for all empirical specifications. For description of specifications and color-coded
comparisons by specification see figure 3.4.
simulation exercises.
3.6 Conclusion
I show that the zero-imputed marginal tax estimates are actually performing almost always
better than regression-imputed tax outcomes. The reason is that most of the values for
the imputed variables are actually zeros, and linear regression does not take that into ac-
count. Therefore, the future work should try Tobit model or machine learning classification
techniques that deal with rare events.
However, when four TAXSIM variables are simultaneously missing, regression-imputation
is outperforming zero-imputation for total taxes. The likely reason for this performance is
the use of standard deductions in income tax formula. Maybe in some cases, it is only after
imputing four variables that the tax deductions will become larger than standard deductions,
hence affecting the total tax estimates. Understanding in which cases the regression impu-
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Figure 3.4: Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients versus TAXSIM Imputed
Coefficients by color-coded by empirical specification
Notes: ANTR refers to the average net-of-tax rate, calculated using income imputed with demographics, as described in the text. The
average net-of-tax rate is the percentage of income that a woman would keep if she participated in the labor force. Standard errors are
clustered by individual. Each regression using the full sample contains data on 1243 individuals. All regressions control for dummies
for all possible values of age and number of children as well as individual and year fixed effects; this is also the set of basic controls
used in Column 1. Column 2 removes individual fixed effects and controls for education dummies (which appear in the imputation but
in other specification cations are collinear with the individual fixed effects). Column 3 controls for the incentives created by AFDC,
TANF, and food stamps, summarized by the variable “Welfare ATR”, equal to the difference between welfare benefits if a woman
works and does not, as a fraction of earnings if she works. Column 4 limits the sample to the period before 1993. Column 5 instruments
for non-labor income with the value of the welfare benefits a woman would receive if she did not work. Column 6 controls for the state
minimum wage, gross state product, the presence of a welfare waiver, average labor income interacted with year, and education-by-year
fixed effects. Column 7 adds the interaction of year dummies with a dummy for having a child. Column 8 uses a Heckman selection
correction in imputing income as described in the Gelber and Mitchell (2012) text. Column 9 instruments for the imputed net-of-tax
wage using the average net-of-tax share. Column 10 instruments for one measure of the average net-of-tax share using another measure
as described in the Gelber and Mitchell (2012) text. Columns 14 and 68 run OLS regressions.
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Proceeding with an empirical example of imputing multiple TAXSIM variables, repli-
cation of Gelber and Mitchell (2012) shows that the final empirical findings can change
dramatically. However, these results are subject to the caveats in performance of imputing
methodology which were shown by simulation exercises. Future work may re-examine this
replication after improving imputing methods.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Replicating Leduc and Wilson (2013) and FHWA(2005)
Leduc and Wilson (2013) give a detailed description of how they construct their shock
measure in their online appendix. After testing a few alternatives, I was able to replicate
their graphs using the same methodology12.
I can closely replicate the 2009 forecasts of FHWA as of 2005. FHWA has published
these forecasts in the attachments to Young (2005). In figure (A.1), I compare my forecasts
with those, which shows that my methodology is very close to that of FHWA. Further
reassuring is that this graph is almost identical to that of Leduc and Wilson (2013) (Fig. 1
in their paper.)
Next, I present the time series of the grant shocks and forecast errors for the four states of
California, New York, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. Both panels of figure (A.2) show
that the shocks can considerably large, and state size or population are not good predictors
of shock size or volatility. Comparing these graphs with those of Leduc and Wilson (2013),
it is possible to verify that I am closely replicating their measures.
Furthermore, figure (A.2) shows that there are large shocks in the first years of highway
bills (1998, 2005 and post 2009 years). There are also some large shocks in other years,
such as 1996 and 2004. However, as discussed in the paper, the shocks that affect all states
1In addition to the assumptions described by Leduc and Wilson (2013), the treatment of stop-gap years
is important. For the years following the stop gap year, I have assumed that nationwide apportionments by
program grow at the expected inflation rate based on actual apportionments of that year. The same assumption
is made for years beyond 2009, until MAP-21 is passed.
2Reallocation of minimum guarantee payments for years before 2007, is another detail that I experimented
with in implementing their methodology. The issue arises because starting in 2007, FHWA statistics include
the minimum guarantee payments of major programs in that programs allocated funds. To make the data
consistent over time, one needs to make a similar adjustment for the years prior to 2007. I reallocate the
“Equity Bonus” or Minimum Guarantee according to each programs share of total for that state. I repeat the
same for the future periods based on each programs expected share of expected total grants.
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Figure A.1: Federal Highway Administration versus my 2009 Grants Forecasts to States as of 2005
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are not my source of identification because I control for year effects.
A.1.1 Using Leduc and Wilson Data
Leduc and Wilson kindly provided their final dataset. This dataset includes all the vari-
ables used in their final specification. Using the same time periods, same states, and same
specification, my estimates of IRFs are of very similar magnitude to LW ones and they
qualitatively replicate their results. That is, my point estimates are within the 90% confi-
dence bands of LW results and vice versa. Figure (A.3) for GDP per capita is presented as
an example.
Since my results are not identical, I compare my measured shocks with theirs. The
only reason these estimates may be different is that my shocks are not the same as LW3.
Scatter plot of my estimated shocks versus LW ones in figure (A.4) highlights how the two
measures differ. Except for a few outliers, they are generally very similar. Furthermore,
there is no systematic over or underestimation of the grant shocks comparing our estimates.
Figure (A.5) presents the shocks for four states over time. This figure, and other tabulations
not presented here, conclude that there is no clear pattern to the differences between our
estimates.
Although I use the same general methodology to construct the shocks as LW, there are
a lot of details that one needs to account for in practice. Our methods possibly diverge in
estimating expected authorizations and apportionments in stop-gap years, allocating Donor
State Bonus, Apportionment Adjustments, or special programs like PL104-59 Restoration
Program that only existed in 1996 and 1997. Despite these potential differences, our shocks
estimates are close. Finally, it is possible that FHWA updated its published since LW
downloaded the data.
A.2 Balanced Budget Rules
The Balanced Budget Rules in this paper were taken from Bohn and Inman (1996). Their
description of the data is repeated here as a reference.
“Five different balanced-budget constraints are listed. The first, and perhaps the weakest
of the limitations, only requires the governor to submit a balanced budget at the start of
3I dont have their work on construction of shocks at this point
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(a) Highway Grant Shocks for 1993-2014
(b) Highway Grants Forecast Error for 1993-2014
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Figure A.5: LW vs. my Highway Grant Shocks over time (1993-2010)
budget deliberations. The second constraint requires the state legislature to pass a balanced
budget. Importantly, neither of these two prospective constraints alone imposes any fiscal
discipline at the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, states with just these prospective con-
straints - Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Nevada - are
legally allowed to run deficits at the end of a fiscal year.
States facing the third constraint are allowed to run a deficit at the end of the year, but
they are required to explicitly budget for that deficit in the next fiscal year. These states
may carry-over a deficit from one year to the next. For example, if Connecticut runs a
deficit, then the governor and the legislature must include funds to repay that deficit when
they submit and then pass their prospective budget for the next fiscal year. Importantly,
however, this constraint never requires the deficit to be actually eliminated. States with
this ”may carry-over” constraint and prospective budget balance rules- Alaska, California,
Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin - can simply roll their
deficits into next fiscal years indefinitely. Here again, there is no effective end-of-the-year
fiscal balance requirement.
An effective end-of-the-year balance requirement occurs only in those states which can-
not carry-over a deficit from one budget period to the next. In these states, having a C or
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an S in columns 4 and 5 of table A.1, deficits materializing during the budget period must
be reduced to zero by the end of the period. This may be accomplished by raising taxes,
by collecting additional federal aid, by cutting spending, or by some combination of these
fiscal options. Fiscal gimmicks also known as ”adjustments” - for example, collecting next
fiscal year’s taxes or grants early or postponing payment for services into the next fiscal
year- may also be used to balance the budget. The aggregate amount of dollars actually
available to the state through these bookkeeping gimmicks appears to be limited, however;
see U.S. GAO (1993). Rather, real spending and tax adjustments are used to close a deficit
gap in the no-carry-over states. If a deficit does remain at the end of a fiscal year after
all spending and revenue adjustments are made, it must be carried into the next fiscal year
where it again faces the end-of-the-year no-deficit constraint.
States with biennial budget periods may impose the no-carry-over constraint on either a
yearly or on a biennial basis; see column 4, table A.1. States with a budget period of only
one year must meet the no-carry-over constraint within that single fiscal year; see column
5, table A.1. l Enforcement of these balanced-budget rules is by the state’s courts, with
the state supreme court the ultimate arbiter. If the state supreme court is appointed by the
governor or by the state legislature (i.e., by those accountable for the deficit), it is possi-
ble that enforcement of balanced-budget rules will be less strenuous. Appointed supreme
courts may behave more like a government agency than a truly independent monitor of
fiscal performance.
Independently elected supreme courts, on the other hand, are free of direct gubernatorial
or legislative influences and therefore hypothesized to be tougher monitors of fiscal policy.
We shall test this proposition in Section 5 below. Table A.1, column 6, indicates whether
the state supreme court is appointed or elected. The balanced-budget rules listed in table
A.1 only apply to the general fund account of the state budgets, but states perform fiscal ac-
tivities through a variety of other accounts as well. In addition to the general fund account,
states have capital budgets and bond fund accounts to receive and allocate capital borrow-
ings, sinking fund accounts to collect funds for debt repayments, public employee pension
fund accounts to save and disburse funds for employee retirements, insurance trust accounts
to save and disburse funds for disability and workmen’s compensation, and “rainy-day”
fund accounts to save general fund surpluses and to cushion general fund deficits. Each
of these accounts is legally entitled to receive funds from the general fund and to allocate
funds to the general fund. Constraints on these funds may therefore have implications for
the general fund deficit. We shall test the additional effects of one of these constraints on
98
the general fund deficit: the inability of states to borrow through general obligation long-
term debt without prior referendum approval of the voters, ff this constraint is binding,
then capital projects must be financed either through (revenue) bonds which do not face
the referendum constraint or through a surplus transfer from the general fund account to
the capital account. States with a referendum borrowing constraint on the use of long-term
general obligation debt are listed in Table 2, column 7.
Peltzman’s (1992) argument that voters are fiscal conservatives and hold governors re-
sponsible for marginal expansions of state budgets suggests that governors seeking re-
election should seek to control spending and taxes. If voters recognize that state deficits
represent future taxes, then deficits should be controlled, too. One potential weapon in a
governor’s budget arsenal is the line-item veto. If this veto is an effective instrument for a
fiscally conservative governor, then governors with the item veto are likely to have smaller
deficits - particularly in states with no-carry-over rules - than governors without an item
veto. In his study of the item veto, Holtz-Eakin (1988) finds that when government power
is divided between two parties - one controlling the executive and the other the legislature
- the item veto does help governors reduce spending and raise taxes. The item veto may
be a useful tool for controlling general fund deficits as well. We shall test this proposition
directly. States whose governor can use an item veto are listed in Table (A.1), column 8.”4
4Bohn and Inman (1996)
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Table A.1: Budget Rules and Enforcement































AL - - - - C 10 E R IV
AK S - C - - 6 A R IV
AZ - - - - C 10 A R IV
AR - - - - S 9 E NR IV
CA C - C - - 6 E R IV
CO - - - - C 10 A R IV
CT S S S - - 5 A NR IV
DE - - - - C 10 A NR IV
FL - - - - C 10 A NR IV
GA - - - - C 10 E R IV
HI C - - C C 10 A NR IV
ID - - - - C 10 E R IV
IL C C - - - 4 E NR IV
IN - - - - C 10 A R NIV
IA - - - - C 10 A R IV
KS - - - - C 10 A R IV
KY - - - C S 10 E R IV
LA - C - - - 4 E NR IV
ME - - - - S 9 A R NIV
MD C C C - - 6 A NR IV
MA C - - - - 3 A NR IV
MI - - C - - 6 E NR IV
MN - - - C - 8 E R IV
MS - - - - S 9 E R IV
MO - - - - C 10 A R IV
MT - C - C C 10 E NR IV
NE - - - - C 10 A R IV
NV S C - - - 4 E NR NIV
NH S - - - - 2 A NR NIV
NJ - - - - C 10 A R IV
NM - - - - C 10 E R IV
NY C - - - - 3 A NR IV
NC - - - - C 10 E NR NIV
ND - - - C - 8 E R IV
OH - - - - C 10 E R IV
OK - - - - C 10 E NR IV
OR - - - C - 8 E R IV
PA C S C - - 6 E NR IV
RI - - - - C 10 A R NIV
SC - - C - C 10 A R IV
SD - - - - C 10 E R IV
TN - - C - C 10 E NR IV
TX - C - C - 8 E R IV
UT - - - - C 10 A R IV
VT - - - - - 0 A NR NIV
VA - - - C - 8 A R IV
WA - - - C - 8 E R IV
WV - - - - C 10 E R IV
WI - - C - - 6 E R IV
WY - - - C - 8 A R IV
Columns 1-5: S=Statutory Regulation, C=Constitutional Regulation.
Column 7: E=Elected by the Voters, A= Appointed by Governor or Legislature.
Column 8: R= Referendum Required for Debt Approval, NR= Referendum not Required.
Column 9: IV= Governor has Item Veto, NIV= Governor Does Not Have Item Veto.
Source: ACIR(1987)
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Table A.2: Budget Stabilization Funds from Wagner and Elder (2005)
State Year
Adopted
Deposit Rule Withdrawal Rule Fund Size
AL - - -
AK 1986 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation No limit
AZ 1990 Following a mathematical formula Following a mathematical formula Between 5 and 25%
AR - - -
CA 1985 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit No limit
CO 1983 If revenue growth is positive In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
CT 1979 In the event of a budget surplus If supermajority legislative approval 5% of budget or less
DE 1977 In the event of a budget surplus If supermajority legislative approval 5% of budget or less
DC - - -
FL 1959 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit Between 5 and 25%
GA 1976 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation No limit
HI 2000 By legislative appropriation If supermajority legislative approval No limit
ID 1984 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation No limit
IL 2000 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation No limit
IN 1982 Following a mathematical formula Following a mathematical formula Between 5 and 25%
IA 1992 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
KS 1993 If revenue growth is positive By legislative appropriation No limit
KY 1983 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
LA 1990 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation No limit
ME 1985 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
MD 1986 If revenue growth is positive By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
MA 1986 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
MI 1977 Following a mathematical formula Following a mathematical formula Between 5 and 25%
MN 1981 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation Between 5 and 25%
MS 1982 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation Between 5 and 25%
MO 1992 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
MT - - -
NE 1983 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit No limit
NV 1994 Following a mathematical formula In the event of a budget deficit Between 5 and 25%
NH 1987 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
NJ 1990 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
NM 1978 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
NY 1945 Following a mathematical formula In the event of a budget deficit No limit
NC 1991 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
ND 1987 In the event of a budget surplus Following a mathematical formula No limit
OH 1981 In the event of a budget surplus By legislative appropriation No limit
OK 1985 In the event of a budget surplus If supermajority legislative approval No limit
OR - - -
PA 1985 In the event of a budget surplus If supermajority legislative approval 5% of budget or less
RI 1985 By legislative appropriation In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
SC 1978 If revenue growth is positive In the event of a budget deficit No limit
SD 1991 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
TN 1972 If revenue growth is positive In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
TX 1987 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit Between 5 and 25%
UT 1986 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit Between 5 and 25%
VT 1988 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
VA 1992 Following a mathematical formula Following a mathematical formula Between 5 and 25%
WA 1981 In the event of a budget surplus If supermajority legislative approval 5% of budget or less
WV 1994 In the event of a budget surplus In the event of a budget deficit 5% of budget or less
WI 1981 If revenue growth is positive In the event of a budget deficit No limit
WY 1982 By legislative appropriation By legislative appropriation 5% of budget or less
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A.3 Robustness Checks for within-fiscal-year effects
Table A.3: Robustness Check I: Response of different outcomes to concurrent grant shocks with state
specific trends and lags of GDP and total expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borro. Cap. Out Maint. Other Total Disb. Gas Tax
Normalization Level Level Level Level Level
Shock 1779.664 0.079 0.228*** -0.096** 0.052
(1205.955) (0.062) (0.082) (0.048) (0.037)
Normalization Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap.
Shock 0.370** 0.076 0.225*** -0.099** 0.048
(0.151) (0.060) (0.080) (0.049) (0.035)
Normalization Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Level
Shock 0.048** 0.014 0.170*** -0.147*** 0.006











Standard errors in parentheses, clustered over state. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
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Table A.4: Response of different outcomes to shock in the current period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borro. (state) Cap. Out
(state)




Normalization Level Level Level Level Level
Shock 1041.938 0.042 0.114*** -0.180*** -0.017
(884.960) (0.046) (0.042) (0.064) (0.034)
Normalization Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap. Per Cap.
Shock -0.025 -0.073 0.114*** -0.181*** -0.020
(0.347) (0.125) (0.043) (0.064) (0.035)
Normalization Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share Tot Exp Share
Shock 0.007 -0.037 0.126*** -0.169*** 0.043











Standard errors in parentheses, clustered over state. Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, *** 1 percent.
A.4 Magnitude of Deferral
Table (A.5) presents the cumulative elasticities of per capita maintenance and its standard
errors with respect to grant shocks until the different horizons. At 5% discount rate, the
present value of elasticities (the cumulative elasticity) over the 10 years from the original
shock is 0.08. However, if we only consider the first 5 to 7 horizon estimates, the overall
effect is actually negative. However, considering that confidence bands on the periods 5 to 7
are as wide and those in periods 8 to 10, there is no good reason to exclude the later periods.
Also, at any discount rate above 11.7%, the overall effect is greater than zero independent of
the horizons included.As noted earlier, the 0.08 overall elasticity means that later increases
in maintenance expenditure do not make up for the initial decrease in response to a negative
shock. Given that the elasticity of current period per capita maintenance is 0.20, later
periods increases make up 60% of the initial decrease.
Alternatively, we can only use the statistically significant estimates. The results will be
the same as presented here, since only horizons 0 and 4 estimates are statistically significant
at the 10% level, and the current period effect is much larger in magnitude.
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Table A.5: Cumulative Response of Per Capita Maintenance to Shocks





0 0.201* 0.072 0.201 0.187
1 0.007 0.060 0.208 0.173
2 -0.048 0.076 0.165 0.163
3 -0.098 0.084 0.080 0.148
4 -0.091* 0.051 0.004 0.129
5 -0.056 0.047 -0.039 0.122
6 -0.015 0.032 -0.051 0.116
7 0.033 0.055 -0.027 0.113
8 0.073 0.076 0.022 0.106
9 0.162 0.135 0.127 0.093
10 -0.076 0.053 0.080 0.032
Cumulative Effect and its Std Errors were calculated using 5% discount rates.
With discount rates above 11.7% all the cumulative effects are greater than zero.
A.5 Anticipated Changes versus Unanticipated Shocks
As discussed earlier, the unanticipated shocks used in this paper include new information
and are thought to be exogenous to the economic and budgeting activities of the state.
However, we may wonder how the states react to anticipated budgetary changes. We can
think of anticipated changes through the lens of expectations.
In the current period, states governments have expectations over the next periods’ present
value of future funds and how that differs from this years. This difference measures their
anticipated change. However, next period, they receive new information about their current
and future funds. Hence, they update their expectations of the new period’s present value
of funds from what they had before. I measure this as the unanticipated shock. Notably,
the sum of this unanticipated shock and the expected change in present value of funds is
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Relationship between Maintenance Per Capita and Anticipated and Unanticipated Changes
Figure A.6: Per Capita Maintenance IRFs in response to Anticipated Changes and Unanticipated Shocks
Equation (A.1) summarizes this decomposition:
Et[PVj,t]− Et−1[PVj,t−1]
0.5× (Et[PVj,t] + Et−1[PVj,t−1])
=
Et[PVj,t]− Et−1[PVj,t]




0.5× (Et[PVj,t] + Et−1[PVj,t−1])
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (A.1) is basically our measure of antic-
ipated shock standardized using a different denominator. However, the common denomi-
nator makes gives the two factors a common scale.
Figure (A.6), shows the response of maintenance per capita to these two factors includ-
ing in my regressions simultaneously. There are serious concerns about endogeneity and
reverse causality of expected changes. That said, expected changes are correlated with
higher maintenance expenditures in the current period. This result immediately dies out in
later periods. The standard deviations of later periods are too large to conclude any solid
interpretations. However, the magnitude of the current period response is much larger than
that of unanticipated shocks. Also, note that the unanticipated shock effects are robust to
the inclusion of expected changes.
One interpretation of this findings is that whether expected or unexpected, maintenance
receives the immediate response from changes in state and local governments funds. The
results found, then, may be only reflecting that maintenance expenditures require less plan-
ning than other expenditures.
105




















0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)






0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)









0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)







0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Total Disb. (state and local)
IRF of outcomes (state and local), normalization: Per Capita
90% confidence interval






















0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)






0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)









0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)







0 2 4 6 8 10
Year(h)
Shock effect on Total Disb. (state and local)
IRF of outcomes (state and local), normalization: Level
90% confidence interval
Figure A.8: Impulse Response Functions for different outcomes
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A.7 Study of Heterogeneity in IRFs
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(b) IRFs of Per Capita outcomes with May Not Carry Over Debt to Next Fiscal Year
Requirement
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(b) IRFs of Per Capita outcomes with Referendum Debt Approval Requirement
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Figure A.12: Impulse Response Functions with Governors’ Election Year interactions (when governor is
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(b) Impulse Response Functions with Divided Government Indicator
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Figure A.14: Level and Interaction Effect of House Election Years (not controlling for year fixed effects)
A.7.3 Level Effects of Political Factors
The regression specifications in the main text identified the effect of election years through
their interaction with the shocks. This is because election years are highly synchronized
across the states, so year effects fully capture all election years. However, dropping the
year fixed effects from my main specification, I can estimate the level effects of election
years. For comparability with the results presented in Figure 1.4a, I continue to control for
shocks and their interaction with house election years.
Figure A.14 presents the house election level effects with no year fix effects. On the
left hand side chart, the dependent variable is maintenance share of total expenditure (logs)
at horizons 0-10, and the independent variable is an indicator for whether there was a
state house election in the same horizons. Clearly, there is a negative correlation between
house election years and maintenance share of highway expenditures. The striking biannual
pattern is indicative of the synchronized state house election years. The estimated level
effects at horizons 0,2,4, ... may be different from each other because the sample sizes are
different or the correlation between election years and other independent variables have
changed. Neither of these factors seems to be at work here. That is, the estimated level
effects are very similar.
On the right hand side figure, we see the analogue of Figure 1.4a, presented in the main
text. Although not statistically significant, the main relationships hold for the current period
effects: the initial response of maintenance is driven by the house election year. Since we
are basically controlling for every-other-year effect, we can see a similar zig-zag pattern to
the main effects throughout the IRFs.
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A.8 First Order Conditions
The first order conditions of the model are accordingly
∂L
∂τs






























Ks)] = 0 (A.6)
These conditions are used to derive the Euler equations.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Additional Proofs and Details
B.1.1 Derivation of Tax Differential
With the definition of the tax deduction, the mobility condition (2.1a) becomes:
Q̂j = (1− δτ ′)syp̂j − (1− τ ′)swŵj
= syp̂






























∗ − δτ ′syp̂j∗ + τ ′
[







1− τ ′ [δ + (1− δ)λL/λN ]
.
The tax multiplier now includes a second mechanism: higher prices lead to greater deduc-
tions, lowering taxes, and increasing prices further. It also softens the wage component of
the multiplier, by softening higher living costs. Thus, the tax multiplier is increasing in δ,
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and attains a maximum value of 1/(1 − τ ′) when δ = 1. Substituting in ŵj∗ and p̂j∗ from
(2.2b) and (2.2c) with τ ′ = 0, gives the tax differential in Equation (2.4) in terms of the
attributes.
B.1.2 State Taxes
The tax differential with state taxes is computed by including an additional component
based on wages and prices relative to the state average, as if state tax revenues are redis-






j − δτ ′syp̂j
)
+ τ ′S[sw(ŵ
j − ŵS)− δSsy(p̂j − p̂S)], (B.1)
where τ ′S and δS are are marginal tax and deduction rates at the state-level, net of federal
deductions, and ŵS and p̂S are the differentials for state S as a whole relative to the entire
country.
B.1.3 Inferring Trade and Home Productivity with Population Data
As derived in Albouy and Stuart (2015), solving Equations (2.12) and (2.15) identifies each
productivity from observable differentials N̂ j∗ , ŵ
j , and p̂j:
ÂjX =
θL[N̂
j − εN,Q(sypj − sw(1− τ)wj)] + φLεN,AY [ θLφLp






j − εN,Q(sypj − sw(1− τ)wj)]− φLεN,AX [ θLφLp




High excess population and high inferred costs imply high trade productivity. Low in-
ferred costs and high excess population imply high home productivity, with the latter effect
stronger as φL > θL.
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B.2 Theoretical Extensions
B.2.1 Multiple Household Types
For simplicity, ignore federal taxes and assume there are two types of fully mobile house-
holds, referred to as “a” and “b.” The most interesting case is when some members of each
type live in every city. The mobility conditions for each type are
ea(p, wa, u;Qa) = 0
eb(p, wb, u;Qb) = 0
I generalize the two zero-profit conditions with unit-cost functions that have factor-specific
productivity components.
cX(wa/AXa, wb/AXb, r/AXL, ı̄/AXL) = 1
cY (wa/AY a, wb/AY b, r/AY L, ı̄/AY K) = p
The terms AXa and AXb give the relative productivity of each worker type in the city.
Log-linearizing these equations:
syap̂− swaŵa = Q̂a
sybp̂− swbŵb = Q̂b
θNaŵa + θNbŵb + θLr̂ = ÂX
φNaŵa + φNbŵb + φLr̂ = ÂY
where θ denotes the cost-shares of each factor, and θaÂXa + θbÂXb + θLÂXL + θKÂXK ≡
ÂX and φaÂY a + φbÂY b + φLÂY L + φKÂY K ≡ ÂY . The additivity of these effects proves
that differences in productivity have the same first-order effects on prices regardless of the
factor they augment directly when weighted by the cost-share of that factor.
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Let the share of total income accruing to type aworker be µa = Nama/(Nama +Nbmb),
with the other share µb = 1− µa, and define the following income-weighted averages
sy ≡ µasya + µbsyb, sx ≡ 1− sy, ςy ≡ µasya/sy

















Then it is possible to show that the following capitalization formulas hold.















































Except for the terms in square brackets, ”[]”, these terms are otherwise identical to equa-
tions (2.2) without taxes. The bracketed term explains that wage and housing-cost differ-
ences increase in the quality-of-life of the labor type that is relatively more represented in
the traded-good sector, or decreasing in the quality-of-life of the labor type more repre-
sented in the home-good sector. The wage of a-types resembles the average wage except






















The model assumes that both types of households live in each city. This assumption is
easier to maintain if the type of labor they supply are imperfect substitutes in production.
Factor-specific productivity differences do have first-order effects on quantities in the
model. For example, in the case where partial elasticities of substitution across factors
within sectors are equal, the relative employment of a-types relative to b-types is





B.2.2 Multiple Home Goods
Suppose now that there is one type of household but two types of goods, 1 and 2, e.g.,
housing versus local services. Beeson and Eberts (1989) consider this situation but do not
solve for it completely. The four equilibrium conditions, using obvious definitions, are
written
e(p1, p2, u)/Q = m
cX(w, r, ı̄)/AX = 1
cY 1(w, r, ı̄)/AY 1 = p1
cY 2(w, r, ı̄)/AY 2 = p2
Log-linearizing these equations produces
sy1p̂1 + sy2p̂2 − swŵ = Q̂
θN ŵ + θLr̂ = ÂX
φN1ŵ + φL1r̂ − p̂1 = ÂY 1
φN2ŵ + φL2r̂ − p̂2 = ÂY 2
If we define an aggregate shares, prices, and home productivity appropriately



















then the main results generalize:





















Now a question is whether using a local price index based on only one home-good price,
e.g. the one for residential housing, p̂1, may be biased relative to using a more balanced
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local price index, p̂.1 Weighted by the relevant total expenditure share, the bias is given by
sy(p̂1 − p̂) =
1
λN


















If the cost structure of both home goods are the same, i.e., if φL1 = φL and φN1 = φN ,
then this collapses to −(sy − sy1)ÂY 1, i.e., the price index is only biased up in cities rel-
atively productive in the first home good. When the first home good is more land in-
tensive and less labor intensive than the second, i.e. if φL1 > φL and φN1 < φN2 then
an index based on the first home good will more strongly capitalize differences in ÂX .
In this case, the first good capitalizes differences in Q̂, ÂY 1, and ÂY 2 more strongly when
(1/λL − 1) (φL1/φL − 1) > (1/λN − 1) (φN1/φN − 1). This condition is expected to hold
as λL is probably much smaller than λN . In the extreme case, where the second good has the
same factor proportions as the traded good, i.e., φL2 = θL and φN2 = θN , p̂2 = ÂX − ÂY 2,
its price only capitalizes differences in its own productivity. Most capitalization occurs in
the first good.
The distinction between home goods and traded goods is somewhat artificial, as most
goods are a mixture of both. The key distinction being how land and labor-intensive the
goods are. The broader the definition of home goods, the larger is the effective share sy,
but the closer the cost shares φL and φN are to θL and θN . The capitalization effects on land
are unchanged so long as sR remains the same. The capitalization of Q and AY will also be
the same, so long as the ratio λL/λN remains constant. The only substantial change are for
AX in wages and prices: as the definition of home goods expands, (1−λL)/λN gets larger,
increasing the capitalization of AX .






























The basic parameter values are taken from Albouy (2009, 2016). Perhaps most notable
is the income share to wages of 75 percent, taken from Krueger (1999), and the share
of income to land of 10 percent. The reduced-form population elasticities are given and
explained in Albouy and Stuart (2015), which appear to explain local labor and market
and housing supply elasticities, as well as density differences across metro areas. For the
immobility parameter, we consider a value of ψ = 0.05 based loosely on values suggested
by Notowidigo’s (2013) estimates.
B.3.2 Haughwout (2002)
To recover the proper weights, we examined the numbers from Haughwout’s Table 4 to-
gether with some accounting in Note 10. A regression of “land price per acre” on “land
price elasticity” produces a value of an acre of land of $95,672. Similarly, the present-value
of a worker’s wage is $145,805 ($ 8,848 annually at a discount rate of 6 %).
Since the model equates land and housing, φL = 1, φK = φN = 0. This leaves three
effective parameters free, sy, θL, θK . Regressions on willingness to pay are also helpful:
for firms, the productivity equation gives 35,010×(land price per acre) + 356,350×(PV
wages per worker); for households, the quality of life equation gives 90,050*(land price
per acre) - 356,350*(PV wages per worker); in total value, 125,060*(land price per acre).
From this we infer that the typical city has 356,350 workers, 35,010 acres devoted to firms,
and 90,050 acres devoted to households - a split of 28 to 72 percent. Acreage in an average
city is 125,060, or 192.3 square miles, consistent with Haughwout’s Table 2. Thus, the
total value of land is $11.96 billion. The results also imply there are 2.85 workers per acre,
or 6.51 inhabitants per acre (Table 2). For the entire city, the present value of the wage bill
is $51.96 billion.
Thus, the acreage results imply λL = 0.280 = (1−sy)θL/[sy+(1−sy)θL]. λL = 0.280 =
(1 − sy)θL/sR. Each value of the wage bill to land sR/sw = 0.2301. Putting these two
expressions together sR = 0.2301sw = (1 − sy)θL/(0.280) or (1 − sy)θL = 0.064428sw
Finally, this leaves the parameter sI = (1 − sy)θI free. Since the chosen value for sw
is 0.75, we benchmark the other parameters to be comparable to Haughwout’s figures.
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Through accounting identities, this then fixes sI . Thus, the implicit parameterization is
then sy = 0.124, sR = 0.173, θL = 0.055, θN = 0.856. Total income, Nm, is equal to the
wage bill $51.96 billion divided by 0.75, or $69.28 billion.
Taking a value sw < 0.75, in the Haughwout calibration leads to a larger total income
and larger inferred values in the revised estimates. If the shares of income from land are
set equal, so that sR = 0.1 in Haughwout’s model, this produces a total income value of
$119,965 million, creating revised estimates that are an additional 72 percent higher. To
be conservative, and since land values are likely to be a larger source of income in central
cities, these higher values are not presented.
B.3.3 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009)
The mapping between our model and Glaeser and Gottlieb cannot be perfect, since theirs
effectively assumes absentee property and owners and that land in traded and nontraded
production are separate. Nevertheless, for this parameterization, we make use of several
quotes
• “Labor’s share in total output [1− α] may be two-thirds.”
• “We need a parameter estimate for 1−β, such as 0.3, the average share of household
spending on housing.”
• “One estimate of the share of nontraded capital, αγ, in production might be 0.1”
• “approximately 30 percent of housing costs are associated with land and permitting
across the United States... This suggests values of 0.4 for labor costs and 0.3 for
traded capital.”
We assume that the absentee owners consume only traded goods. Thus the effective
home good share is sy = (2/3)(3/10) = 1/5. For labor to receive 2/3 of income, we must
then set θN = 11/15. Then sw = (1−sy)θN +syφN = (4/5)(11/15) + (1/5)(2/5) = 2/3.
The rest then falls into place through accounting identities.2
2If owners are not truly “absentee,” then one option is simply to rebate the money back. Based on the cost
shares, labor receives 54 of income: s′w = (1− s′y)θN + s′yφN = 0.7(0.733) + 0.3(0.4) = 0.54. This leaves




The parameter values taken from Rappaport (2008a, b) are taken from his baseline cali-
bration in Table 3 of Rappaport (2008b). Note, that our model differs from his in that he
models leisure, and integrates quality-of-life, using CES aggregators.
B.4 Data and Estimation
Below we discuss issues with the data. With the exception of our instrumental variables
strategy, we largely follow Haughwout’s (2002) choice of variables wherever possible, and
adopt some of his notation as well. However, by collecting data for primary central cities of
84 U.S. metropolitan areas from 1974 to 2011, we vastly expand on the data sets previously
used in the literature. In order to construct housing price and wage differentials, we use
microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Census of Population, and American
Housing Survey (AHS). The city infrastructure variable, our main independent variable,
is built using the surveys of government finances 1905-2011. While our data sets include
information on the residents and their housing within each central city at each cross section,
measures of infrastructure are variable only across cities. For each of the samples, Table
B.4.1 below shows the years each city is available. Table B.2 provides detailed information
on the variables used from each data set and Table B.3 provides some summary statistics.
We use all available data sources to get the most accurate estimates of wage and housing
price differentials in the first stage. We estimate housing price differentials for owners and
renters using AHS, and Census of Population. Wage differentials are estimated for 17- to
55-year-old heads of households who are fully employed using all three data sets, including
CPS. The variables controlled for in the first stage are different, however, we control for
data set by year interactions in the second stage to combine our estimates.3
B.4.1 Infrastructure Stocks
The infrastructure measures are created using the surveys of city finances beginning in
1905, and cover multiple types of infrastructure and accounting methods. The replacement
value of public capital in place is estimated by applying the perpetual inventory technique
3See Table B.2 for a full list of control variables for each data set.
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Table B.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS
City Census and ACS CPS AHS National AHS Metro
Akron, OH 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Albuquerque, NM 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1995-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Atlanta, GA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1987,
1991, 1996, 2004
Austin, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Bakersfield, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Baltimore, MD 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991, 1998, 2007
Baton Rouge, LA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Birmingham, AL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1998
Boston, MA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1993, 1998, 2007
Buffalo, NY 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983, 1996, 2011 1976, 1979, 1984, 1988,
1994, 2002
Chattanooga, TN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Chicago, IL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
Cincinnati, OH 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986,
1990, 1998
Cleveland, OH 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, 2004
Colorado Springs, CO 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1995-2013 1985-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978
Columbus, OH 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1987,
1991, 1995, 2002
Corpus Christi, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
2004-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Dallas, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1994, 2002
Denver, CO 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979, 1983, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2004
Des Moines, IA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Detroit, MI 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1993
El Paso, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
2004-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Fort Lauderdale, FL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2003 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Fort Wayne, IN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Fort Worth, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1994, 2002
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
Fresno, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Grand Rapids, MI 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980
Greensboro, NC 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Houston, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991, 1998, 2007
Indianapolis, IN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, 2004
Jacksonville, FL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996





Kansas City, MO 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2002
Knoxville, TN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Las Vegas, NV 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2003 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979
Lexington, KY 1980, 2000, 2005-2012 1985-2013 1985-2011B, 1996
Little Rock, AR 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Los Angeles, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985,
1989
Madison, WI 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1977, 1981
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
Memphis, TN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1980, 1984,
1988, 1992, 1996, 2004
Miami, FL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2002, 2007
Milwaukee, WI 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1979, 1984, 1988,
1994, 2002
Minneapolis, MN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1993, 1998, 2007
Mobile, AL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Modesto, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1985-2011B, 1996
Montgomery, AL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1995-2013 1985-2011B, 1996
Nashville, TN 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
New Orleans, LA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2004, 2009
New York, NY 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987,
1991




1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1987,
1991





Oklahoma City, OK 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, 2004
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
Omaha, NE 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979
Orlando, FL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981
Philadelphia, PA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1985,
1989




1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1985,
1989, 1994, 2002
Pittsburgh, PA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2004
Portland, OR 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983, 1996, 2011 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2002
Providence, RI 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1998
Raleigh, NC 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1985-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979
Rochester, NY 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986,
1990, 1998
Rockford, IL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2007B, 1996,
2011
Sacramento, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1983, 1996,
2004
Salt Lake City, UT 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1980, 1984,
1988, 1992, 1998
San Antonio, TX 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1986,
1990, 1995, 2004
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
San Diego, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1987,
1991, 1994, 2002
San Francisco, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978, 1982, 1985,
1989, 1993, 1998
San Jose, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2004 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1984, 1988, 1993, 1998




1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981, 1986,
1990, 1994, 2002
Santa Rosa, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1985-2011B, 1996
Seattle, WA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987,
1991, 1996, 2004, 2009
Shreveport, LA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1995-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Spokane, WA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981
Springfield, MA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1975, 1978
St. Louis, MO 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987,
1991, 1996, 2004
Stockton, CA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Tacoma, WA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2003 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981
Tampa, FL 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1975-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1985, 1989, 1993, 1998,
2007
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TableB.1: List of Cities Available in U.S. Census, CPS, and AHS (continued)
Toledo, OH 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Tucson, AZ 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2012
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Tulsa, OK 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Virginia Beach, VA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1976-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Wichita, KS 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996 1974, 1977, 1981
Worcester, MA 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005-
2011
1985-2013 1974-1981, 1983-2011B, 1996
Data sets: Census of Population and American Community Survey (Census and ACS), Current Population Survey (CPS), American Housing Survey (AHS), National and Metropolitan.
Year Suffix “B”: biannual.
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to get gross-of-depreciation capital investment flows from 1905 to the present. Similar to
Haughwout (2002), we divide capital investment into three different types: 1) construc-
tion, 2) land and existing structures (L&ES), and 3) equipment when possible.4 How-
ever, the survey of city finances does not allow us to distinguish among the three types
of capital spending. We can identify total investment spending, total construction, total
non-construction spending, and general investment spending.
Equipment is only separately identifiable in the unit level data sets, which are currently
only available in years 1943–1950, 1987–1992, and 1995–2011. In other years, we will
have construction and other capital outlays, which include equipment and land and existing
structures. Given that the rates of depreciation for the latter two categories are significantly
different, we impute the equipment expenditures in other years. We use the average histor-
ical shares of equipment, and land and existing structures to create appropriate shares.
The most thorough and accurate capital series we could construct was patched together
from several sources and are as follows. For 1987–1992 and 1995–2011, we construct
the exact spending by all American city and state governments on different types of cap-
ital in different sectors. For 1993–1994, only the total spending and construction num-
bers are known exactly. The L&ES and equipment numbers were created by taking city-
specific historical averages from 1987–1992 and 1995–2011 and applying those to the non-
construction spending. For 1951–1986, construction and total spending numbers are exact
for all cities; non-construction spending is allocated into L&ES and equipment in the same
way that 1993 and 1994 was. The shares of the L&ES and equipment in general expendi-
tures are applied to total expenditure minus construction to get total L&ES and equipment.
Finally, prior to 1951 data are available only for spending in larger cities, starting in
1905.5. It is impossible to distinguish between construction, L&ES and equipment for
1943–1950. So the shares of the different types of capital in capital outlays are taken and
4Construction: Production, additions, replacements, or major structural alterations to fixed works, under-
taken either on a contractual basis by private contractors or through a governments own staff. Purchase of
Land and Existing Structures: Acquisition of these assets as such by outright purchase; payments on capital
lease-purchase agreements or installment purchase contracts; costs associated with eminent domain (includ-
ing purchase of rights-of-way); and tax or special assessment foreclosure. Purchase of Equipment: Purchase
and installation of apparatus, furnishings, motor vehicles, office equipment, and the like having a life ex-
pectancy of more than five years. Other Than Construction: This object category represents the combined
definitions for “Purchase of Land and Existing Structures” plus “Purchase of Equipment.” We construct state
and local infrastructure stocks following the perpetual inventory approach as used by Haughwout and Inman
(1996) and Haughwout. Similarly, we use depreciation rate of 0.11 for equipment, 0.0182 for construction,
and 0.01638 for land and existing structures.
5Compendium of Government Finances and Historical Statistics on State and Local Governmental (1905-
1951) is not digitized. So, we manually enter the data from PDF files.
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applied to total expenditure. Finally, we interpolate the missing data points in our data set
to impute the capital outlays for the years before each city first appears in our data set.
We also construct a series of state infrastructure stocks via Census Bureau state govern-
ment investment data. When doing so, we do not double count city infrastructure spending
because individual government units complete the Census surveys, and the state govern-
ment does not report city government spending. Of course, state governments invest in
cities, so the local infrastructure stock does not actually represent an estimate of the total
infrastructure stock present within a city; the local infrastructure stock is an estimate of the
infrastructure stock created by local government. The data are available from years 1942-
2011 6. Before 1950, the government investment data are available bi-annually. We create
an annual investment measure by averaging the adjacent non-missing years.7
Figure B.1 plots the four central variables — housing-cost differentials, wage-differentials,
population, and infrastructure stocks — for our four largest central cities: New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, and Houston.
B.4.2 Amenity Controls
We use several variables to control for city characteristics not captured by infrastucture.
The rate of violent crimes per 100,000 residents, which we call the crime rate, is taken
from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) published by the FBI.8 For the handful of months
with missing data, we use the previous month’s value. There are a few cases where the
crime rate is implausibly zero, e.g. Oakland 1995, Cincinnati 1997 and Baltimore 1999,
which we attribute to missing data.
Haughwout uses both state and city level income and sales tax rates from Significant
Features of Fiscal Federalism published by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations. Unfortunately, this Commission is now defunct. We are not aware of a
centralized database of city-level income and sales taxes. As a result, we do not have city
level income or sales tax rates. We have data on the top state income tax rate, bottom state
income tax rate, and state sales tax rate.9
6Data for Alaska and Hawaii are available beginning in 1959, the year in which they became states. Data
for Washington D.C. is available beginning in 1951, the year in which it was first surveyed.
7For example, if year t data are missing, we construct LGj,t = (LGj,t−1 + LGj,t+1)/2.
8We obtained the UCR series from Justin McCrarys website, http://emlab.berkeley.edu/ jmccrary/UCR/.
9We thank Nathan Seegert for providing us with this data, which he compiled from The Book of the States
and other sources, as described in Seegert (2012).
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Three variables that describe cities climate amenities are mean annual heating days,
mean annual cooling days and mean annual rainfall. We obtained these data from the
National Climatic Data Center and smoothed out effects of weather anomalies by using
10-year averages. Data for both 1980–1989 and 1990–1999 are available.
We obtain city level student to full-time teacher equivalent ratios from the Department
of Education Common Core of Data. There are some issues with this data. First, several
years are missing: 1981, 1979, 1977, 1976. Second, there are mistakes in some of the
older files, as some pupil-teacher rates are unreasonably high or low. To account for this,
we drop the outliers and use MA-3 smoothing and interpolation to impute these cases.
Finally, for years 1973-1975, only the number of full-time teachers and part-time teachers
was published. Hence, we assume that a part-time teacher is equivalent to 0.5 of a full-time
teacher in those surveys and calculate the full-time teacher equivalent ratio by hand.
Table B.2: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables
Dependent variables: vary by house (i), region (j) and time (t).
Source: American Housing Survey, Decennial Census. 1974-2011
1. HV, House and land value, continuous.
Source: American Housing Survey, Decennial Census, and Consumer Population Survey,
1974-2011
2. W, Annual wages and salaries, head of household, continuous.
HQ vector: house quality controls, vary by house (i), region (j) and time (t).
Source (a): American Housing Survey, 1974-2011
1. No. of bathrooms: polychotomous, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.51
2. No. of bedrooms: polychotomous, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61
3. Basement: dichotomous, 0-1
4. Condominium: dichotomous, 0-1
5. Central air conditioning: dichotomous, 0-1
6. Detached unit: dichotomous, 0-1
7. Garage present: dichotomous, 0-1 10
8. Age of house: continuous
9. No. of other rooms: continuous (=total rooms-bedrooms-bathrooms)
10. Public sewerage hookup: dichotomous, 0-1
11. Heating equipment: polychotomous (warm air, electric, steam, other)
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TableB.2: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables (continued)
12. House quality rating: polychotomous (excellent, good, fair, poor)
13. Central city indicator: dichotomous, 0-1
Source (b): Decennial Census and American Community Survey, 1980, 1990, 2000, and
2005-2011
1. No. of rooms: polychotomous, N/A, 1, 2, ... , 9, and 10+
2. Condominium: dichotomous, 0-1
3. Number of units in structure: polychotomous, Mobile home or trailer, 2 family building,
3-4 family building, 5-9 family building, One unit- unspecified type, 10+ units in structure
(CPS)
4. Heating equipment: polychotomous (warm air, electric, steam, other)
5. Commercial use: dichotomous, 0-1
6. Acreage: polychotomous, N/A, less than 1, 1-9, and 10+ acres
7. Built year: polychotomous, Before 1940, 1940-49, 1950-49, ..., 2000+
8. Complete Plumbing: dichotomous, 0-1
9. Own Kitchen: dichotomous, 0-1
10. Interaction of the above with ownership status.
HC vector: head of household human capital controls, vary by house (i), region (j), and
time (t).
Source (a): American Housing Survey, 1974-2011
1. Age: continuous
2. Education: polychotomous (no school, elementary, some HS, HS graduate, some col-
lege,
College graduate, graduate school)
3. Married: dichotomous, 0-1
4. White: dichotomous, 0-1
5. Hispanic: dichotomous, 0-1
Source (b) & (c): Decennial Census and American Community Survey, 1980, 1990, 2000,
and 2005-2011 & Current Population Survey, 1974-2011
1. Educational: polychotomous with 12 categories
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TableB.2: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables (continued)
2. A quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of
education,
continuous
3. Industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification): polychotomous with 9 categories
4. Employment at the one-digit level (1950 classification): polychotomous with 12 cate-
gories
5. Marital status, polychotomous (married, divorced, widowed, separated)
6. Veteran status, dichotomous, 0-1; and veteran status interacted with age
7. Minority status, polychotomous (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other)
8. Immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status interacted
with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other. (Not in CPS)
9. English proficiency, polychotomous (none, poor, or well) (Not in CPS)
STS and LTS: local and state tax and service vectors, vary by region ( j) and year (t).
Sources: Government Finances (GF) series (Census a, various years); Signicant Features
of Fiscal Federalism (ACIR, various years); US Bureau of the Census, 1974-1991; Digest
of Educational Statistics (DES), (Department of Education, various years); Uniform Crime
Reports (UCR), (FBI, various years).
1. Mean city effective property tax rate: continuous, Source: AHS
2. State income tax rate: continuous
3. State sales tax rate: continuous 11
4. Serious crimes per 100 000 population: continuous, UCR
5. Student-teacher ratio in city schools: continuous, Department of Education Common
Core of Data
6. City infrastructure stock: Continuous, GF and authors’ calculations
7. State infrastructure stock: continuous, GF and authors’ calculations
A: unproduced amenities, vary by region ( j).
Source: US Bureau of the Census (1980-2000 Avg.)) and authors’ calculations.
1. Coastal status: dichotomous, 0-1, authors’ calculations
2. Mean annual rainfall: continuous
3. Mean annual heating degree days: continuous
136
TableB.2: Descriptions, Levels of Variation, and Sources for Key Variables (continued)
4. Mean cooling degree days: continuous
B.5 Estimation
We use a two-level hierachical linear model to determine whether city infrastructure can
account for any of the variance in land prices and wages across cities and over time. At
the first level we estimate rent and wage the city fixed effects after controlling for housing
quality and human capital variables. This enables us to compare homogeneous units of
observations over time and space.
B.5.1 Stage 1: Housing-Cost, Wage, and Population Differentials
The first-stage regression equations are:
lnHVi,j,t = α1HQi,j,t + α2,j,tCjTt + εi,j,t (B.6)
lnWi,j,t = β1HCi,j,t + β2,j,tCjTt + µi,j,t (B.7)
lnPopj,t = ζ0 + ζ2,j,tCjTt + θj,t (B.8)
where i indexes individual observations, j indexes cities, t indexes years, HV is self-
reported house value, HQ are house quality controls, W is annual wage, HC are human
capital controls, C and T are city and time dummies, and ε and µ are standard residual
terms. We are interested in the coefficients α2,j,t and β2,j,t, which we take as composition-
adjusted housing prices and wages. ζ2,j,t indicates population differentials.
Consistent estimation of these coefficients requires that housing quality and worker qual-
ity do not vary systematically across cities. All regressions are estimated by OLS and
weighted using AHS, CPS, and Census of sample size weights12.
10Age of the house is computed as a function of when the house is reported to have been built. Those data
are reported in interval form. The midpoint of the interval is used as the year of construction. When bottom
coding is relevant (for old homes), the house is assumed to have been built during the bottom code year.
11We thank Nathan Seegert for providing us with this data, which he compiled from The Book of the States
and other sources, as described in Seegert (2012).
12In Particular, we use the square root of average annual sample size which are 1.00, 1.29, 11.13, and 13.74
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics
(1) (2)
Mean Std. Dev.
Census Housing cost differential -0.14 0.51
Census HCD: Owners -0.18 0.51
Census Wage Differential -0.07 0.11
National AHS Housing cost differential -0.61 0.69
National AHS HCD: Owners -0.18 0.44
National AHS Wage Differential -0.08 0.20
Metro AHS Housing cost differential -0.58 0.63
Metro AHS HCD: Owners 0.17 0.43
Metro AHS Wage Differential -0.14 0.49
All AHS Housing cost differential -0.58 0.68
All AHS HCD: Owners -0.13 0.44
All AHS Wage Differential -0.08 0.21
CPS Wage Differential -0.02 0.11
Central City Population (Log of thousands) 12.86 0.77
Central City Infrastructure Stock ($Billions) 7.44 17.76
Avg. Annual Precipitation 37.78 14.50
Avg. Cooling Degree Days in 65 1,389 946
Avg. Heating Degree Days in 65 4,125 2,059
City on Sea 0.34 0.47
City on Lake 0.10 0.30
Student/Teacher Ratio 18.04 4.42
Top Inc. Tax Rate 5.28 3.87
Bottom Inc. Tax Rate 1.75 1.69
State and Local Sales Tax Rate 4.96 1.29
State Infrastructure Stock ($Billions) 65 47.86
# Violent Crimes per 100K 1,121 636
Source: Difference sources listed in Table B.2, 1980-2011. There are 85 distinct cities in our sample.
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B.5.2 Level 2: Estimating the Effect of Infrastructure
The second stage of the estimation strategy involves examining whether the variance in
composition-adjusted prices can be accounted for by a vector of climate characteristics
(Aj), local and state marginal income tax rates, violent crime rate, and student-teacher
ratio (LTSj,t, STSj,t), version k ∈ {1, . . . , 5} of local infrastructure stock (LGkj,t), and the
state infrastructure stock (SGj,t) 13.
The regression equations are
α̂2,d,j,t = γ1Aj + γ2LTSj,t + γ3STSj,t + γ4LG
k
j,t + γ5SGj,t + γ6Lj,2000 + νj,t (B.9)
β̂2,d,j,t = δ1Aj + δ2LTSj,t + δ3STSj,t + δ4LG
k
j,t + δ5SGj,t + δ6Lj,2000 + ηj,t (B.10)
ζ̂2,j,t = φ1Aj + φ2LTSj,t + φ3STSj,t + φ4LG
k
j,t + φ5SGj,t + φ6Lj,2000 + ξj,t (B.11)
where α̂2,d,j,t and β̂2,d,j,t are the estimated housing quality adjusted house values and human
capital adjusted wages for sample d, city j, time t respectively; and ζ̂2,j,t are the population
differentials.
We estimate these regressions using pooled OLS and with city and year fixed effects.
Since we use the prices from three different data sets, we include data set indicator variables
in OLS estimates and use year by data set indicators instead of year indicators in city and
year fixed effect regressions.
We estimate wage and rent elasticity of local infrastructure from B.9 and B.10 and esti-
mate average willingness to pay for infrastructure by households and firms using the for-
mulas from the theoretical model.
B.6 Supplementary Results and Robustness
In this section we present further results focused on the relationship between infrastructure
and commuting time, and intra-MSA and inter-MSA spillover effects. At the end, we check
the sensitivity of our results to exclusion of different cities.
1. Transportation Costs and Commuting Time. Higher investment in city infras-
tructure can reduce the transportation costs, and facilitates commuting. In this section,
we investigate the magnitude of such a relationship. As shown in Table B.4 below, this
for National and Metro samples of AHS, Census of Population, and CPS, respectively.
13See Table B.2 for a complete list of the variables used in each of these categories.
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is particularly relevant for our sample because highways and transportation utilities com-
pose 19.5% of total capital outlays in our cities. Since we readily have such composition
for years after 1950, we can’t construct highway and transportation infrastructure stock
measures. However, we can test whether the stock of infrastructure is facilitating the com-
muting between the employment and residential locations.
Table B.4: Component shares of investment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Total Educ-Cap Outlay (% of total) 3.867 11.371 0 98.946 3,471
Gen Pub Bldg-Cap Out (% of total) 1.909 4.869 0 72.146 3,471
Total Hospital-Cap Out (% of total) 0.650 3.107 0 61.747 3,471
Total Highways-Cap Out (% of total) 18.576 14.81 0 90.658 3,471
Hous & Com-Cap Outlay (% of total) 7.182 12.698 0 100 3,471
Parks & Rec-Cap Outlay (% of total) 5.896 8.703 0 67.703 3,471
Sanitation-Cap Out (% of total) 7.197 9.864 0 91.601 3,471
Sewerage-Cap Outlay (% of total) 8.886 10.644 0 81.057 3,471
General NEC-Cap Out (% of total) 24.866 19.484 0 100 3,471
Liquor Stores-Cap Out (% of total) 0.002 0.143 0 8.401 3,471
Total Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 20.969 20.986 0 99.529 3,471
Water Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 14.566 15.391 0 92.705 3,471
Elec Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 5.037 14.649 0 86.354 3,471
Gas Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 0.451 2.366 0 47.786 3,471
Transit Util-Cap Outlay (% of total) 0.914 3.379 0 46.1 3,471
Calculated using the data from City Government Finances 1950-2006 for our sample of cities.
We estimate commuting time differentials using the same Census of Population and AHS
samples used for wages, applying the methodology of Albouy and Lue (2015). We regress
the square root of commuting time on the same controls used for the wage equation. The
differential is then constructed using ĈT j = 2µCTj /
¯√CT where ¯
√
CT is the average of
square-root commuting time14.
In the second stage, we then regress the commuting time differentials on stocks of infras-
tructure and the same other control variables used for wage, rent, and population regres-
sions. Table B.5 shows the regression coefficients for different specifications for central
cities and suburbs.
2. The Effect of Central City Infrastructure on Suburbs Not only higher levels of in-
frastructure in central cities benefits the residence of them, but also the residence of nearby
14We use square root since Albouy and Lue (2015) found that it fits the data better, and as it accommodates
reports of zero commuting time
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Table B.5: The relationship between Infrastructure Stocks and Commuting time






Log N 0.182*** 0.138***
(0.019) (0.017)
Log C,Y 0.083** 0.044
(0.034) (0.027)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
suburbs may benefit from it. Since the available investment data does not fully cover the
suburbs of metropolitan areas, we cannot calculate the infrastructure stocks for the sub-
urbs and how those stocks react to central city investments. However, we test the presence
of intra-MSA spillover effects by investigating whether higher central city infrastructure
has spillover effects on the suburbs. We can do so by estimating the relationship between
central city infrastructure and the welfare and productivity of the suburbs.
In our regressions, the infrastructure measures of the suburbs are the missing variable.
Consequently, we are overestimating the direct effect of central city infrastructure on the
suburbs if suburban infrastructure stocks are positively co-moving with the central city
stocks. On the other hand, if the central city infrastructure crowds out suburban invest-
ments, we are underestimating the direct effects. This is straightforward from the omitted
variable bias formula in linear regression.
Table B.6 shows positive and statistically significant effects of central city infrastructure
on suburban wage and housing price differentials.
3. Sensitivity of the Results to large cities In this section we show how sensitive the
main results are to removing certain cities in our sample. We do this by estimating the main
second stage results while excluding each city from the sample. Repeating this exercise 84
times, we present the average coefficients and p-values in Table B.7 below.
The log-log specification estimates are fairly robust to exclusion of different cities from
our sample. This is consistent with precision of these estimates presented earlier. Re-
assuringly, if we treat the range of these estimates as alternative confidence bands, our
conclusions will be similar to those drawn from the confidence bands of the full sample
estimates.
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Log N 0.123*** 0.137*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.475***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.063)
Log C, Y 0.105* -0.068 0.076***
0.048**
0.386*** 0.422***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.023) (0.020) (0.071) (0.083)
1. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2. In column 2, “N” indicates no fixed effects and “C,Y”, city and year fixed effects.
Table B.7: City Exclusion Robustness
Log Specification
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Housing cost
Coefficient 0.106 0.007 0.085 0.124
P-Value 0.086 0.021 0.044 0.159
Wage
Coefficient 0.077 0.003 0.069 0.086
P-Value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003
Place Population (Log)
Coefficient 0.386 0.009 0.347 0.407
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
142
Figure B.1: Price, Wage, Population and Infrastructure Values for the Four Largest Central Cities
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APPENDIX C
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Supplemental Figures
Figure C.1 simply switches axis of figure 3.3 of the main text, and presents the confidence
































−4 −2 0 2 4
New Coefficients
Labor Force Participation Usual Weekly Hours of Market Work
Usual Weekly Hours of Housework Weekly Residual Time
GM’s Table 2 Coefficients vs. My Coeficients
Figure C.1: Gelber and Mitchell (2012)’s Table 2 ANTR coefficients with 95% confidence bands versus
TAXSIM Imputed Coefficients by color-coded by dependent variable
Notes: ANTR refers to the average net-of-tax rate, calculated using income imputed with demographics, as described in the text. The
average net-of-tax rate is the percentage of income that a woman would keep if she participated in the labor force. Vertical lines
represent 95% confidence bands. The results are for all empirical specifications. For description of specifications and color-coded
comparisons by specification see Figure 3.4.
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